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THE PRICE-RIGIDITY PUZZLE ON A MICRO-ISLAND 
Small open economies are price takers in the world market due to their small market 
shares.  In general, developing economies have little control over their export and import prices 
(Agenor & Montiel, 1999).  Rather, their domestic prices are supposed to follow the world 
prices.  Contrary to this expectation, prices in the commodity markets seem to be sticky on the 
Caribbean micro-island of Curaçao (Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance [CCMF], 2011).  
This finding challenges the hypothesis of price flexibility in small developing economies.  The 
phenomenon is a puzzle and raises the question of how to account for the price rigidity in 
Curaçao.  The prime objective of this dissertation is to explain this price-rigidity puzzle. 
Markets can be affected by an unexpected disturbance, which is called a shock.  Shocks 
may occur on a firm/sector-specific level or on a mcro-level.  The most common shocks at the 
firm or sector-specific level are demand, cost, and idiosyncratic shocks.  Shocks at the macro-
level can broadly be divided into demand and supply shocks.  A shock in a market with a well-
functioning market-clearing mechanism is followed by an instantaneous adjustment in price, 
quantity, or both.  A failure of market-clearing is mainly caused by price rigidities (Greenwald & 
Stiglitz, 1989; van Bergeijk, Haffner, & Waasdorp, 1993).  
Prices may adjust slowly1 or quickly in response to a shock.  Thus, the observation of 
price adjustments centers on their “speed” after a shock.  Frequent price adjustment or a high 
speed to change the price corresponds to a short period between a shock and the adjustment in 
price.  A high speed of price adjustment, implying an immediate adjustment in price after a 
                                                 
1 The words “infrequent,” “rarely,” or “sluggish” are also used.  Price adjustment can be full or partial. 
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shock, results in flexible prices, while a low speed of price adjustment, suggesting a lag in price 
adjustment after a shock, results in so-called sticky prices. 
The concepts of sticky versus flexible prices and the duration of a price spell are 
presented in Figures 1.1 and 1.2.  These figures represent the price trajectories of two different 
articles—“A” and “B”—in the same outlet during the period of t1	t2.  A price trajectory is a 
series of price quotes for a specific article of a particular brand observed in a specific outlet.  
After a shock, price adjustments may occur.  The periods in a price trajectory during which the 
price remains unchanged are called price spells.  During the t1	t2 period, three common shocks 
(shocks 1, 2, and 4) to both price trajectories and one idiosyncratic shock (shock 3) to product 
“B” occurred.  
 
Figure 1.1. Price trajectory of good "A" 
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Figure 1.2. Price trajectory of good "B" 
The price trajectory of product “A” shows that despite the shocks in the t1t2 period, 
prices remained unchanged; hence, product “A” has one price spell.  The price trajectory of 
product “B” has two price spells, as prices changed twice in the period of t1  t2.  Hence, good 
“B” has a higher price change frequency than good “A.”  Good “B” has shorter price spells than 
good “A” from the periods of t1 to the occurrence of shock 3 and from shock 3 to t2.  Thus, the 
price of good “B” is more “flexible” and the price of good “A” is “stickier,” in the period of 
t1t2. 
The speed of price adjustment is measured using either the price change frequency or the 
duration of price spells.  The price change frequency is defined by how often prices change in a 
specific timeframe.  Hence, the size of the price adjustment (full or partial) is not considered 
when measuring price change frequencies. 
Whether a firm is able to change its price also depends on the market structure.  In perfect 
competitive markets, firms are price takers.  In this type of market structure, firms jointly adjust 
their given price after a shock.  In contrast, each firm in an imperfect competitive or 
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monopolistic market can decide whether to adjust the price after a shock.  When a firm keeps the 
prices unchanged, they may be sticky.  
1.1. The Price Rigidity Hypotheses from a Micro-Island Perspective 
The mainstream (New Keynesian) hypotheses/theories n price rigidities can be broadly 
categorized into the (a) menu cost, (b) staggered price, (c) sticky-information (Appendix 1A), 
and (d) other pricing hypotheses.  The New Keynesia theories that may explain the price-
rigidity puzzle in Curaçao are analyzed in this section. See Appendix 1A for an extensive 
analysis of the price rigidity theories that may or may not apply to Curaçao.  
The price-point hypothesis in the category of state-dependent pricing (SDP) menu cost 
theories offers a plausible explanation for the sticky prices on Curaçao. Price points (or 
attractive pricing) occur when firms have a price strategy of setting prices ending with 9 cents, 
99 cents, or 5 cents.  Levy, Lee, Chen, Kauffman, and Bergen (2011) found that prices ending 
with “9” have a lower probability of changing than prices with non-9 endings.  Price points with 
price endings at 5 (e.g., 45 cents) or 9 (e.g., 79 cents) were found for 60% of the observed prices 
of the database of the Central Bureau of Statistics of Curaçao consumer price quotes for Curaçao 
in the period of October 2006March 2010.  Hence, attractive pricing is a plausible source of 
price rigidity in Curaçao. 
The implicit contracts in the staggered price hypothesis are informal, long-term 
agreements between firms and their customers.  As each contract has its own renewal time, it 
causes staggered and sticky pricing.  In the small and medium-sized neighborhood stores in 
Curaçao, the sellers know their customers and may even be on a first name basis, as their 
relationships have lasted a long time.  This long-term customer–seller relationship may influence 
the frequency of changing prices, as the focus of the seller is on maintaining the old price “for 
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old times’ sake,” even in the face of a shock.  Hence, the hypothesis of implicit contracts is likely 
to apply in Curaçao.   
Other explanations for causes of staggered pricing are found in the time-dependent 
pricing (TDP) models (Calvo, 1983; Taylor, 1980).  TDP models assume exogenous price 
adjustments that are independent of the state of the economy.  The Taylor model assumes that 
firms change their prices every nth period, while in the Calvo model, the change in prices occurs 
randomly.  The TDP hypothesis may apply to Curaçao, as its regulated prices are adjusted 
randomly or periodically (see Appendix 1A). 
The other pricing hypotheses consist of fair pricing, tacit collusion, and the fear of 
competitors’ reaction.  In the fair pricing models (Rotemberg, 2002, 2011), firms may stabilize 
prices out of an obligation of “fairness” to their consumers (Rotemberg, 2011).  Price increases 
that are caused by cost increases are perceived as fair.  In contrast, price increases resulting from 
a rise in demand are considered unreasonable.  Consequently, firms do not always change the 
price following a demand shock, which may lead to price rigidity.  This hypothesis may apply to 
Curaçao, as firms in a small, close-knit community may be sensitive to the adverse publicity 
from antagonized customers reacting to the “unfairness” of price increases due to demand 
shocks.  
In the hypothesis of tacit collusion, oligopolies “join forces” to achieve a joint 
maximization of profit by agreeing on the levels of price and/or output (Lipsey, Purvis, & 
Steiner, 1991).  With the small market size of Curaçao, firms are likely to join forces and engage 
in tacit collusions (see Appendix 1A). 
The theory of the fear of competitors’ reaction is also known as the kinked demand curve 
(Lipsey et al., 1991).  The oligopolist assumes that e competitor ignores price increases 
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because this will result in a loss in the price-increasing firm’s market share.  Moreover, the 
oligopolist assumes that price reductions will be matched.  Fear of the competition’s reaction in 
the oligopolistic markets of Curaçao is likely to apply, as cooperative behavior among firms in a 
small community will increase their joint profit maximization.  Table 1.1 summarizes the price 
rigidity theories/hypotheses and the corresponding models that may apply to Curaçao.  
 
Table 1.1 
The Price Rigidity Theories/Hypotheses for Curaçao 
Theory/hypothesis of price rigidity Models 
1. Menu costs hypothesis: 




2. Staggered pricing hypothesis:   
- TDPa TDP 
- Implicit contractsb  
3. Other pricing hypotheses:  
- Kinked demand curve a  
- Fair pricing b Fair pricing model 
- Tacit collusion a  
Notes. 
a. Yes: the theory is likely to apply to Curaçao and data are available. 
b. Yes, no data/information available: the theory is likely to apply to 
Curaçao, and the data to test this theory are not available for Curaçao. 
. 
 
The price-rigidity theories/hypotheses of attractive pricing, TDP, implicit contracts, fear 
of competition’s reaction (kinked-demand curve), fair pricing, and tacit collusion may explain 
the price rigidity in Curaçao.  To test the implicit ontracts hypotheses, panel data of information 
of the seller and the customer are necessary.  For the testing of tacit collusion theory, levels of 
prices and outputs of all participants in the oligopolistic markets are required.  For fair pricing, a 
survey of consumers on fair pricing is needed.  The theories/hypotheses that can be tested using 
the available data are as follows: attractive pricing, TDP, tacit collusion, and the fear of 
competitors’ reaction. 
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1.2. The Political Interference Hypothesis from a Micro-Island Perspective 
In addition to the previous price-rigidity theories, which are market-based, market 
intervention by the government may also lead to price igidity.  The concept of political 
interference in this dissertation refers to government intervention in the price setting of 
commodities.  I discuss the impact of three forms of political interference abstracted from the 
field of political science on the price setting in a micro-island.  The three forms are: price 
regulation (Peltzman, 1993), political business cycle (Schuknecht, 1996), and regulatory capture 
(Dal Bo, 2006; Peltzman, 1976; Shapiro, 2012).  
  Price regulation was introduced in the 1960s in Curaçao based on incomes and anti-
inflationary policies (P. B. No. 117, 1961).  Regulated prices are changed are changed at random, 
or periodically (De Minister van Financien, 2015).  These regulated price changes are time-
dependent, which may cause sticky prices (see Appendix 1B).  
According to the political business cycle theory, the political party in power takes only 
those decisions that favor their re-election (Schuknecht, 1996).  Similarly, decisions that would 
be unpopular, such as price increases in the regulated energy sector, are not made in the 
immediate pre-election periods in Curaçao.  Price in reases in the energy sector are perceived as 
a deal-breaker for an upcoming election.  A price decline in the energy sector, in contrast, is 
expected to be supported by the electorate.  Therefor , in pre-election periods in Curaçao, it is 
unlikely that the international energy price increas s will lead to domestic energy price increases.  
However, international energy price declines in the pre-election period most probably will be 
passed on to residents of Curaçao.  Over the long term, such a phenomenon may have resulted in 
prices remaining unchanged for an extended period in pre-election times.  
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Regulatory capture2 is the “process through which special interests affect state 
intervention in any of its forms” (Dal Bo, 2006, p. 203).  An example of regulatory capture can 
be seen in the energy sector in Curaçao.  In 2005, the interest groups (the consumers) in Curaçao 
“pressured” the government not to comply with the proposal of companies in the energy sector to 
increase prices following the cost increases occurred due to the international oil price hikes 
(Antilliaans Dagblad, 2005a, p. 5).  In reaction, the government establi hed the “Energy Fund” 
to freeze energy prices (NRC- Handelsblad, 2005).  The regulatory authority3 agreed with this 
decision (Antilliaans Dagblad, 2005b, p. 1).  The institutionalization of the “Energy Fund” is an 
example of a regulatory capture, as the government was apparently influenced by the pressure of 
the consumers/voters and chose not to increase the energy prices.  The regulatory capture may 
have led to a longer period of the fixed energy prices than in a regular period, which may explain 
the sticky energy prices.  
My hypothesis is that price regulation, the political business cycle, and regulatory capture 
contributed to the price stickiness in Curaçao.  This hypothesis might provide an additional 
explanation for the price-rigidity puzzle and is referred to in this dissertation as the “political 
interference hypothesis.”  
1.3. Outline of the Study 
A micro-island is a price taker in the world economy and is assumed to have flexible 
domestic prices.  This study demonstrates that prices are sticky in the commodity markets of one 
micro-island, namely Curaçao, which is a topic thathas not been raised before in the economic 
literature.  The introduction of the concept of a price-rigidity puzzle on a micro-island and the 
                                                 
2 The forms of regulatory capture are described in Appendix 1B. 
3 The function of the regulatory authority in this period was assigned to the Department of Economic 
Affairs—the Department of Economic Affairs, “Dienst Economische Zaken,” (DEZ). 
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explanation of this phenomenon represent the main contribution of this dissertation to the 
economic literature.  This dissertation proposes viable theories to explain this puzzle.  
Additionally, sticky prices may lead to deviation from the long-run domestic prices that are 
measured by purchasing power parity (PPP) equilibrium. Sticky prices, therefore, may result in a 
rejection of the PPP hypothesis.  For this reason, the impact of sticky prices on long-run 
equilibrium PPP value is also analyzed.  
As the focus of this discussion is on price setting in the context of a Caribbean micro-
island, gaining insight into the commodity markets of these islands is essential.  Chapter 2 offers 
an introduction to factors that affected prices in the commodity markets of the Caribbean micro-
islands, particularly Curaçao, in the period of 19962012.  The methods applied in this chapter 
are comparative and descriptive analyses.  The commodity markets are analyzed using selected 
indicators of the Caribbean micro-islands, and the developments of these indicators are used to 
provide an indication on the functioning of the Caribbean commodities’ markets, particularly 
that of Curaçao, a micro-island with sticky prices.  The analyses summarize some potential 
factors that might explain the price-rigidity puzzle. 
Chapter 3 presents the evidence for sticky prices in Curaçao.  The methods applied in this 
chapter are comparative analysis at the internationl level and sectoral analysis in Curaçao.  The 
sample data of the comparative analysis vary considerable by country and cover the period of 
1979–2010.  The sectoral analysis of price adjustmen  in Curaçao covers the period of 2006–
2010.  The sectoral analysis shows which price-rigidity hypotheses are not relevant in solving the 
price-rigidity puzzle.  
Chapter 4 applies the price-rigidity theories/hypotheses of attractive pricing, time-
dependent pricing, and “political interference” to explain the price rigidity in Curaçao.  The 
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political interference hypothesis, consisting of price regulation, the political business cycle, and 
regulatory capture, assumes that policymakers intervene in price setting, which may cause sticky 
prices.  The method applied in this chapter is panel data analysis.  The sample period is 2006–
2010, and the data consist of the consumer price ind x (CPI) data, excluding the sectors/items of 
energy, postal services, insurance, and rents.  The tests provide a partial explanation for the price 
rigidity in the selected sectors in Curaçao.  
Chapter 5 shows that in Curaçao, the gasoline prices ar  sticky.  As this is one of the 
commodity markets, its sticky prices are considered to represent a piece of the larger price-
rigidity puzzle.  The hypotheses of political interference, menu costs, and rational inattention are 
tested for the gasoline retail market of Curaçao.  The method applied in this chapter is the 
autoregressive binomial conditional (ABC) model for the period of 1990–2012.  The tests reject 
the menu costs and the rational inattention hypothesis in the gasoline retail market in Curaçao.  
In contrast, the hypothesis of political interferenc  is supported by the data. 
In Chapter 6, the impact of the sticky prices in Curaçao on the long-term PPP is analyzed.  
The PPP is a theoretical approach measuring the long-term behavior between the domestic price 
and the price of the trading partner.  Sticky prices may lead to a deviation from the PPP, making 
its testing relevant.  In addition, the impact of the high transaction costs, which is also a factor 
that may cause a deviation from the PPP, is analyzed.  Micro-islands have high transportation 
costs; their impact on the relative PPP hypothesis is analyzed for a group of selected Caribbean 
micro-islands in this chapter.  The (relative and absolute) PPP hypotheses are tested for 
Caribbean micro-islands—Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, D minica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, and Curaçao—and their anchor country, the United States.  The methods used are 
the linear co-integration approach and nonlinear (exponential) smooth transition autoregressive 
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(ESTAR) and the threshold autoregressive (TAR) models in the sample period of 1990–2012.  
The results show the effects of both the high transaction costs of Caribbean micro-islands and 
sticky prices in Curaçao on the PPP hypothesis.  
Finally, Chapter 7 presents a summary of the most important findings of this research.  
The results show that to explain the price-rigidity puzzle in Curaçao, a hypothesis other than the 
price-rigidity theories is required.  In addition, contrary to expectations, the sticky prices in 
Curaçao do not lead to a rejection of the PPP hypotesis.  
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Appendix 1A: The Price Rigidity Hypotheses: The Case of Curaçao 
The causes of sticky prices are explained in New Keynesian hypotheses/theories on price 
rigidity. These hypotheses can be broadly categorized into the (a) menu cost, (b) staggered price, 
(c) sticky-information (Appendix 1A), and (d) other pricing hypotheses.  The most frequently 
applied shocks in these hypotheses involve inflation.  In contrast, price declines as monetary 
shocks are seldom considered.  The emphasis on inflatio  may be related to the inflationary 
trends in the 1970s, the period in which these theories were developed.  The price rigidity 
theories are analyzed in terms of whether they may apply to Curaçao.  
The Menu Cost Hypothesis 
The menu cost of price adjustment is defined as a “small fixed cost for changing a 
nominal price” (Romer, 2001, p. 300).  The term is derived from the cost incurred by printing 
restaurant’s new menus.  Menu costs include “(1) the labor costs of changing the shelf prices, (2) 
the cost of printing and delivering new price tags, (3) the costs of mistakes made during the price 
change process, and (4) the cost of in-store supervision of the price change process” (Levy, 
Bergen, Dutta, & Venable, 1997, p. 792).  A broader definition of menu costs includes the “time 
and attention required of managers to gather relevant information and make and implement 
decisions” (Ball & Mankiw, 1994, pp. 24–25).  The mnu costs do not vary with the size of the 
price change, as the menu costs are fixed.  They are modeled in the first-generation state-
dependent pricing (SDP) models of Barro (1972), wherein the decision on a contract termination 
(on price) depends on the state of the economy, and is therefore determined endogenously.  
In Curaçao, menu costs are small, as costs to change the price are not expensive.  The 
information on the import price changes (most goods in Curaçao are imported) can be found on 
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the bills of import.  If the retailer is not the importer of the goods, the prices will be listed on the 
invoice.  The other costs related to price setting are mainly the costs of transportation, rental 
costs, and personnel cost for the shelving of goods.  The information on these costs is accessible; 
hence, the cost of gathering information is small.  In addition, the “price tags” are replaced 
electronically in most supermarkets using the unique classification of bar codes.  When the prices 
are not listed on the products, the consumer can retriev  the prices at the scanner machines in the 
supermarkets.  As prices are inputted electronically in most of the medium-sized to larger firms 
in Curaçao, the cost of changing prices is negligible.  Hence, menu costs are unlikely to be the 
source of the sticky prices in Curaçao, particularly with the automated price-tag facilities.  
A price plan is a set with current and future prices; thus, it consists of a sequence of 
prices.  A firm with a price plan faces menu costs that are not associated only with changing the 
current price but also with changing the entire price plan.  Changing the price plan has additional 
menu costs related to negotiation and communication compared to a commodity without a price 
plan, and the prices in a price plan are expected to be stickier (Burnstein, 2006).  Accordingly, 
price plans are useful for firms that are producers of (intermediate) goods.  For this kind of 
producer, knowledge on future prices is important, s this allows the firm to plan ahead using 
this information and calculate the cost of future poduction.  Since most imported goods in 
Curaçao are final goods ready to sell to consumers, there is no need for a plan concerning future 
prices.  Hence, price plans are also less likely in Curaçao. 
Price points (or attractive pricing) occur when firms have a price strategy of setting 
prices ending with 9 cents, 99 cents, or 5 cents.  The support for price points as a cause of price 
rigidity is presented by Levy, Lee, Chen, Kauffman, d Bergen (2011).  These researchers found 
that “9” is the most frequently used ending, and prices ending with “9” have a lower probability 
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of changing than prices with non-9 endings.  The price points with price-endings at 5 (e.g., 45 
cents) or 9 (e.g., 79 cents) have been found in the database of the Central Bureau of Statistics of 
Curaçao consumer price quotes, which may be an indication of attractive pricing as  a plausible 
source of price rigidity in Curaçao. 
The Staggered Price Hypothesis 
Staggered price adjustment occurs when firms have unsynchronized price-settings.  This 
happens when a fraction of firms (the extensive margin) change their price.  This lack of 
coordination in price setting between firms, the coordination failure hypothesis, is reported in 
Blinder (1994, 1998) as the primary cause of price stickiness in the United States.  A lack of 
coordination between sellers in a small community such as Curaçao would result in consumers 
buying from the firm that offers the best price/quality; therefore, one firm would have a larger 
market share than the others.  Hence, cooperation of firms in price-setting is more likely and 
coordination failure is less likely to occur in Curaçao. 
Staggered pricing is also caused by implicit contracts.  Implicit contracts in a customer 
market are informal, long-term agreements between firms and their customers.  As each contract 
has its own renewal time, it causes staggered pricing.  These agreements may lead to sticky 
prices, as they are “a pledge of continuity of the seller’s offer” (Okun, 1981, p. 169).  The 
hypothesis of implicit contracts is likely to apply in Curaçao.  Most sellers know their customers 
and even have a long-term customer–seller relationsh p which influences the frequency of 
changing prices.  Hence, the implicit contracts may c use rigid prices in Curaçao. 
Other causes of staggered pricing are found in the tim -dependent pricing (TDP) models 
(Calvo, 1983; Taylor, 1980).  Time-dependent pricing models assume exogenous price 
adjustments that are independent of the state of the economy.  The Taylor model assumes that 
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firms change their prices every nth period, while in the Calvo model, the change in prices occurs 
randomly.  In both models, prices remain unchanged for a period of time, and a fixed portion of 
firms changes the price.  As not all firms change prices simultaneously, and the price changes are 
staggered. The time-dependent pricing hypothesis may apply to Curaçao, as its energy regulated 
prices are adjusted periodically. 
  The Sticky-information Hypothesis  
Information costs are the costs of acquiring information (absorbing and processing) on 
the state of the economy (Mankiw & Reis, 2002; Reis, 2006).  In sticky-information hypotheses, 
information is costly and producers have a limited capacity to process the flow of information.  
As a consequence, the information will spread slowly throughout the population of producers.  
The information arrives to this population with noise (Sims, 2003) or without noise but 
irregularly (Mankiw & Reis, 2002).  
Sims (2003) described a r tional inattention theory, in which agents have an information-
capacity constraint and pay little attention to macroe onomic information.  To reduce the noise 
(measured by higher variance) in macroeconomic information, more capacity is reallocated to 
this field.  As a result, the allocation in information capacity in other areas is limited, and agents 
will become less attentive.  This lack of information brings along that prices will remain 
unchanged. 
In the sticky-information model developed by Mankiw and Reis (2002), a few firms (the 
extensive margin) update the current situation and compute optimal prices given the updated 
information.  The other firms are inattentive, as they continue to set prices based on outdated 
information.  Reis (2006) showed that the producers rationally choose to be inattentive to new 
information (measured as a fixed cost) and calculated the optimal length of the producers’ 
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“inattentiveness.”  During this period, prices will remain unchanged.  In both the rational 
inattention and the sticky-information models, information is costly.  The commodity markets in 
Curaçao are most likely transparent, as social conta ts play a crucial role in the distribution of 
information.  Firms cooperate, using their network, to distribute information.  This occurs at low 
cost, which is not consistent with the sticky-information and rational inattention models.  Hence, 
these theories are less likely to apply in Curaçao.  
Other Pricing Hypotheses 
A different angle in the analysis of price rigidity s offered in fair pricing models 
(Rotemberg, 2002, 2011).  Their focus is on a consumer’s (emotional) response to a firm’s price 
setting.  In these models, firms may stabilize prices out of an obligation of “fairness” to their 
consumers (Rotemberg, 2011).  The benevolent attitude of firms toward their clientele is based 
on the belief that the “customer is always right.”  Price increases that are caused by cost 
increases are perceived as fair.  In contrast, price in reases resulting from a rise in demand are 
considered unfair.  Consequently, firms do not always change the price following a demand 
shock, which may lead to price rigidity.  This hypothesis may apply to Curaçao, as antagonized 
costumers in a close-knit community are bad publicity for these small firms. 
In the hypothesis of tacit collusion, oligopolies “join forces” to achieve a joint 
maximization of profit by agreeing on the levels of price and/or output (Lipsey, Purvis, & 
Steiner, 1991).  Even with temporary changes in demand, firms will be cautious to change prices, 
as they fear that the change in price can be misinterpreted and considered a competitive move (to 
increase their market share).  The competitors’ reaction can cause a price war, which will reduce 
the joint maximum profit.  With the small market size of Curaçao, firms are likely to join forces 
and are more likely to apply tacit collusion. 
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The theory of the fear of competitors’ reaction is also known as the kinked demand curve 
(Lipsey et al., 1991).  This is based on assumptions about competitors’ reaction.  The oligopolist 
assumes that the competitor ignores price increases.  Specifically, the competitor will not follow 
a price increase because this will result in a loss in the price-increasing firm’s market share.  
Moreover, the oligopolist assumes that price reductions will be matched.  This theory is likely to 
apply in the oligopolistic markets of Curaçao as it i more favorable for firms in a small 
community to cooperate and increase their joint profit maximation.  
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Appendix 1B: The Political Interference by Price Regulation and Regulatory Capture 
Dexter, Levy, and Nault (2002) showed that regulated prices in the United States 
changed more slowly after a demand or a cost shock; moreover, the price change frequency of 
regulated commodities is lower than that of non-regulated ones.  Price regulation was introduced 
in the 1960s in Curaçao, based on incomes and anti-inflationary policies (P. B. No. 117, 1961).  
The price regulation on selected commodities is imple ented by applying a mark-up on the cost 
price (T. Magloire, personal communication, June 20, 2013).  Regulated prices are changed at the 
arrival of goods, and therefore at random.  For a few regulated commodities, prices are set to 
change periodically (De Minister van Financien, 2015).  Regulated price changes are at random 
(time-dependent Calvo pricing) or periodical (time- d pendent Taylor pricing). Time dependent 
pricing is a source for sticky prices.  
Regulatory capture is the “process through which special interests affect state 
intervention in any of its forms” (Dal Bo, 2006, p. 203).  In this dissertation, two forms of 
regulatory capture are described.  In Peltzman’s (1976) model, the government is the regulator.  
The aim of the government in this model is to maximize its power by balancing the benefits 
between the consumers (the voters) and producers (financial power to support the political 
parties).  Regulatory capture occurs when the interes  of one of these groups is not consistent 
with the policy set by the government as the regulator. 
In Dal Bo’s (2006) study, the government and the regulator were two separate entities.  In 
this setting, the regulatory capture occurred when t  regulators colluded with the producers.  
The consequences of this behavior was presented by Shapiro (2012), who described two recent 
calamities related to regulatory capture, namely the 2008 Wall Street collapse and the British 
Petroleum (BP) Deepwater Horizon oilrig.  In both cases these industries used their large 
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influence to persuade the regulator.  Subsequently, the regulator persuaded the policymakers to 
relax certain regulations. This has contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 and the 





 THE CARIBBEAN MICRO-ISLANDS’ COMMODITY MARKETS 
Caribbean micro-islands are small, open, developing countries or territories.  Their 
economies are suitably referred to as “tropical paradises” and “tax havens,” reflecting their main 
export sectors of tourism (Shareef & Hoti, 2005) and international financial services (Hampton 
& Christensen, 2002).  They are classified as small isl nd developing states (SIDS).  SIDS are 
“economically disadvantageous” and vulnerable due to their small size (Briguglio, 1995).  One 
indicator that reflects the (economic) smallness of Caribbean micro-islands is the population size 
(Griffith, 2007).  Caribbean micro-islands are inhabited by a few thousands of people, and thus 
they constitute small domestic commodity markets.  Consequently, micro-islands are price takers 
in the world market, and their domestic prices are assumed to adjust frequently in accordance 
with the world market’s prices.  
Given these considerations, a case of sticky prices on the Caribbean micro-island of 
Curaçao may indicate that other factors than the world market’s prices have an impact on its 
price setting.  The central question is what these factors are.  The objective of this chapter is to 
identify the factors or indicators that influence price setting in the commodity markets of the 
Caribbean micro-islands, particularly Curaçao.  Theanalysis consists of two parts.  The first part 
uses common characteristics of the SIDS, as describd by Briguglio (1995), Armstrong and Read 
(2002), and Winters and Martins (2004), among others.  The selected characteristics of SIDS are 
related to their commodity markets and price formation.  From these characteristics, information 
on the price developments of the commodity markets are derived, particularly for Curaçao.  The 
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second part of the analysis is island-specific, as it elaborates on the factors involved in price 
setting in the commodity markets in Curaçao.  
Both analyses require considerable data mining in the databases of Caribbean micro-
islands, as the data on micro-islands are scattered across several locations.  Moreover, the 
databases on micro-islands exhibit series with missing observations, discontinued time series, or 
isolated random observations.  In addition, the most recent data are rarely available.  The lack of 
comparable data is the main challenge in data collection on micro-islands.  
Despite these deficiencies, a dataset for the period of 1995–2006 was built for the 
comparative analysis of the Caribbean micro-islands.  The collection of consistent data for the 
analysis on the selected common key indicators of the Caribbean micro-islands is an important 
contribution of this chapter. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows.  The first part of the analysis focuses on a 
sample of Caribbean micro-islands, which is defined i  Section 2.1.  Section 2.2 presents a 
literature overview of the constraints related to the small size and insularity of the commodities’ 
markets on micro-islands, focusing on the limited room for domestic price setting.  Section 2.3 
presents a comparative analysis of the Caribbean micro-islands regarding selected common key 
indicators related to the commodity markets.  This analysis presents preliminary information on 
the commodity markets of this group of islands, particularly Curaçao.  Section 2.4, the second 
part of the analysis, uses sectoral data from Curaçao to study its commodity markets, and Section 
2.5 presents conclusions on the price-setting behavior in Curaçao. 
2.1. The Caribbean Micro-islands 
For the classification of micro-islands, two basic concepts are important, namely the 
criteria for measurement of economic size and a threshold value for economic smallness.  Since 
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the studies performed by Demas (1965) and Khalaf (1974), three criteria are routinely used to 
measure economic smallness, namely population size, land area, and production; these criteria 
may also be used in combination (Crowards, 2002).  The production is measured by the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita or by the aggregate v lue of the GDP or by the gross national 
product (GNP).  Although the population size is the most commonly used criterion, the choice of 
the most fitting indicator of smallness has to be associated with the subject of research, which in 
this case is the domestic goods and services markets of Caribbean micro-islands.  
For the commodity markets on micro-islands, the potential sales depend on the demand 
of the consumers, which are primarily domestic consumers.  The examples of the Bahamas, a 
country with fairly large land area and small commodity markets, and Bermuda, with a high 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and small commodity markets, may show to illustrate 
that land area and production are less appropriate th n population to define the domestic 
commodity market size.  The demand of domestic commdities mainly depends on the size of 
the population, the price, the price of substitutes, and the GDP per capita.  The example of 
Bermuda shows that the GDP per capita is not an adequat  measure for small Caribbean 
commodity markets.  Hence, the population size is the most suitable criterion for these markets. 
Related to the choice of the criterion of economic smallness is its threshold value.  As 
size is a relative concept, the classification of small economies in the economic literature is 
arbitrary, and practitioners are divided concerning the threshold value of (economic) smallness.  
In the literature, the most commonly used thresholds are 1 and 1.5 million inhabitants.  The 
common practice for defining smallness in the Commonwealth of Nations and the United 
Nations (UN) is a threshold value of 1 million inhabit nts (Sutton & Payne, 1993).  Sutton and 
Payne (1993) and Anckar (1999) also used the threshold value of 1 million people to categorize 
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small countries.  The Commonwealth Secretariat (The Round Table, 2011) adapted the upper 
limit to 1.5 million.  In this dissertation, the focus is on the smallest of the world’s islands; hence, 
the lowest threshold value of 1 million inhabitants applies. 
SIDS were recognized in 1992 by the UN, defined as “low-lying coastal countries that 
share similar sustainable development challenges, including population, limited resources, 
susceptibility to natural disasters, vulnerability to external shocks, and extensive dependence on 
international trade” (the United Nations Environment Program [UNEP], n.d.).  This broad 
definition of SIDS reaches beyond islands to include small coastal economies, although the “I” 
in the acronym SIDS stands for “island.” As a consequence of this inconsistency, non-island 
economies, such as Belize, Suriname, and Guyana, are wkwardly classified as SIDS, and are 
listed on the official UN list of SIDS (Fialho & van Bergeijk, 2016, p. 20).  SIDS are categorized 
into three geographical areas, as follows: the Caribbean; the Pacific; and the combined area of 
Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean, and South China Sea (AIMS).  
To draw the list of Caribbean micro-islands, the official UN list of SIDS is used as a 
starting point.  The non-island economies (Belize, Suriname, and Guyana) and the Caribbean 
islands consisting of more than 1 million inhabitants (Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Puerto Rico, Trinidad, and Cuba4) are excluded from the category of micro-islands.  Added to the 
official list of the UN SIDS are the islands of Bermuda, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint 
Barthelemy, Tobago, the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the countries listed under the former 
collective name of the Netherlands Antilles.  After Aruba abandoned the Netherlands Antillean 
confederation in 1986, the Netherlands Antilles consisted of Curaçao, Sint Maarten, Bonaire, 
Sint Eustatius, and Saba.  In 2010, Curaçao and Sint Maarten became autonomous countries 
                                                 
4 Cuba was not an open economy until 2015. CubaUS trade started at the beginning of 2015. 
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within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the islands of Bonaire, Saba, and Sint Eustatius (the 
BSS or BES islands) became Caribbean municipalities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  
Table 2.1 shows the list of the Caribbean micro-islands, ranked by population size in the 
year 2006.  This list shows 24 countries and territories, where several consist of groups of 
islands, for example, the Bahamas, the British and US Virgin Islands, and the BSS islands.  For 
completeness, Tobago is listed as a Caribbean micro-island.  However, this island forms one 
country with the larger Trinidad, and the available data on Tobago are usually combined with the 
data on Trinidad.  Hence, its inclusion in the analysis would bring inconsistency into the data on 
the micro-islands; Tobago is therefore excluded from further consideration.  The BSS islands are 
also excluded from further analysis due to a lack of data resulting from their recent change in 
status to Caribbean municipalities of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
To summarize, the Caribbean micro-islands are defined as Caribbean SIDS with a 
population size less than 1 million.  In fact, each of the Caribbean micro-islands has a population 
of less than half a million.  
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Table 2.1 
The Population of the Caribbean Micro-Islands in 2006  




Montserrat    5,789 
Saint Barthélemy (Saint Barths) (2009)a/b    8,902 
Anguilla   12,445 
BSS islandsa/c   15,851 
Virgin Islands, British (2001) d   23,161 
Turks & Caicosa/e  33,202 
Saint Martin (2009)a/b  35,263 
Sint Maartena/c   37,629 
Saint Kitts & Nevis  49,774 
Cayman Islandsf  53,172 
Tobago (2000)g  54,084 
Bermudaa  63,800 
Dominica   67,621 
Antigua & Barbuda   84,097 
Arubac 103,772 
Grenada  105,597 
Virgin Islands, USh 113,689 
Saint Vincent & Grenadines 119,772 
Curaçaoa/c 139,596 
Saint Lucia  163,071 
Barbados 292,930 
Bahamas  327,279 
Martinique (2009)a/b 398,000 






The Population of the Caribbean Micro-Islands in 2006  
 (in Number of  inhabitants) 
Notes.  
a.This country has been added to the UN list of SIDS. 
b.Data on Saint Barths, Saint Martin, Martinique, and Guadeloupe are from 
Census 2009 of “Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques,” 
(INSEE), the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of France. 
Saint Martin (French territory) and Sint Maarten (Dutch territory) are two 
“countries” on one island.  
c.The BSS (Bonaire, Saba, Sint Eustatius) islands made up the former 
Netherlands Antilles, together with Curaçao, Aruba, and Sint Maarten. The 
data on Bonaire and Curaçao are from the statistical office of the former 
Netherlands Antilles, and the data on Sint Maarten, Si t Eustatius, and Saba 
are the author’s estimates.  
d.The British Virgin Islands include, Tortola, Virgin Gorda, Jost van Dyke, and 
Agagada. The data are from the Census Report 2001 of the British Virgin 
Islands. 
e.Department of Economic Planning and Statistics of Turks and Caicos (n.d.)  
f.The Cayman Islands consist of Grand Cayman, Cayman Br c, and Little 
Cayman.  The data are from the “Statistical Compendium 2008” of the 
Economics and Statistics Office of the Cayman Islands. 
g.With Trinidad, Tobago forms a twin island country.  The data are from the 
Central Statistical Office Trinidad and Tobago, Census 2000. 
h.The 2006 data are retrieved from “Annual Economic Indicators” of the Bureau 
of Economic Research of the US Virgin Islands (n.d.)  
Source: Adapted list from the United Nations [UN] (n.d.)  
 
 
2.2. Micro-Islands’ Commodities Markets 
SIDS differ from other developing nations in that they “face a greater risk of 
marginalization from global activities than other dveloping countries” (Santos-Paulino, 2010, p. 
855).  Their small sizes are “economically disadvantageous” (Briguglio, 1995, p. 1616), and 
introduce in an “overall feasibility constraint” (Winters & Martins, 2004, p. 376).  Micro-islands 
have two main common characteristics, namely their insularity and small size. 
Insularity refers to being surrounded by sea and entails depenncy on air and sea 
transportation.  It is often confused with remoteness, suggesting inaccessibility.  One way to 
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measure the accessibility of micro-islands is through the frequency of the connections by air and 
sea transportation for travel and the delivery of goods.  As most Caribbean micro-islands are 
tourist destinations, they have frequent air transportation from and to American and European 
markets.  In addition, the goods markets on the Caribbean micro-islands are regularly supplied 
by imports from the international markets.  Caribbean inter-islands’ accessibility, in contrast, is 
limited due to lack of interregional transportation.  This is associated with small trade volumes 
and low numbers of regular travelers.  The low volume of trade, and hence the lack of freight 
among micro-islands, is probably partly due to the lack of comparative advantage between 
countries with similar export sectors. 
The second characteristic, namely small size, has several implications for the commodity 
markets.  First, the smallness results in small, fragmented freights (Briguglio, 1995) at high 
transportation costs.  Micro-islands have approximately 70% higher sea freight transportation 
costs, 57% higher average personal air travel costs, and 4.1% higher average airfreight costs than 
larger economies (Winters, 2005).  In particular the Caribbean area, the relatively high sea 
freight cost compared to airfreight cost is explained by the collusive behavior in the international 
sea transportation sector. (J. Gois, personal communication, May 27, 2015).  
Beside the high transportation costs, an implication of the small size is the uncompetitive 
production levels in the goods markets of micro-islands.  The production on micro-islands is 
constrained by the small domestic goods markets; thus, these economies have small domestic 
production units.  Armstrong and Read (2002) used th  concept of “economic sub-optimality” (p. 
436).  The demand of the domestic goods market is too mall (lack of scale), while an “optimal” 
output level to produce efficiently is too large.  The second implication of the small size is 
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therefore that Caribbean micro-islands lack economies of scale and produce at uncompetitive 
levels. 
From an opposing perspective, Griffith (2007, p. 956) argued that a globally competitive 
level of production on the Caribbean islands can be reached by “creating knowledge skills.”  
Moreover, globalization also implies adding foreign demand to the small markets of islands and 
diversifying the economic structure.  From this viewpoint, both economies of scale and scope can 
be reached on small islands.  However, to the best of my knowledge, only the micro-islands of 
Bermuda and the Bahamas have been able to achieve economies of scale in the international 
financial services markets, while economies of scale in the goods markets are not feasible on any 
of the Caribbean micro-islands.  The reason for this is that the production cost per unit and the 
transportation costs in the good markets are relativ ly higher than they are in a larger country 
(Winters & Martins, 2004). 
The high costs of transportation and production mayfunction as a natural barrier for a 
new firm to enter the market, which limits the number of firms.  Market structures with limited 
number of firms are called monopolies or oligopolies.  The third implication of smallness is that 
there is a “tendency toward” market structures of m nopolies or oligopolies on small islands 
(Briguglio, 1995, p. 1617). 
The fourth implication of smallness is that the commodity markets have a narrow 
economic structure, and the economies are not diversified and lack economies of scope.  For 
Caribbean micro-islands, economies of scope are absnt, and a limited variety of goods are 
produced.  These islands have restricted exports of goods and high imports of goods, which 
illustrate their narrow production structures.  According to Medina Cas and Ota (2008), “while 
small states tend to produce a narrow range of goods and services, they use a wide variety” (p. 
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15).  As a consequence, their high imports have to be financed by exports, in this case by high 
export of services.  The fifth implication of smallness is the high degree of openness and lack of 
economies of scope among micro-islands. 
Sixth, as result of their smallness and openness, micro-islands adopt fixed–exchange rate 
regimes (Caramazza & Aziz, 1998, p. 6).  A pegged exchange rate is advantageous, as it makes 
trade in commodities easier and more cost efficient (Abel & Bernanke, 2005).  In addition, 
inflation may be lower in a fixed–exchange rate regime (Abel & Bernanke, 2005).  Flexible 
exchange rates are disadvantageous, as they have a negative impact on growth in less financially 
developed countries (Aghion, Bachetta, Ranciere, & Rogoff, 2009).  The small financial markets 
of Caribbean micro-islands are not particularly well d veloped; hence, adopting flexible 
exchange rates may have a negative impact on the growth ates of these islands.  The 
disadvantage of fixed exchange rates, however, is that their pegged currencies are sometimes 
overvalued, thereby undermining their competitiveness.  
In conclusion, (Caribbean) micro-islands have small, fragmented freight due to their 
smallness.  Their insularity means dependency on air and sea transportation.  The collusive price 
setting in sea transportation combined with the small trade volumes of Caribbean micro-islands 
may partly explain the typically high cost of transportation.  The smallness of Caribbean micro-
islands also leads to openness, fixed-exchange rates, and lack of economies of scale and scope.  
Their production structures are narrow and most firms are monopolies or oligopolies.  
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2.3. The Impact of Selected Indicators on the Commodity Markets 
The common indicators, which are characteristics of Caribbean micro-islands, are 
selected based on their effect on the commodity markets.  The characteristics that are used as 
indicators may provide information about some aspects of the commodity markets.  These 
indicators are the colonial history, monetary dependency (dependency on the monetary policy of 
another country, either by choice or by necessity), low inflation rates, a small and migratory 
population, a small land area, high volatility in the GDP per capita growth rates, and openness.  
The effect of these characteristics on the commodity markets is analyzed in this section. 
2.3.1. The Colonial History 
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the Caribbean micro-islands by current constitutional 
status.  The second column in the table shows that mos micro-islands have constitutional ties 
with a larger economy.  Anguilla, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos, and 
the (British) Virgin Islands are dependencies of Engla d.  Guadeloupe and its dependencies 
(Saint Barths and Saint Martin) and Martinique are “Départements d’outre-mer,” or French 
Overseas Departments and Territories.  The former Netherlands Antilles—Aruba, Bonaire, 
Curaçao, Saba, Sint Eustatius, and Sint Maarten—have constitutional ties with the Netherlands, 
and the US Virgin Islands are part of the United States.  With the exception of the US Virgin 
Islands, the constitutional ties indicate the bond between the Caribbean micro-islands and their 
respective mother countries.  Hence, for most islands, their constitutional status is rooted in the 
colonial past. 
The colonial past affects the commodity markets of the Caribbean micro-islands through 
their population sizes and import preferences.  Most of the former colonies have high imports 
from their mother countries.  The preference for Dutch cheese instead of regional cheese and the 
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demand for commodities from the Netherlands in Curaçao, for example, originated in the 
colonial period.  As a consequence, the commodities in Curaçao to a significant extent consist of 
goods produced in the Netherlands.  In addition, migration to and from the islands has influenced 
the sizes of the domestic commodity markets.  
Most of the countries without constitutional ties (third column in Table 2.2) participate in 
two important entities of (economic) cooperation, namely the Organization of the Eastern 
Caribbean States5 (OECS) and the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).6 
The OECS currently consists of 10 micro-islands and provides for a common commodity market 
that primarily includes the Eastern Caribbean countries.  The members of the OECS consist of 
the six independent micro-islands and Montserrat, the only micro-island with constitutional ties.  
The associate members of the OECS are the micro-island  of Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, 
and Martinique, all of which have constitutional ties.  A larger internal market is provided by 
CARICOM, including both micro- (14) and larger (5) Caribbean islands.  Unfortunately, due to 
the lack of inter-island accessibility (sea and air tr nsportation) and the lack of comparative 
advantage, the benefits of the larger internal markets will be limited.  
 
                                                 
5 The OECS is an intergovernmental organization withthe aim to achieve economic harmonization and 
integration. Members are: Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, S int 
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Montserrat. Associate members are Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, and 
Martinique. 
6 CARICOM is an organization aiming at economic integration with a single market (of goods) on the 
Caribbean area. To date CARICOM consists of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Gr nadines, 
Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. The associate members are: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos.  
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Table 2.2 
Caribbean Micro-Islands by Constitutional Status in 2012 
Country Constitutional ties No constitutional ties 
Anguilla British Overseas Territory   
Antigua & Barbudaa/b   Independent state 
Aruba 
Part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands   
Bahamasb   Independent state 
Barbadosb   Independent state 
Bermuda  British Overseas Territory   
Cayman Islands  British Overseas Territory   
Curaçao 
Part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands   
Dominicaa/b   Independent state 
Grenadaa/b   Independent state 
Guadeloupe 
French Overseas Departments 
and Territories   
Martiniquea 
French Overseas Departments 
and Territories   
Montserrata/b British Overseas Territory   
Saint Barthélemy  
French Overseas Departments 
and Territories   
Saint Martin 
French Overseas Departments 
and Territories   
Saint Kitts & Nevisa/b   Independent state 
Saint Luciaa/b   Independent state 
Saint Vincent & Grenadinesa/b   Independent state 
Sint Maarten 
Part of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands   
Turks and Caicos Islands  British Overseas Territory   
Virgin Islands (British) British Overseas Territory   
Virgin Islands (US) Territory of the United States   
Note. 
a.Member of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Anguilla, the British Virgin 
Islands, and Martinique are associate members. 
b.Member of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM). Anguilla, Bermuda, 
British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos are associate members. 
Source: Websites of the micro-islands. 
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In short, the colonial history has influenced the siz  and composition of the commodity 
markets.  For countries with constitutional ties, in principle, the migration of the islanders to and 
from the mother country is unrestricted.  Therefore, th  migration flows from the micro-island to 
the mother country reduce the size of the domestic commodity markets for the Caribbean micro-
islands.  For the countries without constitutional ties in particular, their membership with the 
OECS, CARICOM, or both extends their small commodity markets.  The benefits of these larger 
internal markets, however, are restricted due to lack of transportation and lack of comparative 
advantage.  
2.3.2. Monetary Dependency 
Caribbean micro-islands have monetary dependency, as they do not have their own 
monetary policy, and their monetary policy is tied to another country, as shown in Table 2.3.  
Two forms of monetary dependency are the fixed-exchange rate and dollarization.  Dollarization 
is when a country uses a foreign currency that substit tes for the domestic currency (Berg & 
Borensztein, 2000).  Although in the case of the Caribbean micro-islands, the foreign currency 
used to substitute for the domestic currency is usually the US dollar, the terminology of 
dollarization is broadly applied for the foreign currency of choice; thus, it also covers the use of 
the euro or the British pound. 
Since the official introduction of the fixed exchange rates or dollarization in these micro-
islands, their monetary regimes have remained unchanged; thus, the official peg is equal to the 
actual peg.  Most of the Caribbean micro-islands have a long-lasting peg with the US dollar or 
are dollarized, with the longest period of dollarizt on evident in the British Virgin Islands, 
where it started in 1959.  Turks and Caicos and the British and US Virgin Islands use the US 
dollar as legal tender.  The choice for the peg, or the use of the US dollar in most of the 
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Caribbean micro-islands, is based on the fact that the United States is their main trading partner.  
Of the Caribbean micro-islands, only the French “Départements d’outre-mer” use the euro as 
their legal tender.  Consistent with most other Caribbean islands, Curaçao has a long-lasting peg 
with the US dollar.  This is particularly important for commodity markets in Curaçao, as the 
United States represents its main market for trade, nd most of its commodities are traded in US 
dollars.  Consequently, the exchange rate risk for Curaçao is limited to the smaller share of its 
non–US currency trade.  In conclusion, the peg of the exchange rate of Curaçao to the US dollar 
has remained unchanged for years, and it is not likely that this constant factor has influenced the 





Caribbean Micro-Islands by Monetary Dependency as per April 30, 2012 
(Domestic Currency for 1 US $ or Dollarized) 
Country Pegged to 1 US $ 
Dollarized ($ or 
€) 
Year peg/ 
dollarization Monetary union 
Anguilla 2.70 XCDa   1976 ECCUb 
Antigua & Barbuda 2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Aruba 1.77 AWGc   1986  
Bahamas  1.00 BSDd  1966  
Barbados 2.00 BBDe  1975  
Bermuda 1.00 BMDf   1970  
Cayman Islands  1.23 KYDg   1974  
Curaçao 1.79 ANGh      1971  
Dominica 2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Grenada 2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Guadeloupe  €  2002  
Martinique  €  2002  
Montserrat 2.70 XCD  1976 ECCU 
Saint Barthélemy (Saint Barths) € 2002  
Saint Kitts & Nevis 2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Saint Lucia 2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines 
2.70 XCD   1976 ECCU 
Sint Maarten 1.79 ANGh  1971  
Turks and Caicos Islands   US $  1973  
Virgin Islands (British)  US $  1959  
Virgin Islands (US)  US $ n.a.   
Notes. a XCD: Eastern Caribbean dollar, b ECCU: Eastern Caribbean Monetary Union, c AWG: Aruban 
guilder, d BSD: Bahamian dollar, e BBD: Barbadian dollar, f BMD: Bermudian dollar, g KYD: Cayman 
Islands dollar, h ANG: after the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles on October 10, 2010, the islands of 
Curaçao and Sint Maarten continued with the Netherlands Antillean guilder (ANG).  
Source: Websites of the islands.  
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2.3.3. Inflation Rates 
Inflation rates consist of imported inflation, transportation cost changes, and the factors 
of domestic inflation (e.g., wage cost change).  The imported inflation is influenced by exchange 
rate changes.  Imports to Caribbean micro-islands con ist of imports from their (former) mother 
countries and/or main trading partner(s).  For the Caribbean islands—with the exception of the 
French territories—a large share of their imports ae denominated in US dollars.  The Caribbean 
micro-islands’ annual inflation rates and volatility in the commodity markets in the period of 
19952006 are shown in the second and third columns of Table 2.4.  The inflation rates of the 
former mother countries and their major trading partner are used as indicators of the import 
prices for the Caribbean micro-islands.  This period was marked by the introduction of the euro 
and low inflation rates.  In the period before the introduction of the euro in 1999, the mother 
countries of France and the Netherlands had their own currencies, namely the French franc and 
the Dutch guilder.  The average (M) and the standard eviation (SD) of the inflation rates in the 
period of 1995–2006 were as follows: France M=1.6%, SD=0.5%; the Netherlands M=2.2%, 
SD=0.8%; and the UK M=1.7%, SD=0.6%.  The major trading partner of the micro-islands in 
the Caribbean is the United States, and its average and standard deviation inflation rate were 
M=2.6% and SD=0.6%, respectively.  
The inflation variation of the Caribbean micro-islands is large considering the small 
variations in inflation of their main trading partners.  Similar to most other Caribbean micro-
islands, the variability in inflation was higher in Curaçao in the study period compared to that of 
its main trading partners.  Inflation (and the variation in inflation) on the Caribbean micro-island 
may have been affected by the exchange rate volatility with the non–US dollar trading partners, 




The Inflation Rates on the Caribbean Micro-Islands  
(in Percent, 1995–2006) 
Country 
The average 





Dominica 1.5 0.7 
Bahamas 1.7 0.7 
Guadeloupea  1.7 1.1 
Saint Vincent & 
Grenadines 1.8 1.4 
Martiniquea  1.8 0.7 
Grenada 1.9 0.9 
Curaçaob 2.4 1.6 
Cayman Islandsc 2.4 1.6 
Saint Lucia 2.6 1.9 
Barbados 2.8 2.8 
Aruba 3.1 0.6 
Anguilla 3.4 2.4 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 3.6 2.4 
Antigua & Barbuda  n.a.  n.a. 
Bermuda   n.a.  n.a. 
Montserrat  n.a.  n.a. 
Saint Barthélemy (Saint 
Barths)  
 n.a.  n.a. 
Turks and Caicos  n.a.  n.a. 
Virgin Islands, British  n.a.  n.a. 
Virgin Islands, US  n.a.  n.a. 
Average  2.4 1.4 
Notes.  
a.INSEE for 1999–2006. 
b.The Central Bureau Statistics of Curaçao (CBS). (CBS, n.d.) 
c.Economic and Planning Office of the Cayman Islands. 
Sources: Data from the other islands were collected from the 




In Table 2.5, the import-to-GDP, export-to-GDP, and the trade ratios (export and imports 
as share of the GDP), are shown.7 A high trade ratio implies high degree of openness.  A  shown 
in Table 2.5, Caribbean micro-islands have a high degree of openness.  The import ratios show 
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that for most of the Caribbean micro-islands, more than 60% of commodities are imported, 
capturing their dependency on the international markets for their domestic commodity markets.  
Similarly, the import-to-GDP ratio of 74% in Curaçao emphasizes that the commodity markets 
are mostly supplied by imported goods.  It may be expected that the prices in the domestic 
commodity markets will adjust in line with the import prices.  
 
Table 2.5 
The Import and Export Ratios of the Caribbean Micro-Islands in 2010 






(Export and Import)/GDP 
2010 
Grenada (2011) 0.49  0.21  0.70  
Saint Vincent & Grenadines (2011)a  0.56  0.27  0.83  
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0.53 0.21  0.84  
Bahamasa 0.50  0.41 0.91 
Dominica (2011)a 0.54  0.39  0.95  
Bermudaa 0.55 0.41  0.96  
Monserrat 0.74  0.21 0.96  
Barbados 0.51  0.46  0.97  
Antigua and Barbuda (2011)a 0.59  0.45  1.04  
Saint Lucia 0.62 0.51  1.13 
Anguilla 0.72  0.45  1.17  
Cayman Islandsa 0.61  0.62  1.23  
Aruba 0.76  0.61 1.37  
Curaçao (2011)b 0.74  0.67  1.41  
Turks & Caicos Islands  0.80  0.62  1.42  
Virgin Islands (British) 0.77 1.11  1.88  
Guadeloupe n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Martinique n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Saint Barthélemy (Saint Barths) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Virgin Islands (US) n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 0.64 0.51 1.16 
Notes. 
a.The Word Bank data in parentheses represent the reported year when this is not 2010.  
bThe Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten.  
Source: UN (2012). 
 53 
2.3.5. Development in Population Sizes 
Table 2.68 shows the development in population sizes of the Caribbean micro-islands.  
The development in the average population sizes is important, as it gives an indication of the 
development of the commodity markets’ sizes.  The second column in the table shows the 
average population size in 19602006.  The largest micro-economy of this region is the island of 
Guadeloupe, consisting of approximately 450,000 inhabitants; the smallest is Anguilla, with a 
population of approximately 8,000.  The SDs in the third column show the variation in the 
population sizes, which may be related to migration.  It is worth mentioning that there has been 
extensive emigration from Montserrat caused by the eruptions of the Soufrière Hills volcano, 
which has been active since 1995.  As a consequence of this adverse supply shock, a negative 
population growth rate (–1.4% in Column 4) and a high volatility in population growth rate of 
4.8% (Column 5) were registered.  
Low population growth rates and high volatility have been reported.  Similar to the other 
Caribbean micro-islands, the developments in the population data in Curaçao showed low 
population growth caused by migration (The Central Bank of Curaçao and Sint Maarten [CBCS], 
2001).  The sizes of the Caribbean micro-islands’ commodity markets have consequently shown 
slow growth. 
 
                                                 
8 The data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies of France, the INSEE, the Social Science Research Council 
(SSCR), the World Bank, and the Central Bureau of Statistics of Curaçao (CBS). 
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Table 2.6 










































Anguillaa    8,388   2,101 1.7 1.1 
Turks & Caicosc    8,611   3,345 2.8 2.3 
Montserrata  10,121   2,484 -1.4 4.8 
Virgin Islands, Britishc  12,371   2,101 2.5 1.7 
Cayman Islandsd  31,902   8,604 4.2 0.7 
Saint Kitts & Nevisa  45,159   3,103 0.0 1.9 
Bermudae  56,371   5,238 0.8 0.9 
Dominicaa  67,478   3,894 0.3 0.8 
Arubaa  69,274 15,930 1.6 1.7 
Antigua & Barbudaa  69,801   7,325 0.9 1.7 
Virgin Islands, USf  86,669 25,813 3.3 3.8 
Grenadaa  96,294   4,369 0.4 1.0 
Saint Vincent & Grenadinesa 102,436 11,809 0.8 0.3 
Saint Luciaa 125,793 22,443 1.3 0.3 
Curaçaog 142,386   8,081 0.3 1.7 
Bahamasa 226,388 63,357 2.4 1.2 
Barbadosa 260,100 20,635 0.5 0.2 
Martiniqueh 344,625 30,625 0.7 0.3 
Guadeloupei 359,563 50,633 1.2 0.5 
Saint Barthélemy (Saint 
Barths) b 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Average 111,775 15,363 1.3 1.4 
Notes. 
a.International Financial Statistics.  
b.INSEE Census 2009, included in Guadeloupe.  
c.SSRC (1960–1998). 
d. Cayman Islands consist of Grand Cayman, Cayman Brac, and Little Cayman. The 
data (1979–2007) are from the Statistical Compendium (2005, 2008) of the 
Economics and Statistics Office. 
e. World Bank data from 1960–2006.   
f.The US Virgin Islands consist of St. Croix, St. John, and St. Thomas.  
g.Curaçao data are from the CBS of Curaçao.  
h. INSEE.  
 INSEE: the data include Saint Barthélemy and Saint Martin (French Sint Maarten) 
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2.3.6. Land Area  
Table 2.7 lists the data of the land area (in square kilometers).  The data show the 
smallness of the countries’ areas; Saint Barths is the smallest, at 22 km2, while the largest is the 
Bahamas, an archipelago comprising 700 islands, with a land area of approximately 14,000 km2.  
The land sizes in the Caribbean area are small, which may indicate a scarcity of land.  This is 
likely to drive up property prices.  The three Caribbean micro-islands with the highest property 
prices9 are Bermuda ($7,056), British Virgin Islands ($6,469), and Barbados ($4,189).  The 
property price ($2,162)10 in Curaçao (and Bonaire) is considered moderate compared with the 
aforementioned three Caribbean micro-islands. 
The demand for land on the Caribbean micro-islands probably pushed the property prices 
upward.  High property prices were likely passed on in the cost of production, and consequently 
reflected in the overall prices in the Caribbean commodity markets.  However, due to lack of 
time series data, the impact of property prices on price setting must be addressed in further 
research. 
                                                 
9 Price of property per square meter (m2) based on apartments of 120 m2 in the center of the city in 2013 
(Global Property Guide, 2015). In Brazil, the property price per square meter was $3,751 in 2015, and in the 
Netherlands, the price was €4,907 per square meter in 2015 (approximately $5,404; (Global Property Guide, 2015). 
All prices based on apartments of 120 m2.










Saint Barthélemy (Saint 
Barths) 
      22 
Bermuda        53 
Anguilla       96 
Montserrat      104 
Virgin Islands, Britisha      174 
Aruba      193 
Cayman Islandsa      259 
Saint Kitts & Nevisa      261 
Grenada      344 
Virgin Islands, USa      349 
Saint Vincent & Grenadinesa      389 
Barbados      431 
Antigua and Barbudaa      440 
Curaçaoa       444 
Saint Lucia      616 
Dominica      751 
Turks and Caicosa      948 
Martinique    1,077 
Guadeloupe    1,779 
Bahamasa 13,935 
Average   1,133 
Note.  
a.This country is an archipelago 
Source: World Bank.  
 
2.3.7.  The Level of and Development in GDP Per Capita 
An indicator for the real production per capita11 is the GDP per capita in constant prices.  
However, GDP data in constant prices (or in real terms) are lacking, as most Caribbean micro-
islands do not have GDP deflators.  The growth rate of he GDP (per capita) in constant prices is 
proxied by subtracting the inflation rate from the growth rate of the nominal GDP (per capita).  
                                                 
11 The GDP per capita in real terms is also a proxy of the productivity of labor, assuming that the other 
factors of production are constant and no technological progress has occurred.  
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The wedge between the nominal GDP (per capita) and the GDP (per capita) in constant prices is 
small, as Caribbean micro-islands have low inflation rates (Table 2.4).  For an approximation of 
production per capita therefore, the nominal GDP per capita is appropriate. 
In Table 2.8, the GDP per capita data in nominal US dollars12 in the period of 19952006 
are presented.13  The second column of Table 2.8 shows the large diff rences in the averages of 
GDP per capita across the micro-islands in the period of 19952006.  Bermuda has a high mean 
GDP per capita of $57,660, contrasting to Grenada, which exhibits a small GDP per capita of 
$2,909 on average.  Column 4 of Table 2.8 reports high average per capita nominal growth for 
most Caribbean micro-islands in the period of 19952006.  The low inflation rates reported in 
Table 2.4 and the high nominal growth rates per capita are an indication of su tainable14 growth 
rates.  In the fifth column of Table 2.8, high stand rd deviations of nominal GDP per capita 
growth rates in some of the micro-islands are report d.  The volatility in growth rates is mainly 
due to natural disasters in the Caribbean area, including the hurricanes hitting Anguilla (Luis in 
1995), Grenada (Ivan in 2004), and the Bahamas (Wilma n 2005) and the eruptions of the 
Soufrière Hills volcano in Montserrat since 1995. 
The sixth column shows the per capita GDP of a single observation, which is for the year 
2004.  Point estimates for 2004 were not always available; hence, the year of the reported 
                                                 
12 The data of the French Overseas Departments and Territori s that were originally reported in euros were 
converted into US dollars by applying the average exchange rate of 2006.  In the second column, the average per 
capita GDPs in the period of 1995–2007 are shown.  The population statistics for Guadeloupe includes th  
inhabitants of Saint Barthelemy and Saint Martin.  The data on the GDP of Guadeloupe include only the production 
of Guadeloupe.  Hence, the data of the average GDP per capita of Guadeloupe is an underestimated value of the 
GDP of this country.  
13 Tables 2.6 on population and 2.8 on the GDP per capita use different time periods, and the choice of 
period is based on the data availability.  The population size data are for 1960–2007, while the GDP per capita data 
are for 1995–2006.  The discrepancy between the two peri ds is due to the lack of data on the GDP in the period 
before 1995. The data on the “Départments et territories d’outre-mer” are unavailable in the world databases and 
only accessible in the INSEE.  
14 A sustainable growth rate is defined as GDP (per capita) growth in real terms of 2% and higher. 
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observation is listed in parentheses.  These point estimates fill the information gap on production 
in the countries of Turks and Caicos and the British and US Virgin Islands.  These data show 
relatively high GDP per capita; however, from a single observation, no additional iformation on 
the developments in their production per capita could be derived.  
Similar to other Caribbean micro-islands, Curaçao hs a relatively high per capita GDP, 
indicating a relatively sizeable production per capita.  In contrast to most other Caribbean 
islands, the GDP per capita growth rates in Curaçao were low, implying underperformance in 
Curaçao.  
To summarize, most Caribbean countries reported high growth rates; the exceptions were 
Montserrat and Curaçao.  The small growth rates in Mo tserrat are the result of an adverse 
supply (environment-related) shock.  The underperformance in Curaçao is discussed in the 
second part of the analysis.  As only data on the market structure of Curaçao were available, the 
second part of the analysis discusses the behavior of price setters and its implications for the case 
of Curaçao.  
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Table 2.8 





























































Countries pegged to the US $/with US $ 
   
Grenada    2,909      559 6.3  10.5    2,891 
St. Vincent & Grenadines    3,050      536 5.4    2.9   3,495 
Dominica    3,887      406 3.6    3.8    4,195 
Saint Lucia    4,587      512 3.4    3.5    5,004 
Montserrat   6,753   1,122 2.9    7.9    7,656 
Saint Kitts & Nevis    7,226   1,313 5.8    3.4    8,237 
Barbados (1995–2004)a   8,394     950 4.3    4.3    9,669 
Antigua & Barbuda    9,050   1,281 8.7    3.7    9,988 
Anguilla  10,370   2,914 8.7    9.4  12,360 
Curaçao (1996–2006)b 15,848   1,385 2.2    2.7  16,865 
Bahamas  17,198   2,990 6.3    6.0  18,888 
Aruba  19,859   2,366 3.6    3.6  22,009 
Turks and Caicos (2008)c n.a. n.a. n.a.    n.a. 24,273  
Virgin Islands, British (2005)d n.a. n.a. n.a.    n.a. 37,550  
Virgin Islands, US (2007)e n.a. n.a. n.a.    n.a. 39,915  
Cayman Islands  52,896   7,416 7.6    4.6  56,274 
Bermuda  57,660 16,102 8.4    9.5  70,359 
Countries dollarized with the €  
  
Guadeloupef  17,256   2,760 4.5  1.4  22,896 
Martinique  19,106   2,771 4.3  1.7  24,851  
Saint Barthélemy (Saint Barths)  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a. n.a. 
Notes. 
a.Data on Barbados are for 1995–2004; International Financial Statistics (IFS).  
b.Data on Curaçao are for 1996–2006; CBS of Curaçao. 
c.Data on Turks and Caicos are for 2008, Department Economic Planning and Statistics. 
d.Data on the British Virgin Islands are for 2005 (UN, 2012).  
e.Data on the US Virgin the Islands are for 2007. (Burea  of Economic Analysis [BEA], n.d.)  
f.INSEE  




2.4. The Commodity Markets in Curaçao 
The data on economic structure show the developments by sector and are used as an 
indication of the performance of the commodity markets in Curaçao.  In addition, the market 
structure provides insight into the market forms, the market share by sector, whether firms are state 
owned or privately owned, and whether the prices set by the market forces are administered15 or 
regulated by the government. 
2.4.1. The Economic Structure of Curaçao  
Table 2.9 presents the economic structure of Curaçao in the period of 19962012.16  The 
main shift in the economic structure is the declining share of government in the GDP, from 
19.0% in 1996 to 11.4% in 2006.  Starting in 1988, the government of Curaçao embarked on a 
number of restructuring programs to reduce the governm nt apparatus, which was followed by a 
massive migration (CBCS, 2001).  The underperformance i  the period of 19962006 was 
probably caused by the adverse demand shock generatd by the restructuring of the government.  
In the 19962012 period, small increases occurred in the “hotel and restaurant” sector, 
“real estate, renting and business activities,” “private education,” and the “financial” sector.  
These increases were related to the increased numbers of visitors and the “penshonado facility” 
for European citizens acquiring a second home in the Caribbean, among other things (Baker Tilly 
International, 2009, p. 13).  The “financial sector,” “the government,” and “trade” remained the 
main sectors, which is an indication of a lack of further diversification in the economic structure 
in this period.  Similar to other Caribbean micro-islands, the financial sector is one of Curaçao’s 
                                                 
15 Administered prices are set at sellers’ discretion according to some rules or judgements (Ackley, 1959, p. 
421). 
16 The data from 1996 to 2006 are from the National Accounts and the 2011 and 2012 data are estimates 
produced by the CBS. The classification systems are follow the system of National Accounts of 1993 (SNA93) and 
the international standard industrial classification (ISIC, Revision 3).  
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main economic activities.  Unlike most other Caribbean micro-islands, the government sector, 
instead of the tourism sector, is the second largest economic activity (as % of the GDP).  The 
tourism sector, approximated by the “hotel and restaurants” sector, has a moderately small share 
(approximately 3.7% of the GDP) in Curaçao.17  
To summarize, the two main sectors in the economy of Curaçao are the financial sector 
and the government, whereas most other Caribbean micro-islands have the financial sector and 
tourism as their main sectors.  In addition, in contrast to sustainable growth rates on the 
Caribbean micro-islands within the period of 1995–2006, Curaçao reported low growth rates.  
The underperformance in Curaçao was probably the result of the demand shock caused by the 
public sector restructuring that started in the lat1980s.  As output has been reduced, this 
implied smaller commodity markets. 
  
Table 2.9 
The Gross Domestic Product by Sector in Curaçao (% f Total GDP for 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2012) 
ISIC 
sectionsa Non-financial corporations 1996 2001 2006 2011b 2012b 
A+B+C    Agriculture, fishing, & mining     0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 
D  Manufacturing     8.9 8.0 7.8 7.9 7.9 
E Electricity, gas, & water     4.0 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.4 
F Construction     5.3 4.7 4.8 5.3 5.0 
G Trade   12.1 12.0 10.3 11.0 11.3 
H Hotels & restaurants     2.5 2.8 3.0 3.5 3.7 
I Transport, storage, & communications     9.0 8.5 7.8 8.2 8.6 
K 
Real estate, renting, & business 
activities     5.5 7.7 7.0 6.9 6.7 
M Education (private)     0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 
N Health & social work     2.9 4.3 4.1 4.2 4.0 
O 
Other community, social, & personal 
service activities     1.7 2.8 3.5 3.3 3.2 
 Value added, gross, market prices   52.3 56.5 53.1 54.8 54.9 
                                                 
17 In terms of revenues received from exports, the financial sector and tourism are the two main export 
sectors in Curaçao.  
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Table 2.9 
The Gross Domestic Product by Sector in Curaçao (% f Total GDP for 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2012) 
    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
  Financial corporations      
J     Financial intermediation   16.3   16.9   18.9   17.6   17.8 
 Value added, gross, market prices   16.3   16.9   18.9   17.6   17.8 
       
  Government      
A+B Agriculture     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0     0.0 
I Transport, storage, & communications     0.7     0.3     0.2     0.3     0.3 
K 
Real estate, renting, & business 
activities      0.3     0.1     0.1     0.1     0.1
L 
Public administration & defense; 
compulsory social security     8.7     6.3     7.0     6.5     6.3 
M Education     4.3     1.3     1.7     1.9     1.9
N Health & social work     2.5     1.6     1.3     1.6     1.6 
O 
Other community, social, & personal 
service activities     2.5     1.0     1.0     1.2     1.1 
 Value added, gross, market prices   19.0   10.6   11.4   11.6   11.3 
       
  
Households & non-profit institutions 
serving households      
A+B Agriculture & fishing     0.0     0.0     0.0     n.a.     n.a. 
D Manufacturing     0.0     0.0     0.0     n.a.     n.a. 
F Construction     0.1     0.0     0.0     n.a.     n.a. 
G Trade     0.1     0.2     0.3     n.a.     n.a. 
H Hotels & restaurants     0.1     0.1     0.2     n.a.     n.a. 
I Transport, storage, & communications     0.4     0.4     0.4     n.a.     n.a. 
K 
Real estate, renting, & business 
activities     5.6     7.5     7.8     n.a.     n.a. 
N Health & social work     0.0     0.0     0.0     n.a.     n.a. 
O 
Other community, social, & personal 
service activities     0.4     0.4     0.3     n.a.     n.a. 
P Private households     0.3     0.3     0.3     n.a.      n.a. 
 Value added, gross, market prices     7.1     9.0     9.4     8.5     8.5 
 Total value added, gross, market prices   94.8   93.0   92.7   92.5   92.4 
 Plus taxes less subsidies on products     7.8     9.6     9.7   10.2   10.3 
 Minus Fisimc     2.6     2.6     2.4     2.7     2.7 
  Domestic product, gross, market prices 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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Table 2.9 
The Gross Domestic Product by Sector in Curaçao (% f Total GDP for 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2012) 
Notes.   
a.ISIC is the acronym for International Standard Industrial Classification for all economic activities 
(ISIC, Revision 3). 
b.Estimates. 
c.Fisim: Financial intermediation services indirectly measured.  
Source: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, National Accounts.  
 
2.4.2. The Market Structures in Curaçao  
Table 2.10 presents an overview of the classification of the economic sectors by market 
structure in Curaçao.  For each sector, the market structure provides information on the degree of 
competitiveness, whether firms cooperate or engage in collusive behavior, or whether firms are 
price setters/price takers.  This information is valuable in the assessment of the functioning of the 
commodity markets.  In the table, Column 1 shows the classification system of the ISIC, 
Revision 3, and Column 2 presents the corresponding economic sectors.  The three most 
common market structures in Curaçao, which are the imp rfect competitive markets of 
monopoly, oligopoly, and monopolistic competition, are presented in Columns 3 to 5, and the 
concentration ratios are shown in Column 6.  The concentration ratio is measured by the fraction 
of total sales controlled by the largest group of firms (Lipsey et al., 1991, p. 264).  The threshold 
value for the concentration ratio is set at Q4, the market share of the four largest companies.  
The first market form in Column 3 is the monopoly.  A monopoly is when the output of 
the industry is sold by a single firm (Lipsey et al., 1991, p. 245).  Monopolies on a micro-island 
are not uncommon, as more than one production unit in a sector of a micro-island is often not 
economically feasible, which creates natural monopolies.18  Curaçao has many natural 
monopolies.  In the “manufacturing” sector, the following state monopolies are operating: the 
                                                 
18 A natural monopoly is when the cheapest way to produce at any level of output is by having a single firm 
that produces the goods or services. 
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“Refineria di Kòrsou N.V.” (leasing of the oil refinery), the “Refineria Isla” (oil refining), and 
the “Curaçao Dry-dock Company” (dry docking).  The Venezuelan multinational, PDVSA, 
leases the Refineria Isla, which produces oil derivatives.  The “energy” sector has the state 
monopolies of “Aqualectra N.V.” (water and electricity production and distribution), “Curoil 
N.V.” (sales of oil and oil derivatives), and “Curgas N.V.” (distribution of household gas).  All 
monopolies with the exception of “Mijnmaatschappij” (mining) and Refineria Isla are state-
owned companies.  The government regulates the pricsetting in all of the state-owned 
companies (P. B. No. 203, 1982; P. B. No. 44, 1995), excluding the Curaçao Dry-dock Company.  
The price setting of Refineria Isla and the Dry-dock Company is determined in the international 
markets.  The price setting of sand and bricks produce  by Mijnmaatschappij is regulated.  
“Curaçao Ports Services” is a privately owned company with a monopoly concession on 
stevedoring.  
The second market form in Column 4 is the oligopoly.  An oligopoly contains two or a 
“few” firms, where at least one produces a significant proportion of the industry’s total output.  
The threshold of a “few” firms in an oligopoly may vary between 3 and 12 firms (Lipsey et al., 
1991).  To classify the industry by oligopoly in this dissertation, the maximum of 12 firms has 
been applied.  Oligopolistic markets usually have high concentration ratios.  Firms in 
oligopolistic markets cooperate or engage in tacit collusive behavior.  Tacit collusion is when 
firms agree to cooperate to restrict output and/or raise prices (Lipsey et al., 1991).  The “air 
transportation” sector in Curaçao has an oligopolistic market structure with few firms, mostly 
comprising foreign-based companies.  The airline companies differ in the provided services in 
relation to comfort, possibility of connecting flights, and whether flights are scheduled daily or 
only on specific weekdays.  The air transportation ca be partitioned into transatlantic flights, 
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flights to the US, regional flights, and flights betw en the former islands of the Netherlands 
Antilles.  On January 1, 2012, a new air transportati n policy between the countries of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was agreed on (Protocol 2011, 2011).  The price setting in air 
transportation is based on “commercial considerations n the market place,” Article 13 of the 
Protocol 2011 (2011)) and collusive behavior is not permitted. 
 “Sea transportation” is mainly used for transportation of goods in containers.  Most 
containers arrive full of merchandise, but they are freightless from Curaçao to their next port 
(Curaçao produces mainly services).  This market is oligopolistic, with four large feeders owned 
by mainly foreign companies, and the prices are set int rnationally (D. Cloose, personal 
communication, March 26, 2015).  Another important sector is the financial sector.  In the 
banking sector there is one dominant player, Q1, with 50% of the market share (Department of 
Economic Affairs, “Dienst Economische Zaken” [DEZ], 2004).  The price setting in the banking 






Sectors by Market Structures and the Concentration Ratio in Curaçao in 2011 and 2012 
ISIC Economic sectors   Monopoly Oligopoly 
Monopolistic 
competition  Concentration ratio 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A+B+C 
















Branch of food, 
beverage, tobacco 
Branch of textile, 
leather, wood, 
paper, cartons  
Q4 in the branch of 
food, beverage, 
tobacco has 51% 
Q4 of the branch of 
leather, wood, paper, 
cartons has 68% 
E Electricity, gas, & water 
Aqualectra N.V., 
Curgas N.V, 
Curoil N.V.  
 
 
F Construction  
Infrastructural 




Q4 has 68% 
G 
Trade Curinde N.V.  
Supermarketse, 
tokos, minimarkets  
Pharmaceuticals 
importers: f 
Q4 of the 
supermarkets, tokos 
has 43% 
Q4 has 65% 
H Hotels & restaurants   
Hotels, apartments, 
& villasg, small 
restaurants 
Q4 of the hotels 
apartments has 51% 
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Table 2.10 
Sectors by Market Structures and the Concentration Ratio in Curaçao in 2011 and 2012 
I 
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maximum of 2 
airlinesi 
Sea freight by 
route: maximum 
of 4 mainly 
foreign firms j 
Communication: 
Cable providers: 














branch: foreign firms 
operate 
Public transportation 
branch: Q4 has 70% 
Storage branch: Q4 has 
66% 
Information and 






banking sector: 7 
firmsm 
 
In the domestic banking 
sector, Q1 has 50% (DEZ, 
2004) 
K 













Sectors by Market Structures and the Concentration Ratio in Curaçao in 2011 and 2012 
L 
Public administration 












maximum of 6n 
 Q4 has 56% 











Social and personal 
service activities 










Sectors by Market Structures and the Concentration Ratio in Curaçao in 2011 and 2012 
Notes. Classification of firms according to the ISIC, Revision. 3. 
Source: Construction sector (S. van Rijn, personal communication, March, 16, 2015): 
a.Infrastructure works: Janssen de Jongh, CWM, MNO Vervat, Alianza.  
b.Civil engineering: Ballast Nedam, Curcon, NAB, BWC, Betonbouw, and many others in wood works and painting firms. 
c.Constructors mainly work for the refinery: de Ron Machine Shop, Nederex, MITS, and many other small firms. 
d..Other constructors dealing with installations and technical support.  
e..Supermarkets: 2000, Albert Heijn, Alves, Arco Iris, Artis, Best Buy, Boulevard Market Place, California, Centrum Supermarket, Cost U Less, 
Esperamos, Exito, Goisco, Mangusa, San Pedro, Vreugdenhil. 
f.Pharmaceuticals importers are at least 13 firms and the concentration ratio of Q4 is 65%. Source: J. Barton, personal communication (March, 25, 
2015) 
g..Tourism. Source: Website Curaçao Tourism Board. There are 25 registered hotels, of which 2 have fewer than 20 rooms, 6 have 20–50 rooms, 7 
have 50–100 rooms, 4 have 100–200 rooms, and 6 hotels have more than 200 rooms. The number of registered apartments and villas are 34 and 
18, respectively. 
h.Air travel transportation (Source Curaçao Airport Holding [CAH], personal communication, March 1, 2015): Route Curaçao–US: American 
Airlines, Insel Air, Jet Blue, Miami Air (charter); Route Curaçao-Canada: Air Canada, West Jet, Sunwing (charters); Route: Curaçao–South 
America: Avianca, Surinam Airways, Insel Air, Copa Airlines, Estelar, Rutaca, Avior; Route Curaçao –Bonaire: Divi Divi Air, Insel Air Route 
Curaçao–Sint Maarten: Insel Air; Route Curaçao–Netherlands: KLM, Arkefly; Route Curaçao–Dusseldorf: Air Berlin. 
i.Air Freight (Source: CAH, personal communication, March 1, 2015): Route Curaçao–US: AmeriJet, Ameriflight; Route Curaçao–South America: 
DHL, LAS, Aerosucre; Route Curaçao–Europe: see air travel transportation. 
j.Sea transportation sector: Route US –Curaçao: 4 feeders (of containers): Caribbean Feeder Services, Seafreight, Seaboard, King Ocean; Route 
Transatlantic–Curaçao; Spliethof, Seatrade; Route: Venezuela–Curaçao (2 firms); Route Bonaire–Curaçao: Don Andres (1 firm). Source: D. 
Cloose, personal communication (March 26, 2015). 
k.Communication sector: Cable providers: Flow, Direct TV, Tres Network, TDS.  
l.Internet providers and mobile phones: UTS, Digicel, Flow, Tres Network (no mobile). 
m.Financial intermediation: Domestic banking sector: Banco di Caribe, Maduro Bank, Orco Bank, SFT bank, Giro Bank, RBC Bank, Postbank. 
Source: Department of Economic Affairs (2004). 
n.Education: Universities: UDC, UoC, ICUC,St. Martinus University, Caribbean International University, Avalon, Nashko. Private secondary schools: 
International School, Abel Tasman College, Schroeder, Omega, Vespucci.  
o.Health: Hospitals: Advent ziekenhuis, Kraamkliniek, Taams kliniek, ‘ Sint Elisabeth hospital (Sehos). 
p.Laboratories: Advent, ADC, Lab de medicos, Medial laboratory services, Laboratory of the “Sint Elisabeth” Hospital 
 





The third market form, monopolistic competition, is when there are many sellers with 
product differentiation, and easy entry and exit of firms.  In the “tourism” sector, the hotels, 
apartments, and villas have a monopolistic competitiv  market structure.  The hotels have 
differentiated products and are competing in the tourist markets of Europe, the United States, and 
Latin America.  The price setting of the hotels is determined largely by the quality of the product 
(often based on whether it is a chain hotel or an independent hotel).  As there is product 
differentiation in the accommodation of the tourism ector, this sector is less likely to cooperate 
in price setting; hence, tacit collusion is less likely.  
The “trade” sector can be partitioned into import/wholesale and retail.  A few importers 
are also retailers.  The “retail trade” is best described through a street scene in a neighborhood.  
On every street corner, a small grocery shop/convenience store (also called a toko, tienda, or 
minimarket) is present, adjacent to a snack bar.  The number of firms in the retail sector is large, 
and the products are differentiated.  Hence, retailers operate in a monopolistic competition 
structure.  In these grocery shops, clients “walk in,” as the stores cater mainly to the 
neighborhood and those in walking distance.  The larger supermarkets are fewer in number (see 
note e in Table 2.10) and are organized in the Curaçao supermarkets association, (SUVECU). 
The supermarkets carry a larger variety of goods an are cheaper than the 
tokos/minimarkets.  Nonetheless, the tokos have some advantages compared to the supermarkets.  
The tokos are easily accessible, and as a result, they are frequently visited by the elderly.  The 
owner and client have a long-term relationship and may even be on a first-name basis.  In 
addition, for a small errand, the nearest store is a toko.  Tokos have longer business hours than 
the larger supermarkets, and they are usually open n holidays.  The latter is explained by the 




In the trade sector, selected food items are regulated (P. B. No. 117, 1961; P. B. No. 76, 
1965).  Price regulation in this sector is based on a maximum markup.  The prices of the 
nonregulated goods are set by a markup on the import prices (J. Gois, personal communication, 
May 27, 2015).  Hence, these prices in the trade sector are administered.  Moreover, tacit 
collusion in supermarkets’ price setting has been repo ted (Koek, 2014).  Two other sectors also 
reported to have tacit collusion are the “construction” sector and the branch of importers of 
pharmaceuticals (Koek, 2014).  Both sectors have high concentration ratios and tacit collusion.  
The Q4 of the construction sector is 68%.  The branch of importers of pharmaceuticals has a Q4 
of 65% (J. Barton, personal communication, March 25, 2015).  In the latter branch, the prices of 
some selected medicines are regulated (P. B. No. 28, 2012; P. B. No. 40, 2014). 
2.5. Conclusions 
Caribbean micro-islands have very small populations, each with less than half a million 
inhabitants.  Consequently, their commodity markets are small.  Although the economic 
cooperation of the OECS and CARICOM has extended th commodity markets of 14 of the 
Caribbean micro-islands, in the absence of inter-island freight and personal transportation, and 
given the lack of comparative advantage (micro-islands tend to specialize in similar exports), the 
benefits of a larger internal market of the micro-islands remain unexploited.  As a result, the 
costs of production of these small islands remain high.  Next to the high production costs are the 
high import-to-GDP ratios.  Micro-islands are therefo  highly dependent on sea and air 
transportation, and these costs tend to be relativey higher than in larger economies (Winters, 
2005).  Micro-islands tend to have low domestic inflation rates, the result of dollarization or pegs 




Caribbean micro-islands are price takers, and theirdomestic prices are expected to be 
flexible.  However, the observed sticky prices in Curaçao invite a more in-depth analysis.  Thus, 
the aim of this chapter was to pinpoint factors that m y explain why the domestic prices of 
Curaçao deviate from the international prices. 
The factors considered were inflation, collusive behavior, high concentration ratios, and 
price regulation.  Inflation causes wages to rise, which affects future domestic price adjustment.  
Hence, inflation is a factor that may cause the domestic prices to deviate from the international 
prices.  According to the theory of collusive behavior, particularly in oligopolistic markets, such 
behavior of firms brings about sticky domestic prices.  In addition, a low degree of market 
competition is associated with less frequent change i  prices and even sticky prices.  Following 
the next hypothesis, concentration ratios of the Q4 are used as a measure for a low degree of 
market competition.  Finally, according to the price regulation hypothesis, this keeps the price 
fixed for a period of time, possibly leading to sticky prices.  Sticky prices imply that the 
domestic prices are not following the international prices, causing the domestic prices to deviate 
from the international prices. 
Inflation, the collusive behavior of firms, concentration ratios of the Q4, and price 
regulation are factors that lead domestic prices to diverge from international price setting.  
Inflation affects how often prices change, and it is a variable in the state-dependent pricing 
hypothesis.  The collusive behavior of firms, high concentration ratios of the Q4, and price 
regulation are sources of price rigidity in the various price-rigidity hypotheses.  These factors are 
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STICKY PRICES ON A CARIBBEAN MICRO-ISLAND 
Small islands are price takers, and they are assumed to have flexible prices.  The “price-
flexibility hypothesis” implies that domestic prices instantaneously change following an 
adjustment in the world market price.  The assumption of flexible prices in these economies has 
remained uncontested, as only recently were data on price adjustment in small Caribbean islands 
published in a report (CCMF, 2011).19 This report contained data on price adjustment of five small 
Caribbean islands, including three micro-islands.  The micro-islands of Barbados and Saint Lucia 
reported frequent price changes, while Curaçao showed infrequent price changes.  
Given the frequent adjustments of import and export rices in Curaçao, the domestic 
price changes are expected to follow these movements.  This is explained as follows.  A change 
in import prices affects the costs of the inputs of production, and these costs will be passed on 
through domestic prices.  Changes in export prices will also be passed on through domestic 
prices.  Doing otherwise may result in a loss of competitiveness.  However, since domestic price 
changes in Curaçao are rather infrequent, the expected price flexibility is contradicted.  Hence, 
sticky prices in Curaçao create a puzzle that needs further analysis.  Therefore, the aim of this 
chapter is to elaborate on the characteristics of price adjustments in Curaçao.  The analysis is 
based on the stylized facts concerning how often prices change and on the rigidity of prices.  
Such data contribute to the matching of the relevant price-rigidity theories to this price-rigidity 
puzzle.  In addition, they provide evidence concerning the magnitude of price adjustments in 
Curaçao.  
                                                 
19 The participating countries were as follows: Barbados (Craigwell, Winston, & Worell, 2011), Curaçao 
(Carolina, 2011), Guyana (Ganga, 2011), Trinidad an Tobago (Mahabir & Jagessar, 2011), and Saint Lucia (Polius 




Price adjustments have high or low frequencies.  A high frequency corresponds to flexible 
prices, as prices change often; meanwhile, a low frequency means that prices change rarely and 
prices are sticky.  In the literature on price adjustment, the distinction between sticky and flexible 
pricing is arbitrary; hence, a benchmark is necessary to define sticky prices.  The benchmark 
used in this chapter is based on international studies that have categorized prices to be either 
sticky or flexible.  With this benchmark, it is possible to distinguish sticky from flexible prices 
and test whether the prices in Curaçao comply with the price-flexibility hypothesis. 
The statistics of price change frequency and the duration of price spell, which is the period 
wherein prices remain unchanged, are calculated using m cro-data from the commodity markets.  
Micro-data include the data collected to produce the CPI, the producer price index (PPI), surveys 
sent to firms asking about price setting, scanner data (data using the bar code of the product and 
other information about the product), or online price data (price data of firms operating on the 
Web).  In this chapter, I use the CPI data, which have been compiled from the national statistical 
agencies, to measure the frequency and size of price adjustments. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Section 3.1 discusses the literature on price 
adjustment and derives a benchmark for the distinctio  between sticky and flexible prices.  This 
benchmark is used as the yardstick to measure whether prices are sticky or flexible in Curaçao.  
The stylized facts on the pricing behavior in Curaçao are presented in Section 3.2, and Section 
3.3 draws conclusions on the price-rigidity hypothesis, which may (not) apply to Curaçao.  
3.1. Sticky Versus Flexible Prices 
Changing prices immediately after a shock entail a h gh speed of price adjustment and are 
indicative of a process with flexible price adjustment.  Prices may also be sticky, resulting in 




change frequencies or from the duration of price spell  (Álvarez et al., 2005; Bils & Klenow, 
2004).  In the literature on price adjustment, there are two approaches that are commonly used to 
measure the frequency of the price change.  The first approach employs the micro-data from 
surveys of firms.  This approach was pioneered by Blinder (1991, 1994, 1998) for randomly 
selected US firms.  The question asked to the US managers in Blinder (1994) was as follows: 
“How often do the prices of your most important products change in a typical year?” (p. 120).  
This method provides an approximation of the frequency of price adjustment, as the answers are 
based on a firms’ interpretation on how often prices of their most important products have 
changed.  The second approach is calculated from CPI or PI micro-data.  The latter approach is 
preferred, as in contrast to the former, it measures th  price change frequency based on a large 
sample of reported data.  In this chapter, CPI-based price change frequencies are applied, mainly 
because on micro-islands, only CPI micro-data are available.  The price change frequency of a 
product or service is defined as the fraction of price changes within a given month.  
A theory-based benchmark for the classification of sticky and flexible prices is 
nonexistent; hence, the distinction between the two is unclear.  According to Blinder (1991, p. 
90), the concept of sticky prices is often used to efine a process of price adjustment that occurs 
“less rapidly” than the Walrasian market-clearing prices.  However, the term “less rapidly” is not 
defined, and the Walrasian equilibrium prices are unknown; hence, there is no norm for market-
clearing prices (Blinder, 1991, p. 90).  This implies that it is difficult to measure whether prices 
are moving fast or slowly or distinguish sticky from flexible prices unambiguously.  My 
approach is to use a sample of studies including CPI-based price change frequencies that qualify 
the price adjustments as sticky.  As a low mean price change frequency marks stickiness, an 




be considered sticky.  In small developing economies, fl xible prices are expected, and sticky 
prices are more likely to occur in larger economies.  Hence, for the setting of a benchmark for 
sticky prices, the literature of the larger economies is reviewed. 
Most national statistical agencies, including the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
departments of statistics in the euro area, started to share the micro data of the CPIs with their 
respective national researchers in the late 2000s (Bils & Klenow, 2004).  With this supply of 
micro-data, a large amount of literature on price adjustments that uses the methodology 
described in Dhyne et al. (2005) to calculate the (sizes of) price change frequencies has been 
produced.  I categorize the countries by the level of development determined by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) classification system as of February 2011 (Nielson, 
2011). 
Table 3.1 shows the price change frequencies in developed economies, partitioned into 
European countries and other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries.  The European countries are categorized in the euro area and other European 
countries.  The sample period listed in the second column differs by country and depends on the 
availability of data provided by the national statistical agencies.  The longest sample period is 30 
years, reported by Norway, while the shortest is 2 years, reported by Israel.  The average price 
change frequencies (Columns 3 and 4) and the median price change frequencies (Columns 5 and 
6) of all CPI categories, excluding dwellings, are listed.  Price change frequencies are measured 
by the type of prices.  The types of price are as follows: the posted prices, which are the 
published prices (sale and non-sale or discounted prices); and the regular prices, which consist of 
non-sale prices.  In the studies of Austria, Norway the United Kingdom, and the United States, 





Frequencies of Price Changes in the Total of CPI Categories in the Developed Countries 
(Period Averages in Percentage of Months, Excluding Rent) 
Country/countries Sample period 
Frequency (in 
% of months) 
Frequency (in % of months) 
Mean Median 
Posted Regular Posted Regular 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The Euro area: 
Italya 1996.012003.12   8.8    
Germanyb 1998.012004.01 10.0    
Spainc 1993.01–2001.12 15.0    
Austriad 1996.012003.12 15.1 12.8 n.a. n.a. 
Netherlandse 1998.112003.04 16.5  17.9  
Belgiumf  1989.012001.01 16.9  n.a.  
Luxembourgg 1999.012004.12 17.0    
Franceh 1994.072003.02 18.9  14.9  
Finlandi 1997.012003.12 17.0/20.0  4.8/5.6  
Portugalj 1992.01–2001.01 22.0  11.7  
Other European countries 
Denmarkk 1997.012005.12 17.3 n.a. 11.8 n.a. 
United Kingdoml 1996.012006.01 19.0 15.0 n.a. n.a. 
Norwaym 1975.012004.12 21.9 21.3 14.3 13.0 
Other OECD countries 
Japann 1999.012003.12 21.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Israelo 1991.011992.12 24.5 n.a. 20.0 n.a. 
United Statesp 1995.011997.12 26.1 23.6 20.9 n.a. 
United Statesq 1988.022005.01 36.2 29.9 27.3 13.9 





Frequencies of Price Changes in the Total of CPI Categories in the Developed Countries 
(Period Averages in Percentage of Months, Excluding Rent) 
Notes. 
a.Source: Veronese, Fabiani, Gatulli and Sabbatini (2005). Posted prices. 
b.Source: Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2005). 
c.Source: Alvarez and Hernando (2006). Posted prices only, excluding tobacco, rents, energy, 
telecommunications, car, hotels, and services. 
d.Source: Baumgartner, Glatzer, Rumler, and Stiglbauer (2005). 
e.Source: Jonker, Folkertsma and Blijenberg (2004). Posted prices. Double weighted sample. 
f.Source: Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004). Posted prices only. 
g.Source: Lunnemann and Matha (2005). Posted prices only. 
h.Source: Baudry, Le Bihan, Sevestre and Tarrieu (2004). Posted prices only. 
i.Source: Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2004). Posted prices only. The data are from the two samples: 
pre- (17%) and post-2000 (20%) data. 
j.Source: Dias, Dias and Neves (2004). Posted prices only. 
k.Source: Hansen and Hansen (2006). Posted prices only. 
l.Source: Bunn and Ellis (2009), the posted price data include all prices, the regular price data exclude 
temporary discounts. 
m.Source: Wulfsberg (2009). Posted prices and regular prices (posted price excluding sales). 
n.Source: Saita and Higo. (2007). Posted prices only.  
o.Source: Baharad and Eden (2003). Posted prices only. 
p.Source: Bils and Klenow (2004). Posted prices only. 
q.Source: Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). Posted and regular prices. 
r.Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The CPI data are the revised data of the Bureau of Labour 
Statistics. The revision included data starting 1998. The posted price data include both sales and 
substitution, the regular price data exclude sales nd substitutions. 
 
The European central banks compiled an impressive list of studies on price adjustment in 
the euro area under the umbrella of the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN; Dhyne et al., 2005).  
In the IPN studies, price change frequencies were mainly calculated on posted prices.  The 
results for the two categories of European countries (the euro area and other European countries) 
are shown in Table 3.1.  The IPN studies of the euro area also reported that the price change 
frequencies in the different categories of the CPIs were heterogeneous, with both low and high 
price change frequencies (Dhyne et al., 2005).  European countries outside the euro area reported 
similar results (Bunn & Ellis, 2009; Hansen & Hansen, 2006; Wulfsberg, 2009).  Table 3.1 




Most of the countries classified as other OECD countries reported higher mean posted 
prices than the European countries.  It is worth mentioning that the first extensive study using the 
complete “non-housing” commodities (excluding dwellings/rental fees) was carried out by Bils 
and Klenow in 2004; they used monthly US CPI data for the period of 1995 to 1997.  This was 
followed by studies on price adjustment in the United States by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) 
and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).  These studies diff r in the sample periods, the use of CPI 
or PPI data, or both, as well as in the regional areas of the sample.  The studies on the United 
States and those on countries in the “other OECD” group, namely Japan (Saita & Higo, 2007) 
and Israel (Baharad & Eden, 2003), reported heterogeneous price frequency adjustment, which 
means that there are high and low price change frequencies across the CPI categories.  In 
addition, in the non-euro area (the other European and other OECD countries), the mean is 
higher than the median.  
To conclude, price frequency adjustments in the developed countries have been reported 
as heterogeneous.  As shown Table 3.1, particularly in the non-euro area, the mean is higher than 
the median.  This means that the mass lies to the left, with the “tail” toward the right (right-
skewed distribution). 
Table 3.2 shows selected Latin American, African, and Caribbean developing countries that 
reported their (posted) price change frequencies.  Of this group, only South Africa reported a low 
mean price change frequency of 15.9% of months.  In general, the Latin American and Caribbean 
countries reported comparatively higher price change frequencies than the developed countries 






Frequencies of Price Changes in the Total of the CPI ategories in the Developing Countries 









Frequency (in % 
of months) 
Frequency (in % of 
months) 
Mean posted Median posted 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Latin American countries 
Brazila 1996.012006.12 37 n.a. 
Chileb 1999.012005.07 46.1 33.3 
African Countries 
South Africac 2001.122006.02 15.9 n.a. 
Sierra Leoned 1999.012003.04 51.5  
Caribbean countries (CCMF, 2011) 
Barbadose 1994.012008.12 50–80 n.a. 
Trinidad & Tobagof 2004.012010.12 1–90 n.a. 
Guyanag 1994.012004.12 98.4 n.a. 
Saint Luciah 1984.042008.01 98 n.a. 
Notes.  
a.Source: Gouvea (2007). Posted prices only. 
b.Source: Medina, Rappoport, and Soto (2007). Posted prices only. 
c.Source: Creamer and Rankin (2008). Posted prices only. 
d.Source: Kovanen (2006). Posted prices of food items only. 
e.Source: Craigwell et al. (2011). The data present the range of price change frequencies 
on the 1 digit COICOP level. Posted prices only. 
f.Source: Mahabir and Jagessar (2011). The data present th  range of price change 
frequencies. Posted prices only. 
g.Source: Ganga (2011). Posted prices only. 
h.Source: Polius and St. Catherine (2011). Posted prices only. 
 
  
In both developed and developing countries, heterogeneity in price change frequencies 
across product categories has been reported.  In most of the reported Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, price changes occurred more frequently compared to the developed 




The counterpart of the price change frequency is the duration of the price spell.  This is 
the period wherein prices remain unchanged; it is calculated as the inverse function of the price 
change frequency.  The duration of price spell datafor developed and developing countries are 
shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.  The duration of regular prices is longer than that of 
posted prices, as sales are not included in the regular prices; therefore, it takes longer for regular 
prices to change when compared to posted prices.  The duration of price spell in the developed 
countries is also longer than in most developing countries, reflecting more frequent price changes 
in the latter. 
Both the duration of price spell and the price change frequency provide similar 
conclusions on the degree of price flexibility (Alvarez & Hernando, 2006).  A short duration is 
equal to high price change frequency, which is similar to a high speed of price adjustment.  
However, the use of the data on duration of the price spell to measure the benchmark for sticky 
versus flexible prices has the disadvantage that there are three methods of calculating the 
duration of price spell for the aggregated CPI categori s; hence, the calculation is ambiguous.  
Two of these methods assume discrete calculations,20 while one assumes continuous21 price 
setting.  Let  be the price change frequency of sector j.  The first discrete method is the inverse 
of the expectation of price frequencies (1/E), while second discrete method is the expectation 
of inverse of the price change frequency (E (1/)). The third method, the calculus of duration of 
price spell, assumes a continuous price setting of −1/((1 − .   
                                                 
20 The price adjustments using the discrete assumption are reported in months only. 
21 The price adjustments using the continuous assumption are reported in (a combined form of) days, 





Duration of the Total of the CPI Categories in the D veloped Countries 







Duration (in months) Duration (in months) 
Mean Median 
Posted Regular Posted Regular 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The Euro area 
Italya 1996.012003.12 10.8    
Germanyb 1998.012004.01     
Spainc 1993.012001.12   6.7    
Austriad 1996.012003.12 14.1 16.1 11.1 14.0 
Netherlandse 1998.112003.04   9.7    8.7  
Belgiumf 1989.012001.01 n.a.  13.3  
Luxembourgg 1999.012004.12 11.8    8.2  
Franceh 1994.072003.02 
 
  8.4   9.5   6.2  
Finlandi 1997.012003.12 4.8–5.6  3.3–3.9  
Portugalj 1992.012001.01     8.5  
Other European countries  
Denmarkk 1997.012005.12 15.5 n.a. 11.8 n.a. 
United Kingdoml 1996.012006.01   5.3   6.7 n.a. n.a. 
Norwaym 1975.01 2004.12   8.1   8.4   6.5   7.2 
Other OECD countries 
Japann 1999.01−2003.12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Israelo 1991.01−1992.12 ..5.8 n.a.   4.6 n.a. 
United Statesp 1995.01−1997.12   3.3 n.a.   4.3   5.5. 
United Statesq 1988.02−2005.01   6.8   8.9   3.7   7.2 





Duration of the Total of the CPI Categories in the D veloped Countries 
(Period Averages in months, Excluding Rent) 
Notes. 
a.Source: Veronese et al. (2005). The duration is calcul ted by (1/E). 
b.Source: Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2006). Duration is not calculated. 
c.Source: Alvarez and Hernando (2006). Posted prices only, excluding tobacco, rents, energy, 
telecommunications, car, hotels, and services. The duration is calculated by (1/E). 
d.Source: Baumgartner et al. (2005). The mean duration is calculated by1/((1  )). 
e.Source: Jonker et al. (2004). The mean duration is calculated by 1/((1  )). 
f.Source: Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004). Weighted median duration (calculation not shown). 
g.Source: Lunnemann and Matha (2005). The mean duration is calculated by1/((1  )). 
h.Source: Baudry et al. (2004). The mean duration is calculated by1/((1  )). 
i.Source: Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2005). Posted prices only. The data are from the two samples: 
pre- and post-2000 data. The mean duration is calculated by1/((1  )). 
j.Source: Dias et al. (2004). The mean duration is calculated by (1/E). 
k.Source: Hansen and Hansen (2006). Posted prices only. The mean duration is calculated 
by −1/((1 − . 
l.Source: Bunn and Ellis (2009). The posted price data include all prices; the regular price data exclude 
temporary discounts. The mean duration is calculated by (1/E).  
m.Source: Wulfsberg (2009). Posted prices and regular prices (posted price excluding sales). The mean 
duration is calculated by −1/((1 − . 
n. Source: Saita et al. (2007). The duration is not calculated. 
o.Source: Baharad and Eden (2003). Posted prices only. The mean duration is calculated by (1/E).  
p.Source: Bils and Klenow (2004). Posted prices only. The mean duration is calculated by 
−1/((1 − . 
q.Source: Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). Posted and regular prices. The mean duration is calculated by 
(1/E).  
r.Source: Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). The CPI data are the revised data of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. The revision included data starting 1998. The mean duration is calculated by 
−1/((1 − . 
The posted price data include both sales and substit tions; the regular price data exclude sales and 
substitutions. One month is on average 30 days; 10.8 months is equal to 10 months and 24 days. 
 
 
Empirical studies have selected one of these three methods, and the results of the duration 
of price spell data are not comparable for a number of reasons.  First, there is a discrepancy 
between the continuous and discrete calculations.  Second, there is a discrepancy between the 




produce duration of price spell data; hence, for a comparison between countries, duration data 
are less appropriate.  Instead, the more uniformly defined price change frequencies are more 
suitable. 
The mean and median both measure the central tendency of the data with an unknown 
distribution, as in the case of the price change frequency.  The studies on price change frequency 
in both developed and developing countries have report d heterogeneity in price adjustments 
(Bils and Klenow, 2004; Dhyne et al., 2005; CCMF, 2011).  With outliers of low and high price 
change frequencies, the use of the median would be pref rred.  However, the median is not 
reported for either the euro countries or the majority f developing countries.  Hence, despite its 







Duration of the Total of the CPI Categories in the D veloping Countries 

















Latin American countries  
Brazila 1996.012006.12 2.2 1.9 
Chileb 1999.012005.07 n.a. n.a. 
African countries 
Sierra Leonec 1999.012003.04 n.a. n.a. 
South Africad 2001.122006.01 n.a. n.a. 
Caribbean countries (CCMF, 2011) 
Barbadose 1994.012008.12 1.3–1.8 0.45–0.86 
Trinidad & Tobagof 2004.012010.12 0.33–114.9 0.17–79.7 
Guyanag 1994.012004.12 0.24 0.17 
Saint Luciah 1984.042008.01 0.26 0.18 
Notes.  
a.Source: Gouvea (2007). Posted prices only. The mean duration is calculated 
by1/((1  )), and the median is −(0.5/((1 − . 
b.Source: Medina et al. (2007). Duration is not calcul ted. 
c.Source: Kovanen (2006). Duration is not calculated. 
d.Source: Creamer and Rankin (2008). Duration is not calculated. 
e.Source: Craigwell et al. (2011). The data present the range of price change 
frequencies on the 1 digit COICOP level. Posted prices only. The duration 
is calculated by−1/((1 − . 
f.Source: Mahabir and Jagessar (2011). The data present the range of price change 
frequencies. Posted prices only. 
g.Source: Ganga (2011). Posted prices only. The duration is calculated by 
−1/(((1 − . 
h.Source: Polius and St. Catherine (2011). Posted prices only. The duration is 
calculated by −1/((1 − . 





To set the maximum threshold value for sticky prices, the information of the countries 
reporting infrequent price change frequencies are used, specifically the United States and the 
countries in the euro area.  Bils and Klenow (2004) registered an average posted price change 
frequency of 26.1% and reported that prices are both sticky and flexible in the United States.  In 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) version of this publication (Bils & Klenow, 
2002, p. 14), the sticky price sector was defined as representing 10th percentile of price change 
frequencies (or 10% of months), and the flexible prices represented the 90th percentile.  The euro 
countries of Austria (Baumgartner et al., 2005, p. 5) and France (Baudry et al., 2004, p. 33) have 
been described as having “sticky” price changes.  The respective mean price change frequencies 
were 15.0%, and 18.9%.  Meanwhile, Dhyne et al. (2005) described the low speed of price 
adjustment in the euro area as “rarely” (p. 12) occurring price adjustments.  In the euro area, the 
maximum mean posted price change frequency was 22%. As this is the maximum value 
reported for sticky prices, the upper bound threshold value of a mean price change frequency of 
22% is used to define sticky prices in this dissertation.  
To assess whether prices are sticky or flexible in Curaçao, the benchmark of 22% is 
applied to the mean price change frequency of this country.  In addition, the stylized facts of the 
price adjustments provide information on price setting in Curaçao.  
3.2. Stylized Facts on Price Adjustment in Curaçao 
Following the IPN project of the Euro area, the CCMF initiated a study on price rigidity 
in the Caribbean area.  The CCMF project started in 2008 and had a similar objective to the IPN 
project, namely to provide information on inflation persistence and price rigidity.  The CCMF 
project produced data on price change frequency, inreases and decreases, the duration of price 




countries that responded, only three were micro-islands, namely, Barbados, Saint Lucia, and 
Curaçao.  The response rate corresponds to one-fifth o  the total population of the Caribbean 
micro-islands. 
From the three micro-islands, only the micro-data for Curaçao were available for my 
research.22  This section presents (stylized facts of) the CPImicro-data for Curaçao in the period 
of October 2006–March 2010.  The raw micro–price data were collected by the CBS of Curaçao 
for the purpose of constructing the CPIs.  The monthly collected “on-the-shelf” price quotes 
included those items of household expenditures as reported in the budget surveys, which are 
administered every 5 years.  
The categories of the CPI data excluded rental fees and covered 82% of the CPI.  June 
2009 was unreported, due to an error made by the statistical office when providing the data.  The 
type of prices was posted prices.  Data in the analysis on the price adjustments in Curaçao by 
Carolina (2011), published in the CCMF publication of 2011, were revised to include observed 
data only, thereby excluding the non-observed rental fees.  The rental fees in the database were 
set by the CBS to rise automatically every month by 0.2% and were not monitored.  
The CBS of Curaçao used its own classification system for product categories of the CPI.  
To increase the comparability with other studies in th s field, the product categories were 
reclassified using the UN classification system, namely the classification of individual 
consumption according to purpose (COICOP).  The COICOP contains three levels of 
aggregation of product categories.  The first level is the two digit-code of the individual 
consumption expenditure of households.  Category 01 consists of “food and non-alcoholic 
                                                 
22 A comparative analysis between the Caribbean micro-islands on the stylized facts of price change 
frequency would have been useful; however, the micro-data of the respective countries were exclusively available to 




beverages” and Category 02 of “alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics.” The second level, 
representing the subcategories of the first level, has a three digit code (e.g., 01.1 for “food” or 
02.2 for “tobacco”).  The third level is the four digit code of the product item.  For example, the 
codes of 01.1.2 and 09.5.1 refer to “meat” and “books,” respectively. 
The first and the second levels of the COICOP classification are used to present the data 
for Curaçao in Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.  In Table 3.5, the data of the price change frequencies are 
presented, denoted in percentage of months.  The third level of the COICOP also presents the 
possibility of partitioning and analyzing commodities in terms of the categories of durables (d), 
non-durables (nd), services (s), and semi-durables (sd).  The classification by category at the first 
level is derived from the combination of the classifications used at the third and the second levels 




































01.1 nd Food 15 10 5 
02  nd Beverages & tobacco 53 36 17 
03 nd/sd Clothing & footwear 4 3 1 
04 nd/s 
Housing, water, electricity, gas, & other 
fuels 
4 3 1 
05 d/sd 
Furnishing, household equipment, & 
routine household maintenance 
7 5 2 
06 d/nd/s Health 12 8 4 
07 & 08 d/sd/s Transportation & communication 9 7 2 
09 & 10 d/sd/s Recreation & education 5 3 2 
12 d/sd/s Miscellaneous goods & services 9 6 3 
Notes.  
a.Type categorizes the commodities by durables (d), non-durables (nd), services (s), and semi-
durables (sd). 
b.Column 4=Column 5+ Column 6. 
 
 
The first stylized fact is that price change frequenci s in the categories are heterogeneous.  
The frequencies of price changes vary from low in most categories to high in the category of 
“beverage and tobacco.”  Curaçao has a mean price change frequency of 9% of months.  Since 
this is lower the benchmark of sticky prices of 22%, Curaçao has sticky prices.  The second 
stylized fact is the low mean price change frequency of 9% and sticky prices in Curaçao.  The 
third stylized fact is the asymmetric price-setting behavior.  In all categories, prices are sticky 
downwards, as price increases occur more frequently than price decreases.  Low frequencies of 
price change, as shown in Table 3.5, by definition c rrespond to high durations of price spell, 




in months.  The price-flexibility hypothesis on micro-islands suggests short durations of price 
spells.  However, the data show high mean and median durations of price spell of at least 4 
months, with exception of the “beverages and tobacco” ategory.  Hence, the fourth stylized fact 
is the long durations of price spells with exception of the beverages and tobacco.  This category 
has a low duration of price spells, as these items are high-demand export products, and thus their 
prices change frequently. 
 
Table 3.6 
Mean and Median Duration of Price Changes in Curaçao (in Months in the Period of 



















01.1 nd Food   6.20   4.30 
02  nd Beverages & tobacco   1.30   0.90 
03 nd/sd Clothing & footwear 24.50 17.00 
04 nd/s 
Housing, water, electricity, gas, & other 
fuels 
10.30   7.10 
05 d/sd 
Furnishing, household equipment, & 
routine household maintenance 
13.80   9.60 
06 d/nd/s Health   7.80   5.40 
07 & 08 d/sd/s Transportation & communication 10.60   7.30 
09 & 10 d/sd/s Recreation & education 19.45 13.50 
12 d/sd/s Miscellaneous goods & services 10.60   7.45
Notes.  
a.Type categorizes the commodities by durables (d), non-durables (nd), services (s), 
and semi-durables (sd).  
b.Mean and median are calculated on the assumption of continuous price setting (in 




While facts on the frequencies and durations of price spells provide information on the 
degree of flexibility of price adjustment, the sizes of price adjustments offer additional 




stylized fact is that the sizes of price changes ar almost symmetrical.  The average size of price 
increases and decreases are almost symmetrical in the ca egories of “food,” “beverages and 
tobacco,” “housing, water, electricity, gas, and other fuels,” and “health.”  The largest average 
price decline was reported in the category “clothing a d footwear,” and the largest average price 
increase occurred in the category of “housing, water, el ctricity, gas, and other fuels.”  Among 
other things, the latter consists of energy prices, which have the tendency to increase 
substantially in a period of oil price hikes. 
Table 3.7 
























01.1 nd Food 12.3 –12.3 
02  nd Beverages & tobacco 11.1 –11.7 
03 nd/sd Clothing & footwear 18.0 –23.0 
04 nd/s Housing, water, electricity, gas, & other fuels 21.0 –20.9 
05 d/sd 
Furnishing, household equipment, & routine 
household maintenance 
10.7 –11.9 
06 d/nd/s Health   9.1 –  8.1 
07 & 08 d/sd/s Transportation & communication 10.7 –14.2 
09 & 10 d/sd/s Recreation & education 19.3 –13.5 
12 d/sd/s Miscellaneous goods & services 10.5 –  8.8 
Notes.  






The aim of this chapter was to provide an analysis of price adjustments, whether they are 
sticky or flexible in Curaçao.  A commonly used yardstick of price change frequency that 




the literature on price adjustments based on the CPI was used.  As low price change frequencies 
mark price stickiness, the benchmark for sticky prices applied in this chapter was a mean price 
change frequency lower than 22%.  Since its mean price change frequency is 9%, Curaçao has 
sticky prices.  
The stylized facts on frequency and the magnitude of price adjustments showed important 
aspects of the price adjustments in Curaçao.  The pric change frequencies were heterogeneous, 
with low and high price change frequencies in the diff rent CPI categories.  At 9%, the mean 
price change frequency was significantly low.  This corresponded to an average duration of price 
spells of 10 months.  Another stylized fact is that prices are sticky downward, meaning that 
prices were found to be resistant to drop. 
As the distinction between short- and long- term is usually set at 1 year, the duration of 
price spells of 10 months could be classified as short-term.  Therefore, prices in Curaçao are 
sticky in the short-run.  This implies that the price-flexibility hypothesis fails to hold in Curaçao, 
creating a price-rigidity puzzle.  This puzzle will be examined further in this dissertation, 
particularly in terms of the determinants of the price rigidity and which price-rigidity theories 
apply on a micro-island.  One theory that is not applicable in Curaçao is the kinked demand 
theory.  According to this theory, the oligopolist wants to increase the market share by price 
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ON THE FREQUENCY AND SIZE OF PRICE CHANGES IN CURAÇO 
Cost shocks, such as higher (oil) import prices or inc eases in the transportation costs, are 
usually followed by domestic price adjustments.  However, despite the frequent cost shocks, firms 
in Curaçao have changed prices infrequently; thus, the determinants of price change frequencies 
require further exploration.  The intriguing question is as follows: What drives the price change 
frequencies in Curaçao?  
The price-rigidity hypotheses that are likely to apply in Curaçao are tacit collusion and the 
state-dependent and time-dependent theories.  In addition, the degree of market competition is 
discussed as a potential factor of influence on the frequencies of price change in Curaçao.  The 
hypotheses of tacit collusion and the degree of market competition are both based on 
(characteristics of) market structures, which influence the price change frequencies.  An 
oligopolistic market structure is one factor that has been found to influence price change 
frequencies.  In the hypothesis of tacit collusion, each oligopolist will avoid lowering the price, 
even if the demand elasticity has changed.  According to Stiglitz (1984), even when the demand 
curves of commodities change, firms will not adjust their prices because the losses incurred by not 
adjusting prices are outweighed by the gains from the collusive behavior.  Hence, tacit collusion 
in the oligopolistic market may be an explanation fr infrequent price changes.  
Another factor considered to influence the price change frequencies is the degree of market 
competition (Carlton, 1989; Fabiani et al., 2005).  The degree of market competition declines with 
lower numbers of sellers in a market.  An inverse indicator often used to measure the degree of 




with higher competition are reported to have higher price change frequency.  The studies of Carlton 
(1989) and Bils and Klenow (2004) showed an inverse relation between the concentration ratio 
values (measured using the Q4) and the frequency of price change.  This is because markets with 
a high degree of competition often have elastic demand (Bils & Klenow, 2004).23  Time series data 
on the market structures in Curaçao, such as the Q4, demand curves, and price change frequencies, 
are not available; thus, the hypotheses based on market structures will not be analyzed further. 
 The remaining price-rigidity hypotheses are the TDP and SDP theories.  TDP was 
developed by Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983).  The Taylor TDP is defined as changing prices 
every nth period, while in the Calvo TDP, prices change at random.24  SDP is when prices are 
determined by the state of the economy, for example, by inflation.  The TDP and SDP 
hypotheses may explain the price change frequencies in Curaçao.  The objective of this chapter is 
to explore the factors of time-dependent and state-dependent pricing that determine the 
frequency of price adjustments in Curaçao.  In addition, as sizes of price adjustment and price 
change frequencies are jointly determined, the sizes of price adjustments are analyzed. 
Sticky prices entail low price change frequencies.  Thus, the variables that lower the price 
change frequency are an explanation for sticky prices.  The price-rigidity theories that explain 
the price-rigidity puzzle in Curaçao are those with the variables that are inversely related to the 
price change frequencies. 
                                                 
23 This relationship between the degree of competition and demand elasticity is based on the monopolistic 
pricing of  = /(1  ), where  is the price,  is the marginal cost, and ε is the demand elasticity.  When 
ε=∞, signifying an elastic demand,  = , a market of a perfect competition is implied (with free entry and exit of 
firms, the monopoly with elastic demand turns into perfect competition).  When ε<∞, representing less elastic 
demand, then  > , implying an imperfect competitive market. 
24 Both Taylor and Calvo TDPs may occur simultaneously in the commodity markets, as each commodity 




The sections in this chapter are partitioned as follows: After the literature overview on the 
determinants of price change frequency and sizes of price changes in Section 4.1, their 
definitions and the calculus are presented in Section 4.2.  Panel models of price change 
frequencies and their sizes are presented in Section 4.3.  Using the panel analysis, the relevancy 
of the selected price-rigidity theories of state- and time-dependent pricing are tested for the case 
of Curaçao in Section 4.4, and Section 4.5 identifies the theories of price rigidities that are 
consistent with the data.  
4.1. Determinants of Price Change Frequencies and their Sizes 
My analysis of the determinants and sizes of price change frequency in Curaçao is similar to 
the approach used in the studies by Dhyne et al. (2005), Klenow and Malin (2010), and 
Nakamura and Steinsson (2013).  The main focus is on the explanatory variables of SDP and 
TDP that are likely to apply in Curaçao.  The expected signs of the relation between the 
explanatory variable and the dependent variables ar hown in Table 4.1.  The dependent 
variables are the price change frequencies or the sizes of price changes.  The term “positive” 
means that a positive correlation is expected between the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variable; otherwise, a “negative” relationship is expected.  A question mark means that either 
sign can be expected.  In addition, the expected sign for the test of price stickiness, which is 
based on the price change frequency, is shown (Table 4.1, Column 8). 
4.1.1. State-dependent Variables and Price Change Frequencies 
The state-dependent variables that influence the pric  change frequency are inflation and 
attractive pricing (Dhyne et al., 2005).  High inflation is positively related to the frequency of 
price increase, and the frequency of price decrease is n gatively related with inflation (Nakamura 




frequency and inflation.  In attractive pricing, firms are reluctant to change prices ending in 5 or 
9 (Levy et al., 2011), and therefore, an inverse relationship is expected between all price change 
frequencies (price change frequency, price increase frequency, and price decrease frequency) and 
attractive pricing (Table 4.1, Columns 3–5). 
4.1.2. The Time-dependent Variables and Price Change Frequencies 
The time-dependent variables consist of seasonality, political interference resulting from 
price regulation, the political business cycle, andregulatory capture.  Seasonality is when the 
frequencies of price adjustments are affected in a specific period of time during the year.  
Seasonality is classified under time-dependent pricing, as price changes occur at random in a 
month/season.  An example of seasonality is found in the US data (Nakamura & Steinsson, 
2008).  Accordingly, the first quarter has a (disproportionately) higher price change frequency 
than the other quarters of the year.  Hence, high price change frequencies (positive relation) are 
expected “in season” and low(er) price change frequencies (negatively related) are expected in 
the “out-of-season” period.  Hence, depending on the season, the sign for price change 
frequencies is either positive or negative (Table 4.1, Columns 3–5). 
The price regulation of commodities in Curaçao is based on incomes and anti-
inflationary policies (P. B. No. 117, 1961, P. B. No. 76, 1965).  The price egulation determines 
the price floor/ceiling by setting a mark-up to cost and/or a period (e.g., month, quarter) to adjust 
prices.  The latter affects the price change frequency and the former influence the sizes of price 
changes.  Price ceilings in Curaçao are applied for selected food products, medical care services 
and selected drugs, health insurance, transportation services, and energy prices.  The price 




Tariffs of medical care services are regulated to adjust annually, consistent with Taylor TDP.  The 
energy prices are adjusted monthly, consistent withTaylor TDP.  
A price floor is applied in the case of the minimum wage, as the minimum wages can be 
adjusted by indexation (P. B. No. 110, 1972), which is consistent with Calvo TDP.  Price 
regulation is expected to be negatively related to all price change frequencies (Table 4.1, 
Columns 3–5).  
The political business cycle in price setting is when policymakers intervene in price 
setting during pre-election periods to increase their chances of re-election.  In the case of 
Curaçao, despite the international oil price increases, policymakers often kept the energy prices 
fixed in the pre-election periods.  Hence, this variable is expected to be negatively related to the 
price change frequency and frequency of price increases.  Conversely, but rarely, international 
energy price declines did occur in the pre-election periods.  On these occasions, policymakers 
were keen on passing on the international energy price declines in the domestic energy prices.  
Hence, a positive relation is expected between the political business cycle and price frequency 
declines.  
Regulatory capture is when, under pressure from interest groups, the regulatory authority 
agrees to keep prices fixed.  The regulatory authority collaborated with the government in 
Curaçao in times of oil price hikes in 2006, and the energy prices were kept fixed.  In this period, 
the incurred losses for keeping the energy prices fix d were financed through the “Energy Fund.”  
Energy prices are a cost component in the production pr cess of most goods and services.  
Keeping the energy prices fixed may have indirectly negatively affected the price change 
frequencies of (non-energy) commodities in Curaçao.  The variables of the political business 




efficiency reasons.  First, both the political business cycle and regulatory capture (the Energy 
Fund) have similar effects on the price change frequencies.  The combined variable shows one 
combined effect instead of two separate variables with similar effects.  Second, these are both 
political interference variables expressed in periods of time; the business cycle is represented in 
the pre-election periods and the Energy Fund in the period of 2006–2007.  Third, the period of 
regulatory capture was a one-year event, which is a relatively short period of time.  A 






































Size of price 
increase 
Size of price 
decrease 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
        
State-
dependent 
-Inflation ? Positive Negative Positive Negative  
-Attractive 
pricing 
Negative Negative Negative ? ? Negative 
Time-
dependent 
-Season ? ? ? ? ? Negative 
 -Regulation Negative Negative Negative Negative ? Negative 
Notes. 
A “negative” means a negative sign, hence an inverse relation, and a “positive” a positive sign, thus a positive relation. 




4.1.3. State-dependent Pricing and the Size of Price Changes  
The determinants of the sizes of price changes are similar to those of the price change 
frequencies, as the time of price adjustment and the size are jointly determined.  In contrast to the 
frequency of price changes, the size of the price changes will not determine whether prices are 
sticky; however the determinants of the size will provide valuable information on price setting.  
After a shock, the price setter will decide whether to adjust the price fully/partially or leave it 
unchanged.  Full or partial adjustment results in a ch nge in size.  Inflation, a state-dependent 
variable, also influences the size of price changes, or the extensive margin.  High inflation 
increases the size of (positive) price change (Table 4.1, Column 6), and in contrast, high inflation 
is expected to have a negative impact on the size of price declines (Column 7).  There is no a 
priori assumption on the relationship between the atractive SDP and the size of the price change.  
This is shown by the question marks in Table 4.1 in Columns 6 and 7.  
4.1.4. Time-dependent Pricing and the Size of Price Changes 
There is no a priori assumption on the relationship between seasonality or price 
regulation and the size of price changes.  Hence, either negative or positive relationships may 
apply.  
In times of pre-elections and the Energy Fund, the rising international crude oil prices 
were not passed through in the domestic energy prices, thereby lowering the frequency of 
domestic energy price changes.  As the energy prices are a “cost” factor for other domestic 
commodities, a delayed effect in the adjustment of the cost of production of the (non-energy) 
commodities would be expected.  Thus, the sizes of price increases of the (non-energy) 
commodities were probably lower.  Therefore, a negative relationship is expected between the 




No a priori assumption about the relationship betwen the factors of the periods of the political 
business cycle and the Energy Fund and the size of price decreases is expected (Column 7).  
To summarize, the SDP and TDP hypotheses are tested for Curaçao.  The state-dependent 
variables of inflation and attractive pricing, the time-dependent variable of seasonality, the 
political interference variable of the pre-elections and Energy Fund periods, and price regulation 
are explanatory variables of the price change frequencies and the sizes of price changes in 
Curaçao.  Although both the frequency and the size of the price changes offer information on 
price setting, price rigidity is only determined by frequencies of price changes. 
4.2. Measuring the Frequency and Size of Price Adjustment 
The calculations of the frequency of price changes and the durations of price spells found 
in the studies of Bils and Klenow (2004) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) have become the 
standard in this field of research.  The standard clculus of the methodology applied in these 
studies is extensively described in Dhyne et al. (2005).  I follow this methodology because it 
facilitates the comparison of my results on price adjustment with those of other countries. 
For each product in category  in store  at time  with price ijt, Dhyne et al. (2005) use 
the following binary variables to characterize the price-setting behavior:  
A binary variable for observation of the price at time  − 1 and  in store  
 = !
1,   and , % are observed
 0, , exists but not , % .     (4.1) 
Hence, at time   for category  in store , if both   and , % are observed, then  = 1; 
otherwise,  = 0. 
A binary variable indicating a price change in  
2ijt  = !1, 3,   ≠  , %0, otherwise .       (4.2) 




2Iijt  = !1,  > , %0, otherwise .       (4.3) 
A binary variable indicating a price decrease in  (the sub-index D stands for decrease) 
2Dijt  = !1,  < , %0, otherwise .       (4.4) 
For i = 1 to nj, where nj represents the total number of stores in the product category j and 
t ∈ 91, :;, and : is equal to the last observation period for the product category j, Dhyne et al. 
(2005) used these four binary variables to define the following four frequencies: the frequency of 
price changes, price increases, price decreases, and price changes for category j at time t.  The 
frequency of price changes is expressed as follows: 




3 .       (4.5) 
The frequency of price increases is expressed as follows (the sub-index I stands for increase): 




3 .       (4.6) 
The frequency of price decreases is expressed as follow (the sub-index D stands for decrease): 




3 .       (4.7) 
The frequency of price changes at time  for product category  is expressed as follows: 
jt=∑ 2 /@A3 ∑  @ 3 .         (4.8) 
For the frequencies of price adjustments, no specific distribution is assumed.  The 
information on the distribution of the price adjustment is obtained ex post with the statistics of 
the mean and the median.  Price adjustments are define  as symmetrical when for each category 
j, the price frequency increases equal the price frequency decreases.  Otherwise, the price 
frequencies are asymmetrical.  
Dhyne et al. (2005) used the following calculations to define the average sizes of price 
adjustment and the duration of price spells:25  
The average size of price increases in percentage  
 ΔFBGGGG  =  ∑ ∑ 2C   H >?IJ (    −   , % / ∑ ∑ 2C   H >?
IJ
 .    (4.9) 
                                                 




The average size of price decreases in percentage  
ΔF%GGGG =  ∑ ∑ 2D   H >?IJ K , % −  L / ∑ ∑ 2D   H >?
IJ
 .   (4.10) 
To measure the duration of price spells, two methods are used depending on the 
assumption of the time variable, namely a discrete tim or a continuous time approach.  When 
prices are set in a time discrete manner, price change occurs only once per month and 
frequencies are expressed in number of months.  The average duration of a price spell is the 
inverse of the frequency of the price change, expressed as follows:  
M =  1/.           (4.11) 
Assuming a discrete time, Equation (4.11) is expressed in number of months.  When it is 
assumed that prices are set in a continuous manner, which implies that a price can change at any 
point during the month, the average price duration of the product category  is calculated as 
follows: 
MNO =  − 1 /  (1 − j .       (4.12) 
Hence, Equation (4.12) can be expressed in (a combination of) days, weeks, or months.  For 
example, suppose that there are 60 products for which 30 price changes have been reported.  
Thus,  =0.50, meaning that price changes occur in 50% of months.  When the duration is 
calculated in a discrete manner, a price change of a product only occurs once a month, and 
 =0.50, 15 products (of the 30) can change their prices the first month and the other 15 can 
change theirs in the second month.  Hence, it takes 2 months on average for prices to change.  
For the duration of price spells using Equation (4.11), M = 2 months.  A duration in a continuous 
manner implies that a price change per product can o cur often during the month, and the 
duration can be denoted in weeks or days.  This results in a reduction in the time spells compared 




assuming that every day, there is one price change d that a month has 30 days,26 30 products 
change their prices in 1 month.  Thus, the duration is approximately 1 month.  Using Equation 
(4.12), MNO = 1,44 months, equal to 1 month and 13 days, which is a reduction of 17 days in the 
price spell when compared to the discrete approach. 
The median price duration (in a continuous time frame) is calculated as follows: 
Mj=  (0.5 /  (1 − j .        (4.13) 
Equation (4.13) can be expressed in (a combination of) hours, days, weeks, months, or years.  
The statistics commonly used in the literature on price adjustment are the mean and median of 
the price change frequencies, the price frequency increases and decreases, the mean sizes of price 
increases and decreases, and the mean and median of the durations of price spells.  The standard 
deviations of the frequencies are usually not reported, as the sample size of each category is large 
in comparison to the deviations, which are expressed in fractions.  This means that the standard 
deviations are negligibly small.  An example of therelatively large sample of micro-data 
databases is shown in Table 4A in Appendix 4A for the case of Curaçao.  
4.3. The Panel Data and Analysis 
The panel analysis explores the determinants of the frequency and size of the price 
change.  The determinants are the variables of SDP and TDP (including political interference).  
Inflation and attractive pricing are state-dependent variables, while the seasonality, political 
interference variables in periods of the pre-election, Energy Fund, and price-regulated goods are 
time-dependent variables.  The sample period covers November 2006−March 2010 and excludes 
the month of June 2009.  This omission represents an error of the statistical office at the time of 
the data delivery.  The panel data (excluding rental fees) are classified into two databases, as 
                                                 




follows: Panel I uses the CPI product categories (e.g., food, housing), while in Panel II, the 
commodities are classified by type (e.g., durables, non-durables).  The panel data also exclude 
the categories of energy prices, health insurance, and postal service tariffs because these data are 
indices.  Thus, they are not suitable for calculating size (see Equation 4.10), nor is it possible to 
distinguish attractive prices with index data.  To categorize attractive prices the last two digits of 
the price are needed, and indices are therefore, not useful.  
4.3.1. Panel I Data: Product Categories 
The panel data consist of time series for each of te nine following CPI categories: 
“food,” “beverages and tobacco,” “clothing and footwear,” “housing,” “furnishing, household 
equipment, and routine household maintenance,” “healt ,” “transportation and communication,” 
“recreation and education,” and “miscellaneous goods and services.” Each category consists of 
data on the frequencies of price changes, price incr ases, price declines, and the average sizes of 
price increases and decreases.  Added to the database re the data on inflation and attractive 
pricing (state-dependent variables), seasonality, time-dependent variable of the share of regulated 
goods, and the dummies of political pre-election and the Energy Fund. 
4.3.2. Panel II Data: Commodities by Type 
The classification by type of commodities is an alternative to the CPI product 
classification.  There are five categories of commodities, as follows: non-durables (nd), non-
durables and semi-durables (nd/sd), non-durables and ervices (nd/s), durables and semi-durables 
(d/sd), and the combination of all types except semi-durables (d/nd/s).  Similar to Panel I, 
inflation, attractive pricing, dummies of seasonality, the price regulation variable, and the 
dummies for the pre-election and Energy Fund periods are added to the price change frequencies 




The inflation data. To calculate inflation, the Curaçao CPI data are retrieved from the 
IFS of the IMF, country code number 354.  Figure 4.1 shows the month-to-month inflation rate, 
defined by R = ln T UVWX UVWXYZ[ ∗ 100.  The month-to-month inflation rate, R , was low, with an 
average of 0.24% in the period of November 2006−March 2010. 
 
Figure 4.1. The monthly inflation rates in Curaçao (in percent, 2006.11–2010.03) 
Source: IFS. Retrieved August, 28, 2013. 
Attractive pricing data. Attractive pricing (or price points) is when prices have endings 
of 5, 9, or 99.  In this study, these different attrac ive price endings were combined into one 
variable calculated by the total monthly prices ending in 5 and 9 (99 is a special case of the 9 
endings) as a fraction of the total monthly observations. 
The seasonality dummy. The seasonality variable is created by making dummies for 
each month separately.  To avoid the “dummy variable trap” (Greene, 1997, p. 381), the month 
of October was chosen as the month of reference. 
The price regulation variable. This variable is one of the political interference 
variables.  The regulated commodities are listed in Appendix 4B (Table 4B).  The categories of 








































































































































































































regulated=1, is assigned.  The variable of the price regulation per category is equal to the share 
of the total regulated commodities by category in the total of observed commodities per 
category.  
The dummy of pre-election and the Energy Fund. Both of these dummies are political 
interference variables.  The dummies of periods of the pre-elections and the Energy Fund are 
combined in one dummy.  The pre-election dummy variable assigns a “1” in the pre-election 
periods and a “0” otherwise.  The pre-election period is defined by 6 months prior to the election 
(Schuknecht, 1996).  Table 4.2 shows the data for the pre-election dummy.  
 
Table 4.2 
Dummy for the Pre-election Periods in Curaçao in 2006–2010 
Elections by level of government Election date Dummy=1 for the months of: 
Central Government 17-Jan-06 August 2005January 2006 
Curaçao Government 21-Apr-07 November 2006April 2007 
Central Government 22-Jan-10 August 2009January 2010 
Note. Source: Hoofdstem Bureau Curaçao (n.d.)  
 
 
The Energy Fund was introduced in the period of the oil price hikes in 2006, following 
the pressure of interest groups to stabilize the energy prices.  From June 2006 to July 2007, the 
energy prices remained fixed and were financed by the Energy Fund.  The dummy variable of the 
Energy Fund is “1” for the months June 2006 to July 2007 and “0” otherwise.  The dummy of the 
pre-election and the Energy Fund periods is the combination of these two periods and consists of 
“1” for the periods of the pre-election or the “Energy Fund” and “0” otherwise.  
4.3.3. The Classical Fixed-Effects Models 
The panel analysis was estimated by assuming fixed or random effects.  A fixed-effects 




there are differences across the categories; this is consistent with the stylized fact of 
heterogeneity in price setting discussed in Chapter 3.  The classical FE model, also termed the 
unobserved effects model (Wooldrigde, 2002), is described below. 
Let  be the T observations of the dependent variable for category j; the time constant 
term ] is the unobserved variable or the individual effect or the cross-section j.  ̂  is the T 
observations of K regressors (excluding the constant term) for category j, and _ is the Tx1 vector 
of disturbances or the idiosyncratic errors: 
 = ] + ̂a + _.          (4.14) 
This FE model, with the time constant term ], is category specific (vary across category j) and 
given in matrix form, as follows (Greene, 1997, Section 14.3): 
F = c] + ^a + _,          (4.15) 
where D is a matrix with dummies, d.  Moreover, d is a dummy variable indicating the jth 
category.  Thus, D=9d … dI;.  
According to Greene (1997), the afgh (the estimator of the FE coefficient) is estimated 
with using ordinary least squares (OLS).  Moreover, b, the matrix form of estimate of agh, is as 
follows: 
b = (^ijk^% (^ijk,         (4.16) 
where 
jk = I − D(cic%ci.        (4.17) 
To test whether the ]′o are equal to zero (in the case of no FE), the F-test is used.  
4.3.4. The Fraction Fixed-Effects Models 
For the model of the price change frequencies, the analysis of “proportions” data or 




fraction data,  is an estimate of the population frequency of category j.  These proportions () 
are nonnegative values bounded by 0 and 1.  A common method is the log-odds transformation 
of  (Greene, 1997).  For the j=1,…,9 categories in Panel I, or for j=nd, sd, nd/s, d/sd, d/nd/s in 
Panel II,  the log-odds transformation is as follows: 
ln p gJ%gJq = a
i.          (4.18) 
af  is estimated using OLS (Wooldridge, 2001).  The cofficient of af  is not equal to the 
elasticity.27  More important than the interpretation of the coeffici nt are the signs and levels of 
significance of the coefficients in this analysis.  The sign indicates whether the explanatory 
variable has a positive or negative relationship with the price adjustment frequency or size.  The 
level of significance indicates whether the coefficients are significant.  
A second method of estimating fractions is the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator 
(QMLE; Wooldridge, 2002).  This is as follows: 
E (KrL) =exp (a′)/(1 + exp Ta′[),       (4.19) 
and the log likelihood is (a) =  log ( GK aiL + (1 −    log(1 − v(ai ,  (4.20) 
where G(.) is the logistic cumulative density function (cdf )function.  The estimator is the 
QMLE, which maximizes the log likelihood; af  is the logit estimator.  I used the most common 
method to estimate the variable, which is the log-odds transformation with the OLS estimator.  
The program Eviews, version 7, was used to estimate the models. 
4.3.5. Test of Price Stickiness 
The test of price stickiness is a test of the price change frequency.  As a low price change 
frequency is an indication of price stickiness, the test of price stickiness is a test on a negative, 
                                                 




significant coefficient between the price change frequency variable and the state- or time-
dependent variable.  Attractive pricing, seasonality, regulation, and other political interference 
variables of political business cycle and the Energy Fund were tested for price stickiness.  This 
test was not used to distinguish which theory provides the stickier prices, as it only shows 
whether a variable leads to sticky prices.  The test shows a case of price stickiness when the 
explanatory variable is negatively correlated with the price change frequency (Column 8 of Table 
4.1).  
4.4. Empirical Results 
The results using Panel I data with the CPI categori s are shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, 
and the results for the categories by commodity type (Panel II data) are shown in Tables 4.5 and 
4.6.  Both panels exclude the data on the energy prices, insurance, rental fees, and postal 
services.  Tables 4.3 and 4.5 show the FE equations with the dependent variables of price 
adjustment frequency (Column 2), price frequency inreases (Column 3), and price frequency 
decreases (Column 4).  These equations are estimated by applying the log-odds transformation of 
Equation (4.18) on the dependent variable.  Tables 4.4 and 4.6 show the FE equations with the 
dependent variables of size increases (Column 2) and size decreases (Column 3).  All equations 
are estimated using least squares.  Both panels offr valuable information on the determinants of 
price change frequencies, the sizes of price changes, and the test of price rigidity. 
The results show low R2 (0.38 < R2 < 0.50) and low adjusted R2 (0.31 <adj. R2 < 0.48) in 
the equations of price change frequencies and high R2 (0.74 < R2 < 0.85) and high adjusted R2 
(0.74 <adj. R2 < 0.84) in the equations of sizes of price changes. The variables did not always 
have the expected signs.  The variables with the incorrect signs are as follows: inflation in the 




frequency increase in both panels.  The following variables were insignificant, namely the 
explanatory variables of the size of price decreases in both panels.  Meanwhile, some were 
significant in one panel and insignificant in the other.  The dummy of political interference in 
periods of pre-election and the Energy Fund is significant in the price change frequency equation 
in Panel II, while it is rejected in the same equation in Panel I.  Other variables were insignificant 
in the price change frequencies equations and significa t in the size equations.  Price regulation 
was not a significant explanatory variable in the equations related to the price change 
frequencies.  However, price regulation was significant in the equations related to the sizes of 
price increases in both panels.  
The FE are shown by the F statistics.  The FE was rejected in the equations of size of the 
price decrease in Panel I, as well as the price frequency decrease, the size of the price decrease, 
and the frequency of price change in Panel II.  Hence, in these equations, the constant terms (the 
sector-specific dummies) ]′o are equal to zero. 
4.4.1. Panel I 
The results for Panel I revealed that inflation hadno impact on the price change 
frequencies.  There was no evidence of a significant positive relation between inflation and the 
frequency of price increases or a significant negative relation between inflation and the 
frequency of price decreases. This is probably due to low inflation in Curaçao in the period 
under review.  In addition, no support was found for the relation between price change frequency 
and attractive pricing.  A significant negative relation between the price change frequency and 
attractive pricing was rejected.  Hence, SDP is not consistent with the data for Curaçao in the 




TDP was tested in terms of seasonality and political interference.  The results show a 
lower frequency of price increases for January in the category of “clothing and footwear” at a 
10% significance level.  The price change frequency was negatively affected in February at a 
10% significance level.  The lower price frequency was probably related to the lower price 
frequency increases in February (significant at 5%).  The months of January and February are 
usually characterized by less sales after the peak of sales in the Christmas holidays.  
The relationship between price change frequency and the variables of the political 
interference in the periods of pre-elections and Energy Fund were rejected.  For regulations, the 
interaction between regulations and the category of “fo d” was chosen, as a large share of food 
was regulated.  A significant relation between the price regulation in “food” and the price change 
frequency was not supported. 
The relationship between the sizes of the price changes and the SDP and the TDP 
variables were also tested.  Similar to the price change frequencies, state-dependent variables did 
not have an effect on the size of price changes.  TDP of seasonality showed no significant 
relationship with the sizes of the price changes.  Meanwhile, TDP by political interference was 
negatively related with the size of the price increas .  The sizes of price increases were 
negatively affected by price regulation in the category of “food,” at a 1% significance level, and 
in the periods of the pre-election and Energy Fund at a 5% significance level. 
The category-specific constant terms (]) were all significant at the 1% significance level 
with the exception of the “food” category in the equation of the price increase frequency.  The F 
statistics allowed the hypothesis that the ]′o are equal to zero to be rejected.  This finding is 




heterogeneity across categories is shown, and the sector-specific categories were significant (at 
1, 5, and 10%).  In contrast, the sector-specific terms in the size declines were insignificant. 
To summarize, when using Panel I, both SDP of attractive pricing and TDP of price 
regulation for the pre-election and the Energy Fund periods were rejected.  The test on price 
rigidity was rejected for the attractive price hypothesis and the variables of political interference, 
namely price regulation and the periods of pre-elections and the Energy Fund.  Meanwhile, the 
test on price rigidity supported the time-dependent variable of seasonality in February and in 
January for the category “clothing and footwear.”  In addition, the sizes of the price increases 
were negatively affected by the price regulation of the category “food” in the periods of the pre-
election and the Energy Fund.  This probably means that in these periods, the price increases 









Price Change Frequencies in Curaçao 
Panel I: Log Odds Regression of a Sample (Excluding E ergy, Postal Services, Rental Fees, 






















































































Price Change Frequencies in Curaçao 
Panel I: Log Odds Regression of a Sample (Excluding E ergy, Postal Services, Rental Fees, 
Insurance in November 2006–March 2010, OLS) 














































Number of observations panel 337 329 311 
R squared 0.41 0.38 0.38 
Adjusted R squared 0.38 0.35 0.31 
Durbin–Watson 2.26 2.07 2.26 
F statistics for fixed effects (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes. 
***,**,* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  Standard errors are between 
brackets.  Each dummy represents the category-specific constant (αj). Eviews automatically adds a 
constant to the model specification to ensure that ∑ ]wx> =0. Hence, ∑ ]wx> /9=constant term. All 
data which were indices were excluded from the panel data, as the calculation of attractive pricing 
was not feasible 









Sizes of Price Increases and Decreases in Curaçao 
Panel I: Least Squares Regression of a Sample (Excluding Energy, Postal Services, Rental 
Fees, and Insurance November 2006–March 2010) 
Variables 
Size increases 
Panel fixed  
effects 
Size decreases 
Panel fixed  
effects 































































Sizes of Price Increases and Decreases in Curaçao 
Panel I: Least Squares Regression of a Sample (Excluding Energy, Postal Services, Rental 





















Number of observations panel 329 311 
R squared 0.85 0.77 
Adjusted R squared 0.84 0.76 
Durbin–Watson 1.92 1.50 
 
F statistics for fixed effects (p-value) 0.00 0.75 
Notes.  
***,**,* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  Standard errors are 
between brackets.  Each dummy represents the category-specific constant (αj ) 
Eviews automatically adds a constant to the model sp cification to ensure that 
∑ ]wx> = 0.Hence, ∑ |}J
~JZ
x = constant term.  







4.4.2. Panel II 
The results for inflation, attractive prices, and price regulation were not significant; thus, 
the hypotheses were rejected in the alternative classification by type of commodities in Panel II.  
The variables of the political interference in the periods of pre-elections and the Energy Fund 
were supported in Panel II for the categories of non-durables and semi-durables.  The variables 
of political interference did not support an increas  in frequencies of price declines in the periods 
of pre-elections and the Energy Fund.  The size of the price increase was positively related with 
inflation at a 10% significance level.  Price regulation and the variables of political interference 
in the periods of pre-elections and the Energy Fund were negatively related with the size 
increases and significant at 1% and 5%, respectively.  
The tests of price rigidity on state-dependent variables were rejected when using the data 
for Panel II.  The relationship between the time-dependent variable of price regulation was also 
not significant.  However, in contrast to Panel I, the hypothesis on the political interference in the 
periods of pre-election and the Energy Fund was not rejected.  The interaction of political 
interference in the periods of pre-election and the En rgy Fund for the categories of non-durables 
and semi-durables (including the items of food, beverages, clothing, and housing) showed price 
rigidity at the 5% level; this was probably related to the lower frequency of price increases (at 
the 10% significance level).  This relationship shows the delayed pass through of the energy 
prices, and therefore, unadjusted costs in the prics of non-energy commodities.  Hence, in Panel 
II, SDP was rejected, while TDP was supported in relation to political interference in the periods 
of pre-election and the Energy Fund in the categoris of non-durables and semi-durables. In 
addition, the F statistics of sector-specific coefficients of the price change frequency and size of 




To summarize, Panels I and II showed the various characteristics of the price 
adjustments.  The results of the two panels demonstrated that the classification is important, as 
each panel illustrated different determinants to explain the frequencies of price adjustment.  Price 
rigidity due to seasonality was disclosed when the commodities were classified using the CPI 
categories (Panel I), while price rigidity due to political interference in periods of pre-elections 
and the Energy Fund were observed in the “non-durables” and “semi-durables” categories (Panel 
II).  The price regulation affected only the size of the price increases.  FE were found in the 
equations of price change frequencies and the size of price increase in Panel I.  For Panel II, FE 






Table 4.5  
Price Change Frequencies in Curaçao by Type of Commdities 
Panel II: Log Odds Regression of A Sample (Excluding E ergy, Postal Services, Rental Fees, 




































Dummy for pre-election and Energy 













































Number of observations panel 180 176 172 
R squared 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Adjusted R squared 0.48 0.42 0.48 
Durbin–Watson  1.92 1.63 2.1 
F statistics for fixed effects (p-value) 0.12 0.02 0.15 
Notes. 
***,**,* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  Standard errors are between 
brackets. Each dummy represents the category-specific constant (αj). Eviews automatically 
adds a constant to the model specification to ensur that ∑ ]w> = 0. Hence, ∑ |}J
JZ
 =constant term.   All data which were indices were excluded from thepanel data, as the 
calculation of attractive pricing was not feasible.  







Sizes of Price Increases and Decreases in Curaçao 
Panel II: Least Squares Regression of a Sample (Excluding Energy, Postal 
Services Rental Fees, and Insurance in November 2006–March 2010) 
Variable 
Size increases 























Dummy for pre-election and 


































Number of observations panel 176 172 
R squared 0.83 0.74 
Adjusted R squared 0.82 0.74 
Durbin–Watson 1.85 1.49 




***,**,* indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors 
are between brackets. Each dummy represents the category-specific constant 
(αj). Eviews automatically adds a constant to the model sp cification to ensure 
that ∑ ]w> = 0.  Hence, ∑ |}J
JZ
 = constant term. All data which were indices 
were excluded from the panel data, as the calculation of attractive pricing was 
not feasible.  





 Table 4.7 presents the results on the test of sticky prices.  The SDP hypotheses were 
rejected as determinants of sticky prices, while most of the selected TDP hypotheses were 
supported.  On the balance, most of the SDP and TDP hypotheses were rejected.  The reason for 
the rejection of the majority of the hypotheses wasth t, with the exception of the hypothesis of 
political interference, they were formulated for developed countries.  Although these selected 
hypotheses were expected to apply to a micro-island, the tests proved otherwise.  The rejection 
of price regulation, a variable representing political interference, was due to the sample of 
commodities, which consisted of non-energy commodities.  Energy commodities represented the 
largest group of commodities that were regulated by a contract period wherein prices were fixed.  
Hence, the exclusion of the energy prices from the sample resulted in a rejection of this 
hypothesis. 
The TDP of seasonality, political interference of the political business cycle, and the 
regulatory capture by the Energy Fund in the categori s of non-durables and semi-durables 
(Panel II) were supported by the data, whereas the TDP of price regulation and SDP were 
rejected.  Hence, the sticky prices were explained by seasonality and in the categories of non- 
and semi-durables in periods of the political busine s cycle and the Energy Fund.  In particular, 
the results showed that in the case of price-rigidity hypothesis of the political business cycle and 
the Energy Fund, the classification of the data (in pa els) mattered.  This is most probably 
related to the indirect effect of the sticky energy prices for a broad variety of non-energy 
commodities.  This variety is probably easier to capture via “broader” classification by type 
(non-/semi-durables) categories.  Both classification systems of the data, by type and by product 







The Summary of the Results of the Sticky Price Test  
(Excluding Energy, Postal Services, Insurances in November 2006–March 
2010) 
Models Explanatory Variables: 
Panel I 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
State-
dependent 
-Inflation Rejected Rejected 
-Attractive pricing Rejected Rejected 
Time-
dependent 
-Season Supported Not tested 
-Regulation Rejected Rejected 
-Political business cycle 






The impact of the price regulation is particularly noticeable in the sizes of the price 
changes.  The price regulation in the selected CPI-categories led to lower price increases.  Table 
4.8 presents a summary of the impact of the SDP and the TDP hypotheses on the sizes of price 
increases.  The expected signs for the size of price de reases were rejected for the SDP and TDP 
hypotheses, hence only the results of the price incr ases are presented.  Consistent with the 
expectations, higher inflation resulted in higher size of price increases (in Panel II), and in both 
panels the price regulation, and the periods of the political business cycle and the “Energy Fund” 







Summary of the Sizes of the Price Increases (Excluding Energy, Postal Services, 
Rental Fees, Insurances in November 2006–March 2010) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) 
    
State-
dependent 
-Inflation Rejected Supported 
-Attractive pricing Not tested Not tested 
Time-
dependent 
-Season Rejected Not tested 
-Regulation Supported Supported 
-Political business cycle 
(pre-election) and the 






The main objective of this chapter was the explorati n of the determinants of price 
change frequencies using SDP and TDP.  Panel analysis wa  used to test the consistency of the 
price-rigidity theories with the data for Curaçao in 20062010.  The panel data excluded the 
energy prices, insurance, rental fees, and postal services.  The panel data were categorized into 
two datasets, as follows: The first dataset was clasified by product type (the CPI categories), 
and the second was classified by type of commodity, including non-durables, semi-durables, 
services, and combinations of types of commodities.  
In both panel datasets, the hypotheses of inflation and attractive pricing were rejected.  
Alternatively, political interference in the periods of pre-elections (political business cycle) and 
the Energy Fund (as regulatory capture) was significant in the categories of non-durables and 




according to CPI categories, namely the month of January for the category of “clothing and 
footwear” and the month of February for all CPI categories.  
The SDP hypotheses of inflation and attractive prices were rejected.  Meanwhile, the TDP 
hypotheses of seasonality and political interference were supported.  Prices were sticky in the 
months of February and in January in “clothing and footwear.” In addition, political interference 
in the periods of pre-elections and the Energy Fund caused price rigidity in Curaçao.  Hence, there 
is evidence that sticky prices are the result of TDP.  
The political interference hypothesis in the periods f pre-elections and the Energy Fund 
was supported in one panel but rejected in the other; is implies that this hypothesis is sensitive 
to the classification system of the commodities.  The reason for the support in one panel was that 
the price setting of political interference indirectly affected a broad range of commodities.  As a 
consequence, the impact of political interference was captured by the panel with a broader 
classification system than CPI product type classification.  
Admittedly, most of the SDP and TDP hypotheses were r jected.  This can be ascribed to 
the origin of the price-rigidity theories, which were generated for large, developed economies.  As 
micro-islands were not expected to have price rigidity, these theories may not be applicable to this 
group.  In contrast to the majority of price-rigidity hypotheses, the political interference hypothesis, 
formulated particularly for explaining the price rigidity in Curaçao, proved to help clarify the price-
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Appendix 4A: A Detailed Description of the Micro-Dataset of Curaçao 
Data Compilation 
The dataset consisted of the unpublished monthly retail price quotes.  The field agents of 
the CBS in Curaçao collected the data at selected outlets to construct the CPI.  Prices were 
collected on a monthly, bi-monthly, quarterly, bi-annual, or annual basis during the period of 
October 2006–March 2010.  Approximately 50 specific outlets were visited during the first 2 
weeks of every month.  In addition, 50 outlets were visited bi-monthly or on a quarterly basis.  
The list with products to be reviewed by the field agents contained the product description, units 
of measurement, material description, and occasionally the brand name.  The code system in use 
was developed by the CBS and shows great similarity to he UN’s international code system, 
namely the COICOP.  Each product code has 5 numbers; for example, item 11511 is “white rice 
Blue Ribbon” at 5 lbs.  This item is classified under subcategory 11000 of “cereals, flour, and 

















average, %)  
(4) 
CPI weights 
based on  
Budget Survey 2006 
(5) 
10000 FOOD 3,248 81 12.3 
11000 
Cereals, Flour, & Bakery  
Product 
393 72 1.9 
12000 Meats & Fish 552 77 2.5 
13000 Edible Fats & Oils 108 68 0.3 
14000 Dairy Products 305 69 1.0 
15000 Fruits & Vegetables 669 77 1.6 
16000 Sugar 169 85 0.3 
17000 Ready Meals 142 80 0.6 
18000 Outdoor Consumption 341 93 3.4 
19000 Other Food Products 569 96 0.8 
20000 BEVERAGES & TOBACCO 528 84 1.6 
30000 CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR 388 71 4.8 
40000 HOUSING 347 80 30.8 
43000 Home Maintenance 239 81 2.6 
44000 Gardening 104 75 0.9 




APPLIANCES 847 65 7.0 
51000 Furniture & Lighting 115 57 1.3 
52000 
Upholstery & Soft 
Furnishing 95 88 0.8 
53000 Home Tools & Equipment 161 44 1.0 
54000 Household Items 278 64 0.6 
55000 Household Expenditure 171 75 0.8 
56000 Household Services 1 100 1.2 





















61000 MEDICAL CARE 165 67 1.3 
70000 
TRANSPORTATION &  
COMMUNICATION 191 68 22.6 
72000 
Expenses for Own Transport 
Vehicles 160 72 13.1 
73000 Transport 5 80 5.1 
74000 Communication 26 42 4.4 
     
80000 RECREATION & EDUCATION 530 62 7.7 
81000 Recreation 142 56 3.7 
82000 Entertainment & Culture 23 96 0.7 
83000 Books, etc. 73 74 0.6 
85000 Educational Material 274 59 2.4 
86000 Hobby Articles 18 50 0.2 
90000 MISCELLANEOUS 526 69 11.9 
91000 Personal Body Care 347 73 3.3 
92000 Insurance 1 100 4.4 
93000 Commodities & Services 178 60 4.2 
      
  Total Trajectories 6,770 75 100 
Notes. Source: Central Bureau of Statistics Curaçao  
 
The first and second columns of Table 4A show the code classification and the product 
description.  The dataset consisted of 9 categories, 30 ubcategories, and 363 item codes.  The 9 
categories are listed in bold in the second column of Table 4A.  The 30 subcategories are listed 
under the categories in Column 2.  Item codes repres nt a group of similar products of various 
brands, so each item code covers several brands in several outlets.  A price trajectory refers to a 
series of price quotes for a specific article of a specific brand observed in a specific outlet.  The 
price trajectories observed covered 6,770 goods and services (Column 3).  On average, 75% of 
the listed good and services are covered each month (Column 4).  The categories of 




(e.g., telephones, washing machines) were out of stock or discontinued. 
The CPI weights in Table 4A (Column 5) show the relative importance of each (sub) 
category in the total CPI.  CPI weights are assembld y the CBS in the budget surveys held 
every 5 years.  The CPI weights are from the Budget Survey 2006.  A higher relative weight does 
not necessarily mean a greater amount of price trajctories.  Rather, the number of price 
trajectories is a reflection of the assortment of aproduct.  The price frequency of, for example, 
the subcategory “energy & rent” of the CPI is measured by four trajectories, namely “rent,” 
“water,” “gas cylinders,” and “electricity,” coincid ng with a substantial CPI weight of 27.4%.  In 
Curaçao, each product in the energy sector is produced by a separate (state-owned) monopoly.  
Hence, each product item has only one price trajectory.  
Estimated Data and Indices in the CPI Micro-dataset of the CBS  
 The category “rent” was estimated by the CBS by assuming a monthly increase of 0.2%, 
which is based on estimates deducted from the Budget Survey 2006.  The prices of energy, 
insurance, and postal service tariffs were entered as indices in the micro-dataset.  The data on 
energy prices were collected from the general information system (websites) of the companies 
providing utilities in Curaçao.  Health tariffs, insurance, and postal service tariffs are adjusted 
once a year; hence, these data are collected annually by the CBS.  It is worth mentioning that for 
tuition, only one price trajectory was accounted for in the CPI dataset, despite the numerous 
private and public education systems.  
Duration Spells  
Figure 4A shows the price trajectory of a food product, 5 lbs. of “Blue Ribbon” at an 
unnamed outlet (in US$).  The item code “rice” has 70 price trajectories in the dataset.  A price 




that this product had six price spells in the sample period.  Most price trajectories are left and 
right-censored, as it is not known when the first or last price spell started or ended.  This item 
includes four completed price spells. 
  
Figure 4A. Price trajectory of 5 lbs. of “Blue Ribbon” white rice (in US$ for the period of 2010.10–
2006.03).  Source: CPI micro-data from the CBS. 
Converting Micro-data to Binary Variables.  
The micro-data were converted to binary variables for Equations (4.1) to (4.13).  To 
convert the data on price quotes into binary variables, the Microsoft Office Excel 2007 software 
program was used.  The binary dataset had to be re-checked for errors.  In this type of data, 
missing data are very common.  As a change in price is programmed to be the change in two 
consecutive months, computational errors occur in the month following the missing data (seen as 
a “0”).  In addition, on some occasions, within a price spell, the same price is recorded in the 
months t-1 and t+1.  Instead of creating two time spells, it is reasonable to impute the price of 
the month t-1 in month t.  These adjustments occurred in approximately 3% of the price 

















































































































































































Appendix 4B: Regulated Commodities 
 
Table 4B 
The Regulated Commodities in Curaçao in 2009  
COICOP code Description COICOP classification 
01.1.1.1 Maize Bread and cereals (ND) 
01.1.1.1 Rice Bread and cereals (ND) 
01.1.1.2 Salted meat Meat (ND) 
01.1.1.3 Salted Fish Fish and seafood (ND) 
01.1.1.4 Milk  Milk, cheese and eggs (ND) 
01.1.1.4 Powdered milk Milk, cheese and eggs (ND) 
01.1.1.5 Margarine Oils and fats (ND) 
01.1.1.5 Cream butter Oils and fats (ND) 
01.1.1.5 Oil Oils and fats (ND) 
01.1.1.8 Sugar Sugar, jam, honey, chocolate, and cofe tionery (ND) 
01.1.1.9 Baby foods Food products n.e.c. (ND) 
01.2.1 Tea Coffee, tea, and cocoa (ND) 
01.2.1 Coffee Coffee, tea, and cocoa (ND) 
      
  Tariffs of :   
04.5.1 Electricity Electricity (ND) 
04.5.2 Gas (LPG 100 lbs., 20 lbs.) Gas (ND) 
04.5.3 Kerosene Liquid fuels (ND) 
04.4.1 Water Water supply (ND) 
      
06.1.1  Birth control pills Pharmaceutical products (ND) 
06.1.1 Antidiabetic medicines Pharmaceutical products (ND) 
      
06.2.1  
Consultations of physicians 
in general or specialist 
practice Medical services (S) 
06.2.1  Mental care services Medical services (S) 
06.3.0  Hospital services Hospital services (S) 
06.2.3  Ambulance services Paramedical services (S) 
06.2.3 Paramedical services Paramedical services (S) 
      
07.2.2  Gasoline 95 octane 
Fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment 
(ND) 
07.2.2 Gasoil 






The Regulated Commodities in Curaçao in 2009  
      
07.2 Private Busses Transport services (S) 
07.2 Public transportation Transport services (S) 
07.2 Taxi Transport services (S) 
      
08.1 Stamps Postal services(S) 
      
10 Tuition fees Education (S) 
      
12.4.0  
Retirement homes for 
elderly persons, residences 
for disabled persons Social protection (S) 
12.5.4  Insurances  Insurance connected with transport (S) 
     
n.a. Asphalt  n.a. 
n.a. Sand and bricks n.a. 
n.a. 
Household services, 
minimum wage n.a. 












PRICE-SETTING IN THE GASOLINE RETAIL MARKET OF CURAÇAO 
Gasoline is an essential combustible, and its price developments are closely monitored by 
consumers.  Consumers in the OECD countries have been complaining about the fact that 
gasoline prices are asymmetrical.  Bacon (1991) referr d to the price asymmetric behavior in the 
gasoline market as “rockets and feathers”: Gasoline prices were perceived to rise like rockets 
following a rise in costs but to go down like feathers when costs decline.  The price asymmetry 
has been confirmed for the European countries of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom (e.g., Galeotti, Lanza, & Manera, 2003) andfor the United States (e.g., Radchenko, 
2005).  Grasso and Manera (2007) presented an overview of the numerous studies of the OECD 
countries on this topic.  According to these authors, most studies reported evidence of price 
asymmetry in their countries’ gasoline markets.  In some gasoline markets, including that of the 
Netherlands, inconclusive results on the price asymmetry were obtained.  In this country, price 
asymmetric pricing behavior was found on Monday, Thursday, and Friday, but symmetric price 
adjustments were evident on Tuesday and Wednesday in the period of 19962001 (Bettendorf, 
van der Geest, & Varkevisser, 2003).  
Price asymmetry in the gasoline market is often associated with market power of the 
price setters operating in oligopolistic gasoline markets (Borenstein, Cameron, & Gilbert 1997; 
Galeotti et al., 2003).  However, Balke, Brown, and Yucel (1998) concluded that there is lack of 
evidence that price asymmetry “arises from market power” (p. 28).  Furthermore, Kaufmann and 
Laskowski (2005) showed that factors other than market power caused the price asymmetry in 
the US gasoline market.  They concluded that the price asymmetry in the US between crude oil 




inventory behavior.  Obviously, the debate on the causal relationship between market power and 
price asymmetry is still unsettled (Borenstein & Shep ard, 2002; Peltzman, 2000).  
The price asymmetry in liberalized gasoline markets in developing countries was 
reviewed by Bacon and Kojima (2010).  They reported that “rockets and feathers” price 
asymmetry was found in Argentina, the Philippines, Russia, Fiji, Colombia, Chile, and Turkey. 
Small island states are usually net oil importers and have less resilience to (oil) shocks than 
the larger economies (Armstrong & Read, 2002; Briguglio, 1995).  It is therefore unsurprising that 
when consumers and firms are confronted with the economic costs of oil price increases, the 
policymakers of small states are often met by calls for government intervention.  Hence, in an 
attempt to shield both consumers and producers against the price volatility of crude oil and its 
derivatives, their governments have implemented energy price regulations (Kojima, 2013). 
Curaçao is a crude oil importer.  The gasoline for the domestic market, a derivative of 
crude oil, is produced at the local refinery.  Similar to the commodity markets on small islands, 
the hypothesis of flexible prices applies to the gasoline market in Curaçao.  Hence, the gasoline 
prices at the gas stations in Curaçao are expected to a just frequently following the daily world 
market gasoline price changes.  In addition, the gasoline retail market in Curaçao is characterized 
by a high number of gas stations (26 gas stations in an area of 444 km2) and a homogenous 
product of unleaded 95 octane gasoline.  The many gs stations and the homogenous product 
offered at the same price per liter at each gas station may reflect a perfect competitive gasoline 
retail market.  Consequently, the domestic price of gasoline is assumed to adjust with the 
international gasoline price changes. 
Consumers in Curaçao, however, have been complaining about asymmetric gasoline 




19902012, as indicated by the median duration of gasoline prices freezes of 3 months and the 
durations of price spells varying from 1 month to 25 months compared to the daily international 
gasoline price adjustments.  I argue that the price rigidity in the gasoline retail market is a driver 
of the larger price-rigidity puzzle of Curaçao, since changes in energy prices affect prices’ 
changes of most non-energy commodities.  Explaining the price rigidity in the gasoline market 
will shed light on the larger price-rigidity puzzle.  The aim of this chapter is to identify the 
causes of price stickiness in the gasoline retail mrket in Curaçao.  The starting point is testing of 
two common price-rigidity hypotheses, namely the menu costs (Barro, 1972) and the information 
delays created by an inattentive producer (Reis, 2006).  The menu costs hypothesis claims that 
the costs of changing the price is too high compared to the size of the price adjustment; therefore, 
the price is kept unchanged.  Meanwhile, the information delay hypothesis suggests that an 
inattentive producer processes information with a lag, and as a result, prices will remain 
unchanged for a period of time.  
A new hypothesis, namely the political interference hypothesis, has been tested for the 
gasoline retail market.  According to the political interference hypothesis in the case of Curaçao, 
whether inspired by altruism or opportunistic motives, the policymakers of Curaçao occasionally 
interfere in the frequency and size of gasoline price setting.  Hence, the menu costs, inattentive 
producers, and political interference represent the hr e hypotheses tested in the gasoline retail 
market in Curaçao. 
This chapter is structured as follows.  As the hypotheses of menu costs and the inattentive 
producer have been discussed at length in the economic literature on price rigidity, the literature 
review in Section 5.1 focuses on the implications of the hypothesis of political interference in 




station in Curaçao and the price setting in the gasoline market of Curaçao.  Section 5.3 presents 
the autoregressive binomial conditional (ABC), the model used to compare the three hypotheses 
of menu costs, inattentive producers, and political interference, showing the expected signs of the 
model parameters for each hypothesis.  The data of the model in the period of 19902012 are 
described in Section 5.4.  The results of the comparison between the three hypotheses are 
presented in Section 5.5; these results reveal that the gasoline price data from Curaçao do not 
support the price-rigidity theories of menu costs and inattentive producers but do support the 
political interference hypothesis.  Price asymmetry is also tested and analyzed.  The calculations 
of cost of economic distortion following the price asymmetry fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  Section 5.6 provides the conclusions on the price setting in the gasoline retail 
markets.  
5.1. Political Interference and Its Consequences 
Political interference in the price setting of the gasoline market includes price regulation 
and pricing policies based on the political business cycle and regulatory capture.  The energy 
price regulation policy in Curaçao started in 1990, motivated by price stabilization for consumers 
(de Haan, 1990).  This policy is an alternative to the immediate gasoline spot price pass-through 
policy, which generated high volatility in the domestic gasoline price.  The price regulation 
entails the setting of price ceilings or price floors and the setting of the frequency of the price 
changes.  The frequency was initially every quarter, and since mid-2007, it has been every 
month, which is consistent with Taylor TDP (Taylor, 1980). 
In the pre-election periods in Curaçao, the gasoline price increases were postponed by the 
policymakers, as these increases would have spoiled their chances of re-election.  In contrast, 




Paiva, 2013; Nordhaus, 1975; Schuknecht, 1996).  In addition, in times of gasoline price hikes, 
interest groups pressured policymakers and the regulatory authority to postpone gasoline price 
adjustments.  As a result of this pressure, the regulatory authority collaborated in the period of 
20062007 with the introduction of the “Energy Fund” (NRC- Handelsblad, 2012).  This was 
implemented to finance the energy price hikes and is consistent with regulatory capture (Dal Bo, 
2006). 
The consequences for the consumers of the political nterference in the pricing of 
gasoline are not clear cut.  This is shown by a few examples concerning price regulation, 
regulatory capture, and the political business cycle.  Governments often use the incomes policy 
to argue that price regulation leads to more stable prices (Suvankulov, Keung Lau, & Ogucu, 
2011).  Kojima (2013), however, challenged the positive impact of price regulation on the 
gasoline retail markets.  He argued that price regulation may produce externalities, including 
inefficient operating firms and rising costs.  Henc, price regulation may actually lead to higher 
prices. 
In a system of regulatory capture with regulated prices, the outcome for consumers is 
ambiguous.  The case of regulatory capture in the period of 19992000 in Spain had favorable 
results for the consumers.  The Spanish political elite in the dominant oil company (Repsol) 
carried out the price setting in an oligopolistic gasoline market.  The price intervention and 
regulatory capture in this sector involved the collaboration between this interest group and the 
government to maintain inflation stability in the 1990s, a period of rising oil prices (Contin-
Pilart, Correlje, & Blanca Palacios, 2009).  Regulatory capture with price regulation resulted in 




Unfavorable to consumers was the case of eight Canadi  cities that were subjected to 
regulatory capture and regulated prices (Sen, Clemente, & Jonker, 2011).  In this case, the price 
ceilings functioned as focal points in the price setting, stimulating firms to set higher prices.  The 
price regulation that was intended to curb the rising gasoline prices resulted in higher prices, 
creating a loss in purchasing power for consumers.  The higher prices benefited firms, which is 
consistent with regulatory capture, with the interest group of firms gaining the most.  Hence, the 
regulatory capture in this case resulted in benefit to the producers.  
Price asymmetry in the reviewed literature is defined as the occurrence of more frequent 
price rises than price cuts, all else being equal.  However, the occurrence of more frequent price 
cuts than price rises, all else equal is also price asymmetry.  Price asymmetry leads to costs of 
economic distortion (Borenstein et al., 1997; Sen et al., 2011).  Political interference by price 
regulation, price intervention in the periods of political business cycle, and regulatory capture 
lead to a price adjustment where price declines are preferred.  Thus, political interference leads to 
price asymmetry. 
Bacon and Kojima (2010) introduced the concept of inverse rockets and feathers 
suggesting that, “many countries are reluctant to raise prices quickly, for fear of popular 
resistance, and anxious to reduce them as soon as economically viable” (p. 13).  As a result, 
“governments even exhibit an inverse rockets and feathers pattern” (p. 13).  A study performed 
by Mitchell and Craigwell (2009) explored the price asymmetry in the gasoline markets in the 
micro-islands of Antigua, Dominica, and Barbados in the period of 20002007.  In Antigua and 
Dominica, price increases persisted more than decreases.  As international gasoline prices were 




Barbados, more price declines than price increases were found.  As international price increases 
occurred more often, this may be an indication of acase of inverse rockets and feathers.  
To summarize, in the gasoline markets, prices rise like rockets and fall like feathers.  
Inverse rockets and feathers also infrequently occur in this market.  When the pricing behavior 
leads to price asymmetry, it brings about costs of ec nomic distortion, which are a disadvantage 
to either consumers or producers.  The hypothesis of political interference in price setting 
suggests that price regulation, the political busine s cycle, and regulatory capture lead to price 
asymmetry and economic distortion.  Political interference in price setting is one of the 
hypotheses that is tested for causing price rigidity n the gasoline sector of Curaçao. 
5.2. Gasoline Pricing in Curaçao 
This section provides a description of the various stages of gasoline distribution in 
Curaçao and discusses their pricing.  It includes comparative analysis with other countries and 
the political interference in the pricing of the gasoline retail market. 
5.2.1. Gasoline Distribution Chains 
  Borenstein et al. (1997) posited that the speeds of price adjustments vary according to the 
“points” or stages in the distribution chains.  Figure 5.1 shows the stages in the distribution chain 
in the gasoline market of Curaçao.  The first stage is the oil refinery in Curaçao, namely 
Refineria di Kòrsou.28  Oil tankers from Venezuela supply the crude oil to the oil refinery.  The 
refinery produces and supplies refined oil products to the international and domestic markets.  It 
has an inventory level of unleaded gasoline 95 octane of approximately 8 months of local 
demand (J. Hernandez, personal communication, April 19, 2013). 
                                                 
28 The oil refinery in Curaçao was established in 1914 by the “Royal Dutch Shell Company,” or the Shell.  
The Shell ceased its operation in 1985 and the refinery was handed over to the government of Curaçao, which until 




The second stage is the distribution to the wholesaler, Curoil a state-owned natural 
monopoly (Curoil, 2013).  The refinery delivers thegasoline by pipelines to Curoil’s oil tanks.  
Curoil stores and distributes the generic unleaded 95 octane gasoline29 and other oil derivatives.  
The company has small storage capacity, and hence, ther  is no excessive inventory of gasoline 
(E. Paulina, personal communication, April 23, 2013).  The last stage of distribution is the 
delivery on demand to the gas stations by tank wagons.  Curaçao has a high density of gas 
stations in comparison to other Caribbean micro-SIDS, with 26 self-service gas stations—
equivalent to 1 gas station per 17 km2.  The densities of other micro-SIDS (denoted in km2 
served by one gas station) are as follows: Aruba: 21 km2, Barbados: 24 km2, Dominica: 50 km2, 
Saint Lucia: 51 km2, and Montserrat: 52 km2.  Larger economies, for example, the United States 




Figure 5.1. Gasoline distribution chains in Curaçao. 
                                                 
29 The sale of leaded 92 octane gasoline was discontinued in 2009. 
30 This information was retrieved from the websites of the respective countries: arubayp.com, 
barbadosyp.com, dominicayp.com, stluciayp.com, montserratyp.com, fueleconomy.gov, (the US), accessed on 





5.2.2. Pricing Procedures  
The crude oil spot prices on the world market are set daily in an oligopolistic market 
structure that is dominated by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).31 
PDVSA, the Venezuelan oil company that runs the oil ref nery in Curaçao, applies the West 
Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil price to calculate the cost price of oil of the refinery in 
Curaçao (J. Hernandez, personal communication, April 19, 2013).  
In the first stage of the distribution chain in Figure 5.1, which represents the level of the 
refinery, the acquisition price of gasoline is set equal to the conventional gasoline spot price of 
the Platts’ Gulf price system, effective on the date of the completion of the gasoline delivery to 
Curoil (E. Paulina, personal communication, April 23, 013).  In the second and third stages of 
the distribution chain, the wholesale and retail gasoline prices are regulated by the government.  
The regulation involves time-dependent price setting where the “contract” period (Minister van 
Financien, 2011) and a price ceiling (P. B. No. 117, 1961; P. B. No. 203, 1982) are set.  To 
change the gasoline wholesale and retail prices, th regulatory authority32 has to submit a 
proposal for price adjustment in a prearranged period33 to the Minister of Finance.  Two days 
after the approval by the Minister of Finance, the regulatory authority must publish the new 
prices in three local newspapers.  The price changes will be effective as of the first workday 
following the week of the approval by the Minister of Finance (Bureau Telecommunicatie en 
Post, BTPU2013/DIR-152, personal communication, May 16, 2013).34 
                                                 
31 Venezuela, the oil provider of the refinery in Curaçao, is a member of the OPEC. 
32 In 2010, the “Bureau Telecommunicatie en Post” wasassigned as the regulatory authority of the energy 
prices (Bureau Telecommunicatie en Post, (BTPU2015/DIR-092, personal communication, May 12, 2015).  
33 Every month since mid-2007. 
34 The private gas stations are represented by the thre associations of Asogas, Vanddis, and Copda; the 




The wholesaler provides two engine combustibles, namely gasoil and unleaded 95 octane 
gasoline, to the gas stations.  Both are chemically homogenous products.  The gas stations, of 
which 21 are privately owned and 5 are state-owned, operate in an oligopolistic market structure, 
and the retail margin per liter of gasoline is prear anged.  Retailers offer the gasoline at the 
regulated price; to increase their sales, a strong customer relationship is necessary.  To increase 
the market share, retailers compete by adding services (pay-as-you-go electricity, prepaid 
telephone cards), offering miles’ savings, or introducing raffle prizes.  The gasoline retail price 
components are listed in Table 5.1; they consist of (a) the acquisition price of gasoline, (b) a 
fixed margin for Curoil, (c) excise tax, (d) a correction factor/recovery index, (e) a cross-subsidy 
for other regulated energy products, (f) sales tax (6%) on wholesale trade, (h) sales tax (6%) on 
the retail trade, and (g) a fixed retail margin for the gas station.  
 
Table 5.1 
Gasoline Unleaded 95 Octane Price Structure in Curaçao (US$) 
Price breakdown Calculation per liter Price per liter 
Sept. 1, 2015–Oct. 5, 2015 
Purchase price a 0.57 
Margin Curoil b 0.05 
Government taxes c 
0.23 
Recovery premium index d 0.07 
Cross-subsidy 1 e 0.00 
Sales tax2 on wholesale f=(a+b+c+d+e)*sales tax (%) 0.05 
Margin gas stations g 0.09 
Sales tax on retail trade h=(a+b+c+d+f+g)*sales tax (%) 0.06 
Retail price i=a+b+c+d+f+g+h 1.12 
Notes. 
1. Cross-subsidy for the LPG (cooking gas) 
2. The sales tax was introduced in 1996. 
Source: www.btnp.org (Bureau Telecommunicatie en Post). This price structure has been 
in place since 2011. The date accessed is October 30, 2015. The author’s codes are shown in the 






A positive recovery index is included to recover the pre-financed amounts because the 
regulated price was set to low in the previous month/quarter and zero when no recovery was 
needed.  Otherwise, the excessive amount of a regulated price that was set to high in the previous 
period will be deducted in the current recovery index by adding a negative recovery index.  The 
margins of Curoil and the gas station, as well as the taxes,35 are adjusted by the government.  No 
policy exists on either the frequency or the size change of the prearranged retail margin.  The 
cross-subsidy is the amount of cents per liter of gasoline the consumer has to pay for Curoil to 
maintain a price freeze for cooking gas.36 
5.2.3. The Taylor and Calvo TDP 
Government intervention in the price setting in the gasoline retail market of Curaçao is 
motivated by price stability (P. B. No. 117, 1961).  The government of Curaçao engaged in the 
regulation of the retail gasoline prices with policy guidelines on the frequency with which 
gasoline prices can change and on gasoline price celings.  The frequency was stipulated by a 
contract period of a quarter in the period of 19902 05 and every month since mid-2007, which 
is consistent with Taylor TDP.  In the period of 2006 until mid-2007, the gasoline prices 
remained fixed and were subsidized through the Energy Fund.  
                                                 
35 The government excise tax (item c) was reduced from 35.20¢ per liter in 2010 to 26.40¢ in 2012; it was 
further reduced to 23¢ in 2013. 
36 Since 2011, the new policy of the government is to maintain the prices of the cooking gas/ propane 
/butane or the liquid petroleum gas (LPG), the LPG 20 lbs. and LPG 100 lbs., fixed. Cooking gas is partly financed 
through cross subsidy, which is included in the prices of the gasoline and gasoil (Bureau Telecommunicatie en Post, 
BTPU2015/DIR-092, personal communication, May 12, 2015). Hence, the car drivers are partly subsidizing the 
































1990a 3 3 0   4.33     0.00 
1991a 3 0 3   0.00 –  3.00 
1992 0 0 0   0.00     0.00 
1993 1 1 0   3.00     0.00 
1994a 1 0 1   0.00 –  3.00 
1995a 2 2 0   3.50     0.00 
1996 3 3 0   4.00     0.00 
1997 0 0 0   0.00     0.00 
1998a 1 0 1   0.00 –  4.00 
1999a 3 2 1   5.00 –  4.00 
2000 2 2 0   6.50     0.00 
2001 3 1 2   6.00 –  4.00 
2002a 4 3 1   6.33 –17.00 
2003a 4 2 2   3.00 –  5.50 
2004 1 1 0   5.00     0.00 
2005 2 2 0   7.00     0.00 
2006a.b 0 0 0   0.00     0.00 
2007a.b 2 2 0   4.00      0.00 
2008 6 4 2   8.75 –  9.00 
2009 9 4 5 10.50 –12.33 
2010a 1 1 0   6.00     0.00 
2011 4 1 3 21.00 –  2.00 
2012a 6 4 2   5.08 –  5.50 
Total 61 38 23   5.74 –  6.30 
Notes.  
a.Election year; elections are held every 2 years, alternating between the island 
and federation (central) level.  
b.Energy Fund in the mid-2006–mid-2007 period. 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on information fr m (Curoil, 2013), CBS, 




Columns 2–4 of Table 5.2 present the number of gasoline price changes per year in the 




increases and price declines.  In the period of 19902006, the proposed policy for price changes 
was that they could occur every quarter.  However, the number of price changes (four) only 
coincided with the proposed pricing policy in 2002–2003.  In 19902006, excluding the period 
of 20022003, the price adjustments did not meet the proposed policy.  In mid-2006mid-2007, 
the price remained fixed and the price increases were subsidized by the Energy Fund.37  It was 
proposed that the energy price should be adjusted af r this fund was depleted.  Starting in mid-
2007, the “contract” period of the gasoline prices hanged from quarterly to monthly.  As a result 
of the new price regulation policy, gasoline prices were projected to change 12 times per year.  
However, in 2008 only 6 of the 12 price changes were implemented, and in 2009, 9 out of the 12 
price changes were reported.  The period of 19902012 was marked by repeated deviations from 
the proposed pricing policy. 
It is common for the incumbent politicians in Curaçao to postpone the decision on 
gasoline price increases in pre-election periods, which is consistent with the political business 
cycle hypothesis.  Price increases combined with uncha ged nominal income lower the 
purchasing power and will reduce the chances of the incumbent policymaker being re-elected.  In 
Table 5.2, the election years are indicated by the lett r “a.”  A postponement in a price increase 
will result in a lower number of price changes.  With the exception of the years 2002 and 2003, 
the number of price changes did not reach the maximum number of expected price changes.  The 
maximum number of price change frequencies in election years 2002 and 2003 are best 
explained in combination with the last two columns (5 and 6) of Table 5.2, which shows the 
average price increases and decreases.38  In the election years 2002 and 2003, the average pric
                                                 
37 The Energy Fund is indicated by “b.”  
38 The average price increase can be calculated by the division of an increase (a positive number) in 
Column 3 of Table 5.3 and Column 3 of Table 5.2.  Similarly, the price decrease is the division of a decline (a 




declines are greater than the average price increases.  Price declines in times of elections are 
favorable for the incumbent policymaker, which most likely will boost his or her chances of re-
election.  These data are an indication of the politica  business cycle in the gasoline sector. 
5.2.4. Unsynchronized Pass-through 
Table 5.3 gives the development in the price adjustmen s of in Gulf Coast gasoline per 
year, ∆   ∗ (the second column), and the retail gasoline in Curaçao, ∆ , (the third column) in 
US cents per liter.  The price–cost change is defined as the difference between the c ange in the 
regulated domestic gasoline price and the c ange in international market spot gasoline price (the 
cost).  In 1993, for example, the Gulf Coast prices (input costs) declined by 3.86¢ and the retail 
prices increased by 3.13¢ in Curaçao; hence, the pric –cost change is approximately 7¢.  The 






Price Changes in the Gulf Coast Gasoline and Gasoline Retail Sector in Curaçao 




Gulf Coast price changes 
in ¢ per liter 
(2) 
Retail price changes in 
¢ per liter 
(3) 
1990   3.04 12.91 
1991 –3.49 –8.49 
1992 –0.24   0.00 
1993 –3.86   3.13 
1994   1.85 –3.24 
1995   1.24   6.87 
1996   4.47 12.35 
1997 –3.97   0.00 
1998 –5.40 –3.91 
1999   9.50   6.48 
2000   1.77 13.13 
2001 –5.61 –2.29 
2002   7.20   1.13 
2003   1.93 –4.37 
2004   4.79   4.64 
2005 14.05 14.03 
2006   0.85   0.00 
2007 17.94   8.10 
2008 –35.58 16.70 
2009 25.32 –18.88 
2010 11.19   6.17 
2011   6.19 16.01 
2012 – 1.83   9.55 
   




The data contain rounding errors 
Source: Energy Information Administration, (Curoil, 2013) 
 
 
Curoil initially evaluated the price–cost changes every quarter; since mid-2007, this has 
been done every month.  A negative monthly/quarterly price–cost change, ∆  ∆   ∗ < 0, 




payments with future retail price adjustments by including a “recovery index premium” (Table 
5.1) in the future prices of gasoline.  A positive monthly/quarterly price–cost change, ∆ 
∆   ∗ > 0, is discounted by including a negative “recovery index premium” in the future price 
adjustments (de Haan, 1990).  The components of the pric  structure, except for the cross-
subsidy and the recovery index, are largely fixed amounts.  The difference between the two lines 
in Figure 5.2, ceteris paribus, can be considered as an approximation of the recovery index 
premium and the cross-subsidy. 
 
Figure 5.2. The components of the price–cost change of gasoline in Curaçao (in US ¢, 1990–
2012). Source: Energy Information Administration, Curoil (2013.) 
Figure 5.3 shows the cumulative Gulf Coast price changes and the cumulative gasoline 
retail price changes in the period of 1990–2012.  In this period, the total cost change in the Gulf 
Coast amounted to an increase of 51¢; in Curaçao, the re ail price increase was 90¢, representing 
a price–cost change of 39¢.  The wedge between the two lines is the cumulative price–cost 
changes.  The cumulative retail price changes lagged behind the cumulative Gulf Coast price 



















2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2012.  A widening of the cumulative price–cost change occurred 
when the sizes of the domestic price adjustments differed from the Gulf Coast price changes, 
mainly due to the gasoline price component of the recovery index premium.  
 
Figure 5.3. Cumulative price changes in the Gulf Coast gasoline and the gasoline retail sector in 
Curaçao (in US ¢, 1990–2012). Source: Energy Information Administration, (Curoil, March 20, 
2013).  
5.3. The Autoregressive Binomial Conditional Model of Gasoline Price Adjustment 
Douglas and Herrera (2010) extended the models used by Davis and Hamilton (2003) and 
proposed the ABC model. The ABC model of Douglas and Herrera (2010, 2014) has a general 
form with a high degree of flexibility to test the competing theories, such as the menu cost, 
inattentive producer, and the political interferenc hypotheses.  This ABC model also offers the 
possibility of testing for asymmetric pricing behavior.  In this model, the probabilities of the 
change in gasoline retail price are related to the current price–cost gap, the lagged probabilities 
of the gasoline retail price changes, and lagged price adjustment.  The current price–cost gap is 
defined in Douglas and Herrera (2010) as the difference between the cash price of bulk unleaded 






















































































as the difference between the wholesale price and the retail price of gasoline.  Hence, the 
definition of the price–cost gap is related to the data under study.  
5.3.1. The Autoregressive Binomial Conditional Model 
In the ABC model, the probability of a price change will depend on past distributions of 
actual price changes, past actual price changes, and the price–cost margin between the 
wholesale/retail price and the targeted optimal price.  The time period in this model, t, is a day.  
Gasoline price changes are binomial (the event  B = 1 represents a change of price, and the event 
 B = 0 represents an unchanged price).   
The probability that a price change will be introduced at time t+1 is defined by the 
following: 
ℎ B ≡ Pr ( B = 1|  ,  %, … , ,  .           (5.1) 
Thus, at time t+1,  B = 1 if a price change is observed, and   is the predetermined variable. 
In the ABC(q,r,s) model, the q refers to the number of parameters of the “error” terms, r 
is the number of past probabilities, and s is the number of parameters of the actual values of the 
price change.  The ABC(q,r,s) model is described by the two following equations: 
v%(ℎ B = ω+ ∑ ]K %B − ℎ %BL> + ∑  a  v% Kℎ %BL> + ∑  %B> +   , (5.2) 
and 
ℎ B = v ω+ ∑ ]K %B − ℎ %BL> + ∑  a  v%Kℎ %BL> + ∑  %B> +  .  (5.3) 
Equation (5.3) shows that the probability of a change in price at time t+1 depends on a 
constant, ω,  an “error” term  %B − ℎ %B (error on prediction of the actual values), the t-r past 
probabilities on price changes of the link function v%(. , the past s actual values of    , and  = 
| % −  %∗ |.  Here ,   is the price at time t, and   ∗ is the firm’s targeted optimal price.  




The function G ( ) is a continuous cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.); hence, strictly 
increasing. v%(. ) represents a one-to-one mapping of ℎ B to R.  Davis and Hamilton (2003) 
compared the logistic and standard normal functions using the gasoline data for the United 
States; based on the Schwartz criterion (SC), they concluded that the logistic function offers a 
better fit.  Hence, G is a logistic cumulative density function (c.d.f), v()  = BY), and for  =
 = o = 0, the ABC(0,0,0) is equivalent to the “atheoretical” logit specification in Davis and 
Hamilton (2003).  Given initial conditions of  , and ℎ , 39 the price change probabilities can be 
obtained recursively.  The parameters  = {, ], … , ], a, … , a,, … ,   , } are obtained by 
maximizing the likelihood function, as follows:  
 = ∑ 9% >{,,B  B  log (ℎ B + (1 −  B  log (1 − ℎ B;.                       (5.4) 
In Douglas and Herrera (2010), the variable r (  −    ( ∗ r is defined as the amount 
remaining from the price–cost gap (due to partial adjustment) after the most recent price change.  
This variable provides information on whether the price adjustment is full or partial.  A partial 
price adjustment may result in future price adjustments, aiming to reach to a full price 
adjustment.  
5.3.2. Autoregressive Binomial Conditional Model Adjustments for the Case of Curaçao 
In the case of Curaçao, the time period, t, of the model is a month, which differs from the 
daily observations in the original ABC model.  In the United States, the gasoline wholesale/retail 
prices may change daily, while in Curaçao, a retail price change will take at least 1 month.  The 
interpretation of time can be changed without loss f generality, as this does not alter the model 
structure.  A second adjustment is the frequency of gasoline price change.  In the study of 
                                                 
39 Douglas and Herrera (2010) proposed setting the following initial values of v%(ℎ¡ =0 and initializing 




Douglas and Herrera (2010), the gasoline prices changed daily.  In the observed period the 
change in gasoline prices was mainly based on a quarterly price setting.  As a result, the lag of 3 
months marked the price-regulation behavior.  Therefore, the price–cost gap | %£   %£∗ |  
would offer more information than the proposed price– ost gap with a lag of 1 day 
(| %   %∗ |, ) as in the study of Douglas and Herrera (2010). 
Another adjustment in the ABC model is the definition of the partial price adjustment 
gap, r (  −    ( ∗ r.  The newly defined partial price adjustment gap represents the absolute 
difference in gasoline retail price change, ∆ , and the imported cost change in period t (the 
change in the Gulf Coast spot price), ∆   .∗  Thus, it is equal to the absolute price–cost 
change  |∆  ∆   ∗|.  This partial price adjustment gap (in changes) differs from the price–cost 
gaps (in levels) in the studies of Douglas and Herrera (2009, 2014).  The newly defined partial 
price adjustment gap can be rewritten in the absolute values of the domestic gasoline price 
change |∆ | and the gasoline imported cost price change |  ¤ ∗|.  The following inequality 
holds:  
|∆  ∆   ∗| ≥ ¢¦o( |∆ |  |∆   ∗|).        (5.5) 
This can also be expressed as follows: 
|∆  ∆   ∗| ≥ ! |∆ |  |∆   
∗|,        § |∆ | ≥ |∆   ∗|                                                      (5.5¢     
− |∆ | + |∆   ∗|, § |∆ | ≤ |∆   ∗|.                                                    (5.5¦   
The aim of the incomes policy of the government of Curaçao is to achieve price 
stability,40 which is equivalent to a government striving for small values of |∆ |.  These small 
values are similar to low price changes (inflation) f gasoline.  Equation (5.5a) presents a 
situation where the domestic gasoline inflation is higher than the imported gasoline inflation, 
                                                 




while Equation (5.5b) shows the opposite situation.  Hence, the lower domestic gasoline inflation 
is applicable in Equation (5.5b).  Hence, with low inflation, |∆  ∆   ∗| ≥  |∆   ∗|, meaning 
that the absolute price–cost change will be at least qual to the absolute foreign price change.  
Thus, when the foreign prices | ¤ ∗| increase, the price–cost changes will likely increase.  At 
the same time, an increase in the foreign prices is likely to increase the domestic prices, as the 
foreign price is the cost factor of the domestic pre.  Hence, the coefficient of the partial price 
adjustment gap r (  −   ( ∗ r is expected to be positive.  
The menu cost hypothesis in the autoregressive binomial conditional model. The 
probability of a gasoline price change in a menu cost model depends on the current price–cost 
gap.  In the menu cost hypothesis, firms review prices based on current information on the price–
cost gap and the menu cost (Barro, 1972).41  Firms will change their prices only when the 
additional profit exceeds the costs for changing the price (the menu costs).  Table 5.3 shows the 
expected coefficients of past distribution, v% (ℎ %, the past changes,  %, the partial price 
adjustment gap, r (  −    ( ∗ r,   the price symmetry, the political business cycle and
Energy Fund, and the price–cost gap with 1 and 3 month lags. 
In the menu cost model,  a  =   = 0 (Douglas & Herrera, 2010).  Thus, neither past 
history (  = 0) nor past distribution ( a  = 0) should affect the probability of a price change.  
The partial price adjustment gap change r (  −    ( ∗ r is not expected to have an impact on 
the price change in the menu cost theory.  In this model, firms will change the price 
independently of whether the price–cost gap is an increase or a decrease; hence, prices are 
changed symmetrically.  The political business cycle and Energy Fund and the lagged price–cost 
gap are not applicable to the menu cost theory.  
                                                 




Hypothesis of rational inattention by producers hypothesis in the autoregressive 
binomial conditional model. In the information delay hypothesis, inattentive producers do not 
frequently update their production plan with regular information on the market conditions.  In 
Reis’s (2006) theories of information delays and inattentive producers, the history of the 
probability of price changes is important; thus, a ignificant a   is expected.  In these theories, 
there is a negative autocorrelation in the probability of changing gasoline prices in the 
consecutive periods.  Periods with high probability of a change in price are followed by periods 
with a low probability of price change due to delays in information; hence,  a  < 0.  The political 
business cycle and ‘Energy Fund’ are not applicable to the inattentive producer hypothesis. 
There is also a lower probability of a price change in two successive42 periods; hence,  < 0.  
Price setters exhibiting rational inattention are not paying attention to any new information; 
therefore, no conclusion can be drawn from the respon e of their pricing behavior on new 
information.  Thus, these firms cannot set prices asymmetrically.  In addition, the inattentive 
producer pays more attention to past information, and the coefficient of | %   %∗ |  should 
be positive and significant, indicating that a large price–cost gap in the t−1 period will increase 
the possibility of price change in period t.  In this hypothesis, no a priori assumption is made for 
the partial price gap adjustment.  
 
 
                                                 
42 The data used in the ABC models are usually high frequency (daily) data (Douglas & Herrera, 2010, 
2014; Russell & Engle, 2005).  For lower frequency data (monthly, quarterly), as in the case of Curaçao, this 






















| %   %∗ | | %£   %£∗ | 
Menu costs   a  =0 (no effect)  =  0 No effect Yes Not relevant Not relevant Not relevant 
        
Inattentive 
producer  
 a  < 0  < 0 ? Yes Not relevant Positive Positive 
        
Political 
interference 
a > 0  >0 Positive No Negative Not relevant Negative 
Notes. 
‘?’ means indecisive 





 The political interference hypothesis in the autoregressive binomial conditional 
model. The political interference hypothesis assumes that the probability of gasoline price 
changes is determined by periods of political interfer nce.  The political interference resulted in 
Taylor TDP (Taylor, 1980) in price regulation and Calvo TDP (Calvo, 1983) in the regulatory 
capture and the political business cycle.  The gasoline prices in the “contract” period remained 
fixed in this period consistent with Taylor TDP.  Hence, the history of the probability is expected 
to show the periodicity in the price change.  The autocorrelation of past probabilities in the 
consecutive contract periods is positively related to the probability of price change of current 
contract period; hence,  a  >  0.  Similarly, the probability of the actual price changes in 
consecutive contract periods is expected to be positively related,  > 0.  In addition, the partial 
price adjustment gap, r (  −    ( ∗ r, which is an indicator of the recovery index of the
gasoline price, is expected to be positive related to the price change.  A larger recovery index 
means that a price change is more likely to occur. 
A regulatory capture in the gasoline retail market occurred in the period of the Energy 
Fund.  The period of the Energy Fund is that of June 2006–July 2007.  A consequence of the 
regulatory capture was longer periods with fixed prices than the pre-set quarterly/monthly 
periods.  In addition, the political business cycle influenced the price setting for gasoline in the 
pre-election periods.  The pre-election period was set as 6 months prior to the election by 
Schuknecht (1996).  The result of the political busine s cycle price adjustment was that prices 
remained fixed for a longer time than the proposed quarterly/monthly periods.  Both elements of 
political interference are expected to be negatively r lated to the probability of a price change.  




domestic price changes were adjusted with a time lag and were unsynchronized with the 
international price changes.  
The test on price asymmetry in the autoregressive binomial conditional model. To 
measure asymmetry, Davis and Hamilton (2003) proposed the dummy variable  , which takes 
the value of 1 if      ∗ ≥ 0 and zero otherwise.  They proposed replacing  with 
 ,   defined as follows: 
 = 9 , (1 −  ,   ( −    ∗, −(1 −  ( −    ∗;i.                                                (5.5) 
Meanwhile, price symmetry is when  = (1 −  , or   ( −    ∗ = −(1 −  ( −    ∗. 
In this study, I propose using only the coefficients  , 1 −   to measure the asymmetry.  
I estimate the parameter 1  for the positive price–cost gap ( % −    %∗ > 0  and 2  for 
the negative price–cost gap ( % −    %∗ < 0 .  The Wald test for symmetry is the null 
hypothesis 1 = 2 .  A rejection of the null hypothesis means that the price adjustments are 
asymmetric. 
5.4. Data  
 
The period of research covers the years 1990–2012.  The observed monthly data consisted of 
the Gulf Coast conventional gasoline regular spot price free on board (FOB) and the retail prices 
of unleaded gasoline 95 in Curaçao.  The Gulf Coast conventional gasoline spot price is used as a 
proxy for the acquisition (purchase) price.  These gasoline spot prices were obtained from the 
Energy Information Administration [EIA], March 20, 2013).  They are set in US$ per gallon and 
are converted to cents (¢) per liter.  Figures 5.4a, b, and c show the frequencies of the Gulf Coast 
gasoline price changes and the retail price changes of the gasoline in Curaçao.  On the horizontal 




price increase and a negative number representing the size of a price decline.  Figure 5.4a shows 
that the small Gulf Coast price changes of 1¢ declin , no price change, and 1¢ increase had the 
highest frequencies.  Gulf Coast gasoline prices remained unchanged in 17% of months. 
 
Figure 5.4a. The distribution of the Gulf Coast gasoline price change (in US ¢ per liter, January 
1990–December 2012).  Source: (EIA, 2013) 
The retail price of gasoline 95 is regulated at the distribution stage (Stage 2 in Figure 
5.1).  The monthly unleaded gasoline 95 octane retail price data are available at the website of 
Curoil (Curoil, 2013).  The data provided by Curoil are in Netherlands Antillean guilders, which 
are converted to US ¢ per liter for comparison with the Gulf Coast gasoline prices.  As illustrated 
in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3), Curaçao’s currency is pegged at 1.79 for 1 US $; thus, there is no 























Figure 5.4b. The distribution of the monthly gasoline retail price changes in Curaçao (including 
unchanged prices in January 1990–December 2012).  Source: (Curoil, 2013).).  
An examination of the distribution of gasoline retail price changes shows a high 
frequency of unchanged monthly prices (Figure 5.4b).  Prices were not adjusted in 78% of 
months in the retail price of gasoline, compared to 17% of months in the Gulf Coast gasoline 
prices in the period of 19902012; which implies that the gasoline prices in Curaçao adjusted 
asymmetrically and were unchanged for a considerably long period of time when compared to 
the Gulf Coast prices. 
Figure 5.4c shows the distribution of sizes of the gasoline price adjustments excluding the 
unchanged prices.  The magnitude of price changes was substantial, varying from a price hike of 

























Figure 5.4c. Distribution of the monthly gasoline retail price changes in Curaçao (excluding 
unchanged prices for January 1990–December 2012). Source: (Curoil, March 20, 2013)  
The data on political interference include price regulation and the periods of the Energy 
Fund and the political business cycle.  Price regulation is considered according to Taylor TDP and 
is captured in the data of the price–cost variable | %£ −   %£∗|.  The cost of gasoline ( −3∗) is 
proposed to adjust in the retail price every quarter (−3.   The Taylor TDP of a quarter is chosen 
because during 1990−2012, the policy of gasoline price adjustment was mainly based on the 
quarterly price change.  Hence, a positive relation on the variable with past information 
| % −  %∗ |  in the inattentive producer model is tested with a price–cost gap with a 3 month 
lag. 
The regulatory capture and the political business cycle periods are represented by binary 
dummy variables.  The Energy Fund in the gasoline market was available in 2006 and 2007, 
when interest groups pressured policymakers to keepthe rising energy prices in check.  As a 























in mid-2006.  Its purpose was to subsidize the rising oil prices in this period.  The Energy Fund 
remained active from June 2006 to July 2007.  Hence, the dummy variable for the regulatory 
capture is specified by a “1” for this period and “0” otherwise.  The second dummy is the 
political business cycle.  Table 5.5 presents the election dates by the two levels of government in 
Curaçao, namely the central and the island levels. The dummy included a “1” for the 6 months 
prior to the election.  As the sample starts in January 1990, only 3 months prior to the election in 
March 1990 have a dummy value of “1.” 
 
Table 5.5 
Dummies for the Pre elections Period in Curaçao in 1990-2012 
Elections by level of government Election date Dummy =1 for the months of: 
Central Government 16-Mar-90 January, 1990March, 1990 
Curaçao Government 12-Apr-91 November, 1990April, 1991 
Central Government 12-Feb-94 
September, 1993February, 
1994 
Curaçao Government 12-May-95 December, 1994May, 1995 
Central Government 30-Jan-98 August, 1997January, 1998 
Curaçao Government 7-May-99 December, 1998May, 1999 
Central Government 12-Jan-02 August, 2001January, 2002 
Curaçao Government 9-May-03 December, 2002May, 2003 
Central Government 17-Jan-06 August, 2005January, 2006 
Curaçao Government 21-Apr-07 November, 2006April, 2007 
Central Government 22-Jan-10 August, 2009January, 2010 
Curaçao Government 27-Aug-10 March, 2010August, 2010 
Curaçao Government 19-Oct-12 May, 2012October, 2012 
Notes. Source: Ritter (1995; for 1990–1997), http://kse.cw/ (for 1998–2012). 
 
Political interference has elements of Calvo and Taylor TDP.  The price regulation is 
Taylor TDP and is captured by the data of the price–cost variable.  The Calvo pricing is exhibited 




captured by a joint dummy including both the dummy of the Energy Fund and the dummy of the 
political business cycle.  
5.5. Results 
The atheoretical logit model, ABC(0,0,0), is the benchmark for the general ABC(q,r,s) 
models (Douglas &Herrera, 2010).  This general ABC(q,r,s) model nests the atheoretical logit 
model with a predetermined variable  .  In the case of Curaçao, the gasoline prices change every 
quarter, shifting to every month in mid-2007.  It can be expected that lags of 1 and 3 months are 
significant; hence the most probable lags values of r and s are 1 or 3.  The feasible model 
versions are summarized in the first column of Table 5.6.  The second column is the constant 
term.  In these models, the constant term is estimated in the periods of political interference by 
regulatory capture and the political business cycle.  This is expressed as follows: 
 Let  = (| ( % −    ( %∗r, |( %£ −   ( %£∗|, d«2¬¢L.     (5.6) 
r (  −    ( ∗ r is the recovery index, while   %£ is the monthly gasoline retail price in 
US ¢ per liter with a lag of 3 months.    %£∗ is the monthly acquisition price, which is the Gulf 
Coast conventional spot oil price in cents per liteagged by 3 months.  Moreover, the variable 
dummypolitical is the Calvo pricing, represented by the joint dummy of the Energy Fund and the 
political business cycle. 
The variable dummypolitical in the predetermined   variable is equal to constant ω in the 
periods of political interference.  In the periods without political interference, dummypolitical=0 
and the constant equals zero. 
The third and fourth columns show which of the coefficients a    ¢d  can be estimated 
and show the assumptions of these coefficients.  Column 5 contains the components of a 




cost gap lagged 3 months, and the dummy for politica  interference.  The current absolute price 
gap, as proposed by Douglas and Herrera (2010), is not included because the price-setting 
behavior is more likely to have a lag of 1 or 3 months.  It is more probably that the absolute 
price–cost with a lag of 3 months, (|( %£ −   ( %£∗|), will be significant, as prices were 
proposed to change quarterly. 
 
Table 5.6 
Specifications of the ABC models and the Nested ABC(0,0,0) Models 
ABC(0,r,s) ω β   ABC(0,0,0) with   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ABC(0,0,1) 
 
yes, if  
dummypolitical=1 
β = 0 δ 
 
 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 
ABC(0,1,0) 
 
yes, if  
dummypolitical=1 
β δ = 0 
 
 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 




 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 
ABC(0,0,3) 
 
yes, if  
dummypolitical=1 
a = 0 
 
£  = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 
ABC(0,3,0) 
 




 = 0 
 
 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 






 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 






 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical 






 = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −
  ( %£∗|,dummypolitical) 
Note.  
The variable ω is equal to the coefficient of the dummypolitical, when the dummypolitical=1, 
otherwise the variable is equal to 0. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the results of these models in the periods of political interference 
according to the Calvo TDP.  In the first column, all of the model options are presented.  The 




10% significance levels) in all models, and all have the correct signs.  The periods of pre-
elections and the Energy Fund had a negative impact on the probability of a price change. 
  
Table 5.7 
The ABC Models in the Periods with Political Interference by Calvo Gasoline Pricing 
(MLE, January 1990–December 2012) 
ABC(0,r,s) Dummy 
Political  
a   | ( 
−    ( ∗| 
| %£ −  %£∗| 
Log L LR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ABC(0,0,1) –0.94 ***  0.08 0.11*** –0.11*** –157.24 0.82 
ABC(0,1,0) –0.70** 0.55***  0.09*** –0.06*** –152.29 0.00*** 
ABC(0,1,1) –0.63* 0.52*** –0.05 0.08*** –0.06*** –152.67 0.00*** 
ABC(0,0,3) –1.07 ***  0.70** 0.09*** –0.11*** –154.87 0.02** 
ABC(0,3,0) –0.77 *** 0.78***  0.09*** –0.04*** –135.09 0.00*** 
ABC(0,1,3) –0.82** 0.39** 0.76** 0.07*** –0.08*** –152.05 0.01*** 
ABC(0,3,1) –0.61** 0.78** 0.19 0.09*** –0.05*** –139.73 0.00*** 
ABC(0,3,3) –1.17 *** 0.79*** 0.53* 0.06** –0.04*** –129.34 0.00*** 
Notes. 
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* 
at 10%. In addition, j refers to the lags q, r, and s in the ABC(q,r,s) model. The LR reports 
the p-value of the likelihood ratio test the ABC(q,r,s) model to be reduced to the 
ABC(0,0,0) with  = (| ( % −    ( %∗| , |( %£ −   ( %£∗|,dummypolitical). 
 
 
The coefficient in the third column, a, is the autocorrelation with past 
probability v% (ℎ %.  The coefficients of past probabilities were signif cant in all models at 
the 1% or 5% significance level.  The coefficients of the history of the actual price change 
variable,  , reported in the fourth column, were significant in he models with a 3 month lag and 
not significant in the models with a 1 month lag.  This is probably related to the relatively higher 
number of observations with quarterly price adjustment (in the January 1990–June 2007 period) 
compared to the monthly price adjustment (July 2007–December 2012).  The coefficients of 




index premium in the TDP in Curaçao, and the price–cost gap, | %£ −   %£∗|, the variable 
representing the Taylor time-dependent price regulation in the fifth and sixth columns, 
respectively, were significant at 1% in all models xcept the ABC(0,3,3) model.  Here, the partial 
price adjustment variable (representing the recovery index) was significant at the 5% level.  
Hence, both the Taylor and Calvo TDP models in the gasoline markets were supported. 
The log likelihood reports the value of the logarithm of the probability of the model, and 
the last column shows the p-value of the likelihood ratio (LR) test.  A better fit of the ABC(q,r,s) 
with a predetermined   is established when the LR test rejects the ABC(0,0,0) model  in favor 
of the ABC(q,r,s).  The first model, ABC(0,0,1), includes the 1 month lagged actual price change 
variable.  Its coefficient, , is not significant.  The p-value of the LR test (in the last column) 
shows that the “atheoretical” model ABC(0,0,0) did not improve with the addition of the 1 
month lagged actual price change variable.  Hence, there is no difference in the ABC(0,0,0) 
model and ABC(0,0,1).  The p-values of the LR tests (the last column) reject the atheoretical 
ABC(0,0,0) model in favor of all ABC(0,r,s) models, except for ABC(0,0,1).  
In Appendix 5 (Table 5A), more nested models are compared and analyzed.  In the 
models of a monthly lag in the history of probabilities of price changes, the model version of 
ABC(0,1,0) is preferred to ABC(0,1,1); hence, this model version offers the better fit.  In the 
model versions with a 3 month lag in the history of price changes, the model of ABC(0,3,0) is 
preferred to ABC(0,3,1), and model version ABC(0,3,3) is preferred to ABC(0,3,0).  Hence, 
ABC(0,3,3) provides the best fit in the nested models with a 3 month lagged history of the 




5.5.1. The Menu Costs Hypothesis in Curaçao 
The menu costs were tested by  a  =   = 0.  This test can be best performed in a model 
that includes both variables of the lagged price changes and the past distribution of price changes, 
namely the models ABC(0,1,1), ABC(0,3,1), ABC(0,1,3), and ABC(0,3,3).  In these models, the 
Wald test is applied, and the null hypothesis is   a  =   = 0.  The null hypothesis was rejected 
in all of these models.  The menu costs model is not applicable to the gasoline market in Curaçao. 
5.5.2. The Rational Inattention Hypothesis in Curaçao 
The test on the rational inattention is when   a  < 0 ,   < 0, and the coefficient of the 
variable | %£ −   %£∗ | is positive.  The test was performed on the models ABC(0,1,1), 
ABC(0,3,1), ABC(0,1,3), and ABC(0,3,3).  The coefficient of | %£ −   %£∗ | is negative and 
significant in all models, and   a  > 0 ,   > 0; hence, the data did not support the theory of 
rational inattention. 
5.5.3. The Political Interference Hypothesis in Curaçao  
The political interference hypothesis requires a significant and positive price–cost 
change, | (  −    ( ∗|, and a negative coefficient for political interferenc  measured by the 
dummypolitical variable.  The conditions for the political interference hypothesis also include 
that  a  >  0 ,  > 0; hence, they entail positive autocorrelation of past probabilities in 
consecutive contract periods and a positive relationship between the probability of price changes 
and the past price change.  The coefficients of the variables of the partial price adjustment and 
the dummypolitical are significant and have the correct signs in all models.  The model versions 




for model ABC(0,1,1) where the coefficient  did not have the correct sign, all models 
supported the political hypothesis.  
To test the robustness of the dummypolitical variable, I used the LR test.  The log 
likelihood in the second column of Table 5.7 includes the dummypolitical variable in the model, 
and the third column excludes the dummypolitical variable.  The fourth column shows the result 
of the LR test defined as –2 [LR(unrestricted) – LR (restricted)].  The LR test has a Chi-squared 
distribution with 1 degree of freedom ( ¯?.  The models with dummypolitical all reject the null 
of dummypolitical=0 at a 1% significance level.  The models including the dummypolitical 
variable offered better explanation of the data.  The political interference hypothesis was not 
rejected in the gasoline market of Curaçao. 
 
Table 5.8  





Log L including the dummy 
 
(2) 






ABC(0,0,1) –157.24 –162.3 10.12*** 
ABC(0,1,0) –152.29 –161.7 18.82*** 
ABC(0,1,1) –152.67 –162.0 18.66*** 
ABC(0,0,3) –154.87 –161.0 12.26*** 
ABC(0,3,0) –135.09 –158.0 45.82*** 
ABC(0,1,3) –152.05 –160.5 16.90*** 
ABC(0,3,1) –139.73 –156.0 32.54*** 
ABC(0,3,3) –129.34 –148.1 37.52*** 
Notes. 







5.5.4. Price Asymmetry 
The analyses in Sections 5.2.4 and 5.3 point to price asymmetry in the gasoline retail 
market in Curaçao.  The test on price asymmetry considers the variable of the price–cost gap, 
| %£ −   %£∗|.  Thus, the test determines whether the coefficient of a positive gasoline price–cost 
gap (  %£∗ −   %£∗ ≥ 0  is equal to that of a negative price–cost gap (  %£∗ −   %£∗ < 0.  The 
results are presented in in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5.9.  
Table 5.9 shows that the coefficients of positive price cost gap variable, 1  , and of the 
negative price–cost gap variable, 2 ,  are both significant and have opposite signs.  The Wald 
test (in Column 9) is applied to test for symmetry in the price adjustment.  The p-values of the 
Wald test show that the symmetry was rejected in all models and prices were asymmetric.  A 
price increase had a negative impact, while a price decline had a positive effect on the 
probability of price change.  
All ABC models, excluding ABC(0,1,1) supported the political interference hypothesis, 
while the menu cost and the rational inattention of pr ducers hypotheses were rejected in all 
models.  In addition, price asymmetry in the gasoline prices of Curaçao was established.  The 









Test on Price Symmetry in the ABC Models and during the Period of Political Interference by Calvo Pricing 

























Wald test  
1 = 2  (9 
ABC(0,0,1)  0.06 –0.07*** 0.13*** –0.95*** 0.09*** –155.74 0.000*** 
ABC(0,1,0) 0.59***  –0.04** 0.05 –0.51 0.06*** –154.9 0.0001*** 
ABC(0,1,1) 0.56*** –0.06 –0.04** 0.06** –0.61 * 0.07*** –155.2 0.002*** 
ABC(0,0,3)  0.69** –0.08*** 0.13*** –1.07*** 0.08*** –155.7 0.000*** 
ABC(0,3,0) 0.81***  –0.03* 0.03 –0.397** 0.08*** –139.7 0.0059*** 
ABC(0,1,3) 0.42** 0.75** –0.06*** 0.08*** –0.78** 0.06** –153.5 0.000*** 
ABC(0,3,1) 0.79*** 0.13 –0.04** 0.04 –0.86*** 0.08**  –142.6 0.0022*** 
ABC(0,3,3) 0.76*** 0.47 –0.04** 0.04 –1.04*** 0.06** –140.7 0.004*** 
Notes.  
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e:*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10%; j refers to the lags q, r and s in 
the ABC(q,r,s) model.  






The objective of this chapter was to identify the causes of the sticky gasoline prices in 
Curaçao.  Besides stickiness, domestic gasoline pric s were not synchronized with the 
international gasoline prices in the period of 1990 2012, as the domestic gasoline retail prices 
were not adjusted in 78% of months, contrasting to 17% of months of international gasoline price 
freezes.  Moreover, the test on price asymmetry showed that occasional international gasoline 
price declines, in contrast to frequent increases, w re often passed through in the domestic 
gasoline prices.  This indicates a case of inverse “rockets and feathers.”  Using the ABC model, 
the hypotheses of political interference, menu costs, and information delay due to inattentive 
producers were tested with the aim of establishing the causes of price rigidity in the gasoline 
retail market in Curaçao.  The menu costs and information delay by inattentive producers 
hypotheses were not supported as causes of price rig dity in the gasoline retail market of 
Curaçao.  Political interference in price setting, i  contrast—with the gasoline price regulation, 
periods of pre-elections, and regulatory capture by the Energy Fund—was supported as a cause 
of gasoline price rigidity.  Price regulation in the gasoline retail market in Curaçao was supported 
in all models.  The political interference hypothesis consisted of two price strategies—the 
political business cycle and regulatory capture; th se were supported by all models except one, 
which was not one of the best models.  
The policy of price regulation is consistent with Taylor TDP.  The regular duration of 
price spells in the gasoline retail market was extended with price freezes up to 25 months, which 
is consistent with Calvo TDP.  Hence, both the Calvo nd Taylor TDP hypotheses were 
supported.  This outcome presents (one of) the causes of sticky prices in the gasoline retail 




commodity markets in Curaçao.  First, the gasoline price is a driver in the price setting of most 
commodities.  The sticky gasoline prices, consequently lowered the price frequency adjustment 
in most commodities.  Second, as the gasoline market is a segment of the commodity markets, 
the sticky prices in the gasoline market represent a piece of the price-rigidity puzzle in Curaçao.  
Hence, the determinants of price rigidity in the gasoline market unraveled a piece of the larger 
price-rigidity problem in Curaçao.  
As was expected, political interference caused economic distortion for the economic 
agents.  In the case of the Energy Fund, the consumers paid a fixed gasoline price in the 2006–
2007 period, while international gasoline prices skyrocketed.  Consequently, the consumers 
benefited from the fixed gasoline prices in this period.  As the Energy Fund was financed by 
government loans among other things (NRC- Handelsblad, 2012), this could imply a future 
taxation to pay back the loans.  Hence, the internaio l gasoline price increases that were 
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Appendix 5: The ABC Model Testing 
Table 5A compares the nested model versions.  The first two columns show the model 
versions.  The model version in Column 1 is compared with a nested model version in Column 2.  
In the first eight rows of Table 5A, each ABC model v rsion (in Column 1) is compared to the 
atheoretical ABC(0,0,0) model version (in Column 2). Column 3 shows the p-value of the null 
hypothesis, and the null hypotheses are stated in Column 4.  When a coefficient is insignificant 
(p > 0.10), this means that the model version excluding this coefficient is preferred.  The model 
ABC(0,0,1) is nested in the model ABC(0,0,0).  In the case of the ABC(0,0,1) model, the null 
hypothesis of =0 was not rejected, and the coefficient of the actu l price change was not 
significant.  Hence, the test shows that ABC(0,0,1) does not provide a better fit to the data than 
ABC(0,0,0).  All of the other model versions provide a better fit to the data than the atheoretical 






The p-Values of the WALD Tests in the ABC Models in the period of Political 













ABC(0,0,1) ABC(0,0,0) 0.82 =0 
ABC(0,1,0) ABC(0,0,0) 0.00*** a=0 
ABC(0,1,1) ABC(0,0,0) 0.00*** a = =0 
ABC(0,0,3) ABC(0,0,0) 0.02** £=0 
ABC(0,3,0) ABC(0,0,0) 0.00*** a£=0 
ABC(0,1,3) ABC(0,0,0) 0.01** a = £=0 
ABC(0,3,1) ABC(0,0,0) 0.00*** a£ = =0 
ABC(0,3,3) ABC(0,0,0) 0.00*** a£ = £=0 
ABC(0,1,1) ABC(0,1,0) 0.89 =0 
ABC(0,1,1) ABC(0,0,1) 0.00*** a=0 
ABC(0,1,3) ABC(0,1,0 0.01** £=0 
ABC(0,1,3) ABC(0,0,3) 0.02** a=0 
ABC(0,3,1) ABC(0,3,0) 0.60 =0 
ABC(0,3,1) ABC(0,0,1) 0.00*** a£=0 
ABC(0,3,3) ABC(0,3,0) 0.09* £=0 
ABC(0,3,3) ABC(0,0,3) 0.00*** a£=0 
Notes. 
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e:*** significant 
at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10%. 
 
 
Following the comparison with the ABC(0,0,0) model, the model versions in Column 1 
are compared with other nested model versions.  The results show that model ABC(0,1,0) is 
preferred to ABC(0,1,1), model ABC(0,3,0) is preferred to ABC(0,3,1), and model ABC(0,3,3) is 




Table 5B shows the result of the ABC models, including a constant and a political 
dummy.  The results show that the political dummy, representing Calvo pricing, and the price–
cost gap, representing Taylor pricing, were insignif cant in all model versions.  
 
Table 5B 
The ABC Models of Political Dummy with a Constant (MLE, January 1990–December 2012) 
ABC(0,r,s) ω Political 
dummy 
a   | ( 
−    ( ∗| 
| %£ −  %£∗| 
Log L 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ABC(0,0,1) -2.44*** -0.09  0.60 0.23*** 0.02 -122.20 
ABC(0,1,0) -1.61*** -0.22 0.39  0.19*** 0.01 -122.96 
ABC(0,1,1) -1.72*** -0.24 0.27 -0.38 0.18*** 0.01 -121.54 
ABC(0,0,3) -2.58*** -0.39  1.41*** 0.22*** 0.02 -115.50 
ABC(0,3,0) -1.59*** -0.41 0.33***  0.20*** 0.03 -129.34 
ABC(0,1,3) -2.15*** -0.37 0.18 1.36*** 0.020*** 0.01 -114.65 
ABC(0,3,1) -1.72*** -0.35 0.36** 0.38 0.21*** 0.01 -118.50 
ABC(0,3,3) -1.91*** -0.41 0.30* 1.02** 0.18*** 0.02 -113.51 
Notes.  
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e:*** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10%; 
j refers to the lags q, r, and s in the ABC(q,r,s) model with  = (| ( % −
   ( %∗| , |( %£ −   ( %£∗|,dummypolitical, ω). 
 
Table 5C shows the results of the two separate dummy components of Calvo TDP, the 
Energy Fund and the political business cycle, and the constant.  The results show that the two 
separate dummies were not significant when a constant w s also included.  The price–cost gap 
variable, representing price regulation, was not significant either.
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Table 5C 
The ABC Models of Dummy Election, Dummy Energy Fund and a Constant (MLE, in 1990.01 –2012.12 
ABC(0,r,s) ω Political interference dummy 
 
a   | (  −    ( ∗|  %£ −   %£∗| Log L 
        




   
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)             (8)       (9) 
ABC(0,0,1) –2.41*** 0.08 –1.63  0.51 0.24*** 0.02 –120.63 
ABC(0,1,0) –1.63*** 0.08 –1.31 0.39  0.19*** 0.01 –121.98 
ABC(0,1,1) –1.79*** 0.01 –1.24 0.23 0.34 0.19*** 0.01 –120.49 
ABC(0,0,3) –2.59*** –0.15 –1.27  1.32*** 0.22*** 0.2 –115.05 
ABC(0,3,0) –1.87*** 0.05 –1.40 0.28  0.22*** –0.02 –119.04 
ABC(0,1,3) –2.22*** –0.18 –1.04 0.15 1.28*** 0.21** –0.01 –114.39 
ABC(0,3,1) –1.95*** 0.011 –1.31 0.26 0.37 0.22*** –0.02 –118.49 
ABC(0,3,3) –2.18*** –0.14 –1.107 0.19 1.06*** 0.020*** –0.02 –114.03 
Notes. 
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10%; j refers to the lags q, r, and s in the 






The ABC Models of Dummy Election and a Constant (MLE, January 1990December 2012) 




a   | (  −    ( ∗|  %£ −   %£∗| Log L 
         
         
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)                 (8) 
ABC(0,0,1) -2.46*** 0.02  0.61 0.23*** 0.02 -122.23 
ABC(0,1,0) -0.30* -0.22 0.78**  0.07*** -0.02 -132.78 
ABC(0,1,1) -1.94*** -0.00 0.19 0.46 0.19*** 0.01 -122.03 
ABC(0,0,3) -2.63*** -0.20  1.40*** 0.22*** 0.02 -115.93 
ABC(0,3,0) -1.89*** -0.00 0.30*  0.21*** 0.02 -120.82 
ABC(0,1,3) -2.25*** -0.23 0.16 1.36*** 0.19*** 0.01 -115.16 
ABC(0,3,1) -1.97*** -0.04 0.27 0.44 0.21*** 0.02 -119.97 
ABC(0,3,3) -2.20*** -0.18 0.21 1.13*** 0.19*** 0.02 -114.80 
Notes.  
The number of asterisks indicate levels of significan e: *** significant at 1%, ** at 5%,* at 10%; j refers to the lags q, r, and s in the 






Table 5D shows the ABC models with both a constant and the variable of the dummy 
election.  The results show that the dummy election and the price–cost gap variable were not 
significant in any models. The constant in the ABC models can be considered an average between 
the period without political interference and the period with political interference.  As my focus is 
on the period with political interference, only this period was considered; the results have been 






DOES THE PURCHASING-POWER PARITY (PPP) HYPOTHESIS HOLD ON THE 
CARIBBEAN MICRO-ISLANDS? 
The PPP hypothesis postulates a bilateral relationsh p between the exchange rate of 
trading countries and their relative prices.  The PPP has two versions—the absolute PPP and the 
relative PPP.  The absolute version posits that the national price levels should be equal when 
expressed in a common currency.  The relative PPP hypot esis assumes that the difference 
between the percentage price changes of the two trading countries equals the percentage change 
of their exchange rate.  Both PPP versions are based on the three following assumptions: (a) the 
law of one price (LOP), (b) the existence of a frictionless arbitrage mechanism, and (c) a 
constant real exchange rate (RER).  
The PPP has two practical applications in the international trade, which are the settings of 
exchange rate parities and the measurement of the degr e of nominal exchange rate 
misalignments.  Rejection of the PPP hypothesis, therefore, implies that the theoretical 
foundation of existing exchange rate alignments is unjustified.  Despite a considerable amount of 
research dedicated to this subject since the 1990s, the empirical evidence on the absolute and 
relative PPP hypotheses remains ambiguous; weak empirical support for the PPP hypotheses has 
obtained (Rogoff, 1996, Taylor & Taylor, 2004).  The most mentioned causes of the departure 
from the PPP hypotheses are as follows: the inclusion of non-tradable goods, differences in 
reporting of the national statistical agencies, the arbitrage costs (e.g., transaction costs), and 




effect43 and sticky prices are also mentioned to lead to failure of the PPP hypothesis.  According 
to Rogoff (1996), “the failure of the short-run PPP can be attributed in part to stickiness in 
nominal prices; as financial and monetary shocks buffet the nominal exchange rate, the real 
exchange rate also changes in the short run” (p. 654). 
The Caribbean micro-islands have comparatively hightransportation costs.  Such costs 
lead to relatively higher prices for Caribbean micro-islands compared to larger countries.  Thus, 
the law of one price, and consequently the PPP hypot eses, will be less likely to hold.  In 
addition, the sticky prices reported in Curaçao in the period of 2006 to 2010 may lead to a 
deviation from the PPP hypothesis.  As the high transportation costs in the Caribbean micro-
islands and the sticky prices in Curaçao may cause  departure from PPP hypotheses, it is 
interesting to examine whether the PPP hypotheses hold in Caribbean micro-islands. 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the validity of the PPP hypotheses on the 
Caribbean micro-islands, particularly Curaçao.  Here, the PPP hypotheses are tested for selected 
Caribbean micro-islands in the period of 1990–2012.  The selection is based on data availability 
and includes Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Curaçao, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and 
Saint Lucia.  
This chapter proceeds in Section 6.1 by providing a literature overview on the derivation 
and the empirics of the PPP hypotheses.  Section 6.2 describes the tests used to validate the two 
PPP hypotheses.  The data description of the CPIs and the RERs of the selected Caribbean micro-
islands is presented in Section 6.3.  The results show that the absolute PPP does not hold in the 
selected Caribbean micro-islands.  Section 6.4 presents the results of tests to validate the relative 
                                                 
43 The Balassa–Samuelson effect is when productivity differentials exist between tradable sectors of two 
countries.  These may lead to a departure from the PPP.  As no data on productivity are available for Ca ibbean-




PPP in the selected Caribbean micro-islands.  The results reveal that the PPP holds for five out of 
the seven selected Caribbean micro-islands.  Remarkably, the PPP holds for Curaçao, the island 
with sticky prices.  The last section, Section 6.5,presents the conclusions on the impact of the high 
transportation costs of the selected Caribbean micro-islands and sticky prices in Curaçao on the 
relative PPP. 
6.1.  The Absolute and Relative PPP Hypotheses 
 The first assumption says that an “identical” good i produced in two different countries has 
the same price.  This relation is assumed to hold for all N goods in the economy (Equation (6.1)).  
6.1.1. Assumption 1: The Law of One Price (LOP) 
   = ° ∗  ±,                       i=1,…,N, (6.1) 
where:  
   : The domestic price of good i, at time t  
 ±,: The foreign price of good i, at time t  
°    : The nominal exchange rate of the domestic currency in a unit of foreign currency 
       at time t.  
By summing the weighted prices of tradable44 goods, the absolute PPP equation is obtained as 
follows:  
 ° = ∑ |²³́
²µ²Z
∑ |²³́¶,²µ²Z
=   ³´³́¶ ,             (6.2) 
where:  
  : The weighted average domestic price of all goods, at time t 
 ±: The weighted average foreign price of all goods at time t.  
]: The weights in the summation with ∑ ]·> =1. 
Equation (6.2) can be rewritten as follows:  
 ° ∗  ³́
¶
³´   =  1.  (6.3) 
                                                 




The left-hand side of Equation (6.3) is the RER.  The first test on the validity of the absolute PPP 
hypothesis is whether the RER is equal to 1, or in other words, whether one unit of good i costs 
the same in both countries.  
The best-known example applied for the law of one price, is the Big Mac index, which 
was introduced by The Economist in 1986.  The Big Mac index is based on prices of McDonald’s 
Big Mac hamburgers by country, which are used in a worldwide price comparison.  However, 
the Big Mac index does not comply with the condition of an identical good, as assumed by the 
law of one price.  Big Macs are not identical45 among countries due to the differences in the non-
tradable input cost component in prices.  The differences in the national labor costs in producing 
a Big Mac (Parsley & Wei, 2004), the differentiation in rents (Taylor & Taylor, 2004), and 
diversity in tax systems (Pakko & Pollard, 2003) are some examples of non-tradable components 
in the domestic prices.  In addition, Big Mac hamburgers differ by country; for instance, the food 
is halal in Middle Eastern countries, India substitutes alternatives for beef, and the beef is kosher 
in Israel.  Hence, the law of one price does not apply.  Similar to the Big Mac, most goods are 
not “identically” produced in different countries.  Moreover, the weights in the basket of the CPI 
goods are not the same across countries, as the preferences are country specific.  Hence, these 
differences contradict the first assumption. 
6.1.2. Assumption 2: Frictionless Trade  
The second assumption of a frictionless trade enviro ment guarantees that when the first 
assumption is violated, arbitrageurs will profit as long as price differentials for the “identical” 
good exist.  The second assumption of the PPP requires continuously well-informed frictionless 
markets.  However, markets are not always well informed (Pippenger, 1986), and trade is not 
                                                 
45 The “iPad” index is a new but not yet widely accepted index to compare prices worldwide.  The 




frictionless due to arbitrage costs in spatially separated markets.  The arbitrage costs include 
transportation costs, administrative costs, tariffs, and non-tariff trade barriers (e.g., inspection 
requirements on food imports).  The arbitrage costs f ariffs, transportation costs, and insurance 
were studied in Micheal, Nobay, and Peel (1997) and Sercu, Uppal, and Van Hulle (1995), and 
the non-tariff barriers were examined in Sarno and Taylor (2002).  It can be assumed that the 
arbitrage costs do not change in the short run, and they are accumulated in a constant factor, Π.  
6.1.3. Assumption 3: The Constant Real Exchange Rate 
 ° ∗  ³́
¶
³´  = Π .  (6.4) 
Hence, the RER on the left-hand side of Equation 6.4 is a constant, which is the third assumption 
of the PPP and the second test on the validity of the absolute PPP hypothesis. 
6.1.4. Absolute and Relative PPP 
The third assumption, a constant RER, is frequently used to test the absolute PPP 
hypothesis.  The second test has replaced the first test of the absolute PPP, which is that the RER 
is equal to 1.  The test of a constant RER takes into account the existence of arbitrage costs in 
trade.  
The relative PPP is obtained by first taking logs of Equation (6.4), as follows: 
 o =   − ± + R,  (6.5) 
and then by taking the first differences of Equation (6.5):  
 ∆o  = ∆ − ∆ ± + ∆R.  (6.6) 46 
For the relative PPP (Equation 6.6) to hold, ∆R has to be equal to zero.  Hence, the test on the 
relative PPP is whether ∆R = 0.  If ∆R ≠  0, Equation (6.6) can be considered as the deviation 
                                                 
46 The interpretation of Equation (6.6) is that when the relative PPP holds (∆R = 0), then the change in the 
exchange rate (depreciation/appreciation) is identical o the difference in movements in prices (or the inflation rates) 
in the two countries.  In other words, the exchange rat  changes are proportional to the relative inflation.  The 





from the PPP.  This equation describes the short-run PPP, while Equation (6.5) represents the long-
run PPP.  A departure from the PPP hypothesis is allowed in the short run, as deviation is allowed; 
in the long run, the deviations of the RER are mean-r verting towards the long-run PPP. 
6.1.5. Fixed-exchange Regimes, Sticky Prices, and the Relative PPP Hypothesis 
The Caribbean micro-islands mainly have fixed exchange rates (Chapter 2), implying that 
∆o = 0 for all goods traded with the anchor country.  Using Equation (6.6) for a fixed-exchange 
rate country, the new equation results in the following:  
∆  = ∆  ∗ + ∆R.        (6.6a) 
The relative PPP test is whether ∆R = 0.  If the PPP holds in a fixed-exchange-rate 
system, Equation (6.6a) implies the equality of the inflation rates of the domestic and the 
anchors’ economy, ∆  = ∆  ∗ .  When prices are sticky in the short run on a Caribbean micro-
island, this may lead to the inequality of ∆ ≠ ∆  ∗ .  Therefore, sticky prices may cause a 
deviation from the PPP.  
The empirical tests in the literature often apply the relative PPP hypothesis.  This 
hypothesis assumes that the long-run PPP follows a mean reverting process.  The linear and 
nonlinear approaches are the two widely used methods to test the relative PPP.  The linear 
approach is mainly based on co-integration, and the nonlinear approach consists of Markov 
switching models, the threshold autoregressive (TAR) models, “momentum” TAR (M-TAR or 
MTAR), and the (exponential) smooth TAR (ESTAR) models.  
The linear approach assumes that the adjustment of the RER to its mean-reverting 
equilibrium is a linear, continuous, one-speed process.  In most studies, the linear approach is 
specified in a log-linear form, as the data have been transformed into logs.  However, the tests 




Taylor, 2004).  The power of the test is the probability that it will correctly lead to rejection of a
false null hypothesis (Greene, 1997).  The problem of the low power of the test lies in the use of 
short time series in the samples to test the mean rversion of the RER, while the process of the 
mean reversion of the RER is slow (Rogoff, 1996; Sarno, 2003).47  A slow adjustment of the 
RER toward the mean implies that a long span of data is necessary to correctly reject the null 
hypothesis that the PPP hypothesis is false (Sarno & Taylor, 2002).  
In the nonlinear specification, the adjustment to the mean-reverting value of the PPP is a 
nonlinear process that either “jumps/leaps” from one regime to the next or changes “smoothly” 
between regimes.  In contrast to the linear specificat on, the nonlinear process has more than one 
speed of adjustment of the RER.  The tests of the nonlinear approach of the adjustment of the 
RER have proven to have more power than linear appro ch (Balke & Fomby, 1997; Kapetanios, 
Shin, & Snell, 2003).  The latter study shows that e power of the nonlinear test, with the values 
of 0.183 and 0.488, is higher than that of the linear t st, which has values of 0.160 and 0.341 for 
50 and 100 observations, respectively.  Literature reviews conducted by Sarno (2003, 2005) 
showed that the process of deviation from PPP is nonlinear, as opposed to the presumed linear 
specification, with a constant speed of adjustment.  His motivation for using a nonlinear 
specification was that the existence of transaction costs causes a nonlinear adjustment.  
In the Markov switching models, the RER switches from stages of appreciation to stages 
of depreciation and vice versa, or it remains in the same stage.  Every switch between the stages 
has a different conditional distribution (Leon & Najarian, 2005).  On the Caribbean micro-
islands, this approach is less likely to apply, as most of the islands have a system of long-lasting 
fixed exchange rates, without stages of devaluation and revaluation (Chapter 2, Table 2.3). 
                                                 




Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) suggested an arbitrage cost band where, for small price 
differentials, no adjustment of the RER takes place, nd the PPP does not hold.  Outside the 
band, the price differentials exceed the transaction costs, and the adjustment is mean reverting; 
hence, the PPP holds.  Accordingly, the RER leaps in and out of the arbitrage band, and the 
behavior is asymmetrical.  In the three-regime, band-TAR models, the RER leaps in a band of 
inaction—the area between the threshold values wherein no adjustment takes place.  When the 
RER leaps outside the band, or when it exceeds the threshold, a co-integration relation exists 
between the nominal exchange rates and the relative pric s.  The threshold’s band is interpreted 
as the transaction/arbitrage costs in Obstfeld and Taylor (1997, p. 442).  The model in their study 
is applied on selected CPI categories in selected ci ies in the United States, Canada, Mexico, 
Europe, and Asia.  An application of the three-regime band-TAR models is also found in Leon 
and Najarian (2005) in some of the 26 developed and emerging market countries.  Other 
theoretical models with three regimes were presented i  Balke and Fomby (1997) and Sercu et 
al. (1995).  As data on the transaction costs are not available for the Caribbean micro-islands, 
and the deviations need to be compared with the transaction costs, the three-regime model will 
not be applied in this chapter and remains open for further study. 
In the two-regime TAR or MTAR models, the threshold is the division between the 
positive deviations and the negative deviations from the PPP.  In these models, the two regimes 
can have distinct speeds of adjustment.  Thus, the method allows for asymmetric adjustments.  
TAR was applied to a two-regime model for African countries by Chang, Lu, Tang, and Liu 
(2011), European countries by Enders and Dibooglu (2001), and countries in the Pacific by 
Enders and Chumrusphonlert (2004).  For the African countries, using the United States as a 




countries in the period of 1980–2003.  Data from all seven European countries in Enders and 
Dibooglu’s (2001) sample supported the long-run PPP with an asymmetric adjustment 
specification in the period of 19731997.  In this case, Germany and France were the two base 
economies.  In Enders and Chumrusphonlert (2004), when using Japan as base country, five out 
of seven countries in the Pacific had a long-run PPP.  With the United States as base country, the 
PPP held for six out of seven Pacific countries for the period of 19732001.  The adjustments 
were asymmetric.  This overview shows that the TAR models have been applied to both 
developing and developed countries with considerabl support for the PPP hypothesis when 
using an asymmetric specification. 
According to Terasvirta (1994), Micheal et al. (1997), and Taylor and Peel (2000), the 
speeds of RER adjustment can switch smoothly from one “regime” to the next in the ESTAR 
models.  The smooth transition of the ESTAR models portrays the aggregated, unsynchronized 
behavior of heterogeneous economic agents.  An ESTAR model is used when there is a 
symmetric adjustment of the RER.  Kapetanios et al. (2003) showed the symmetric adjustments 
in bilateral trade between Australia, Germany, France, Italy, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom and United States in the period of 19571998.  Sarno and Taylor (2002) showed that 
the ESTAR model is a generalization of the TAR model (s e Appendix 6).  ESTAR models have 
mostly been applied to developed countries. 
The limited research in the Caribbean area uses the linear approach of the PPP hypothesis 
in the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU).  Rambarran (1998) applied the linear co-
integration approach to Caribbean countries, including Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and the ECCU vis-à-vis the US in the period of 19731993 and found no evidence for 




19801997, as the PPP held for only two of the six select d ountries of the ECCU.  They used 
the linear approach of the unit root test and applied the co-integration method for the relation 
between the six selected countries of the ECCU and the United States.  Aggarwal and Simmons 
(2004) examined the PPP using the linear approach of o-integration among five selected ECCU 
countries in the period of 1980–2000 and found that t e bilateral PPP relations held among these 
countries.  Sun and Duttagupta (2008) used the linear co-integration approach in the period of 
19902006 for the bilateral relation between six of the eight ECCU countries and the United 
States and concluded that the PPP does not hold. 
Overall, studies of the Caribbean micro-islands have pplied the linear approach to the 
deviation of the RER.  According to the literature (Sarno 2003, 2005), transaction costs motivate 
the use of a nonlinear specification.  Hence, the high transportation costs that are typically found 
on micro-islands represent a strong motive to apply nonlinear specifications.  Moreover, due to 
the higher power of the test of the nonlinear specificat on, this specification has strong 
econometric merits compared to the linear specificat on.  Nonlinear specifications include a 
smooth (ESTAR) process or an adjustment with a jump (TAR or MTAR).  As a priori 
information on the deviation from the RER on the Caribbean micro-islands is not available, both 
nonlinear specifications of the TAR/MTAR, and the ESTAR models will be applied to the data.  
6.2.  Tests on the PPP Hypotheses 
 The absolute and relative PPP may not hold for mico-islands, as their high transportation 
costs will result in prices that differ from those of their trading partners.  Sticky prices on a 
micro-island may also lead to a rejection of the relative PPP.  If the relative PPP is not rejected, 




6.2.1. Tests on the Linear Specification of the Relative PP 
There are two methods of testing the linear approach f the relative PPP.  The first test 
focuses on non-stationarity (a unit root) in the RER.  The null hypothesis (H0) posits the non-
stationarity of the RER, while the alternative hypothesis (H1) suggests RER stationarity.  If it is 
not possible to reject the unit root behavior of the RER, then it follows a random walk and lacks 
convergence.  This implies a rejection of the PPP hypothesis.  The unit root test on the RER is 
the augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test, and the t-t st statistic is labeled tADF1. 
 The second test checks for co-integration between th  exchange rate and the relative 
prices (Mark, 1990; Sarno & Taylor, 2002).  The proposed co-integration test is the two-step 
Engle and Granger (1987) procedure.  If the variables are co-integrated, the PPP hypothesis 
holds.  The variables are co-integrated when the errors of the co-integrated equation are 
stationary.  The first step in the procedure is to estimate the long-run equilibrium using OLS.  
Equation (6.7) is an adapted version of Equation (6.5) when applied to fixed-exchange-rate 
countries, as follows:  
§ =  ]¹ + ] + «  ,         (6.7) 
where § = o +  ±, and «  is the stochastic disturbance term, which may be serially correlated. 
All variables are expressed in logs.  The second step i  to estimate the following equation 
with OLS:  
¤« =  º« % + ∑ ∆« %»> + ¼ ,  (6.8) 
where ¼  is white noise.  If the errors («  have a unit root, then they are serially correlated, and 
OLS is therefore not applicable; thus, the PPP hypothesis is rejected.  This linear framework uses 
the ADF test on the errors with a null hypothesis (H0) of non-stationarity of «  against the 




holds.  The t-statistic on the errors is labeled tADF2.  The critical values are tabulated in Phillips 
and Ouliaris (1988).  
6.2.2. Tests on the Nonlinear Specification of the Relative PPP 
The motivation for a nonlinear specification comes from market frictions between two 
trading countries.  The deviations from the PPP follow a nonlinear process that is mean reverting 
(Sarno & Taylor, 2002).  The validity of the PPP hypothesis found firmer empirical grounds 
through the introduction of the nonlinear specifications of ESTAR (Bahmani-Oskooee, Kutan, & 
Zhou, 2007; Kapetanios et al., 2003; Sarno, 2005) and TAR (Chang et al., 2011; Enders & 
Dibooglu, 2001).  ESTAR and TAR are discussed below. 
The exponential smooth transition autoregressive model: A two-regime model.  The 
smooth adjustment toward the long-run PPP is by an ESTAR specification.  The ESTAR model 
has the following form in Kapetanios et al. (2003): 
∆2  = ∑ º½> ∆2 % + 2 %91 − exp(−2 %? ; + ¼ , (6.9) 
where: 
2  : the “de-meaned” or “de-trended” series of the RER; thus, 2  is a mean zero stochastic process 
j: the lags (1 to p) of serial correlated errors 
º: the autoregressive coefficient of lag variable j 
 : the coefficient of the nonlinear variable or exponential transition function: 
     1 − exp(−2 %?   
: the speed of adjustment  
¼ : i.i.d. error with zero mean and constant variance.  
The exponential transition function: 91 − exp(−2 %? ; is symmetrical and U-shaped 




equilibrium (two regimes).  The “de-meaned” series, 2 , is obtained by regressing the series of 
the RER on a constant and saving the residuals.  The “de-trended” series is created by regressing 
on a constant and a trend and saving the residuals.  The RER is de-meaned or de-trended to 
generate a zero mean variable.  
 A new test for the nonlinear process was introduce by Kapetanios et al. (2003).  They 
included nonlinearity as the alternative hypothesis.  Their null hypothesis (H0) was the unit root 
(as in the ADF tests), and their alternative hypothesis (H1) was a nonlinear stationary process.  
Thus, the hypothesis is: H0:  = 0, and H1:  > 0.  
If   = 0, Equation (6.9) is equal to Equation (6.8).  There is no mean reversion when  =
0, and the process is a linear autoregressive model with a unit root.  If  > 0, it determines the 
speed of mean reversion (Kapetanios et al., 2003, p. 362).  When the speed of adjustment, , is 
small, it has a unit root behavior, which also means  slower transition, 91 − exp(−2 %? ;, and 
more persistence away from PPP.  A higher speed of a justment means a higher transition and 
smaller deviations in the proximity of PPP. 
Because  under the H0 is not known, Kapetanios et al. (2003) used a first-o der Taylor 
series approximation of the exponential function in Equation (6.9), namely ¾%¿ÀÁ  =
∑ (%¿ÂÀÁÂI!
∞
I>¹ , to obtain Equation (6.10), as follows: 




£! + ⋯ (6.10) 
The new hypotheses are H0:  = 0 and H1:  < 0.  The t-statistic of the de-meaned/de-trended 
nonlinear series is denoted ·Ç = ÄÈ..(ÄÉ, where f is the OLS estimate of Equation (6.10) and s.e. 
(f) is the standard error of f.  The critical values of the ·Ç statistics were tabulated by 




Threshold autoregression: A two-regime model.  The test for asymmetric adjustment is 
based on the methodology used by Enders and Siklos (2001).  They started by using the two-step 
procedure (Engle & Granger, 1987).  The first step of the procedure is similar to Equation (6.7); 
the estimation of the long-run equilibrium for fixed- xchange-rate systems is as follows: 
§ =  ]¹ + ] + « , (6.7 
where § = o +  ± and «  is the stochastic disturbance term. 
 All variables are expressed in logs.  The second step i  to estimate the following: 
¤« = Ì  º« % + (1 − Ì  º?« % + ∑ ∆« %»> + ¼ , (6.11 
where ¼  is white noise and Ì  is a Heavyside indicator function.  This function depends on a 
threshold value, :.  The Heaviside indicator function is defined by the following: 
Ì = !1, « % ≥ :0, « % < :. (6.12) 
Then, if the deviation from the PPP exceeds the thrshold, « % ≥ :, then Ì  = 1 and the 
deviation reverts to º.  If  « % < :, Ì  = 0, the deviation reverts to º? (two regimes).  The 
nonlinear approach, in contrast to the linear specificat on, allows for the adjustments of the 
deviations to occur at different speeds, º and º?.  The value : is estimated using Chan’s (1993) 
method.  The statistical package of Eviews (version 7) offers an add-in program, “Tarcoint,” to 
calculate the value of the threshold. 
The necessary condition for stationary «  is -2 < (º, º? < 0.  Under Ho: º =  º? = 0, 
the test for no co-integration, a non-standard F statistic (Enders & Siklos, 2001), is applicable 
(rejecting Ho means that the variables are co-integrated).  The test for symmetric adjustment is 
Ho:  º = º?.  This test has a standard F distribution.  Rejection of Ho means that the speed of 




In Enders and Siklos (2001) the MTAR was defined using the change in « % (∆« %) 
instead of the level « %, as follows: 
j = !1, ∆« % ≥ :0, ∆« % < :.         (6.13) 
Hence, if the change in the deviations from the PPPexceeds the threshold, ∆« % ≥ :, then j  = 
1 and the change of the deviations reverts to º.  If  ∆ « % < :, j  = 0 the change in the 
deviations reverts to º?.  MTAR is used when the changes of the deviations from the PPP, ¤« , 
are large.  According to Enders and Siklos (2001, p. 68), MTAR is applied in cases where 
policymakers seek to “smooth out” large changes in the series.  
6.3.  The Data 
The data that are commonly used to test the PPP hypot eses are the bilateral RER and the 
multilateral real effective exchange rate (REER).  PPP tests using the data of the bilateral RER 
are found in Chang et al. (2011) and Kapetanios et al. (2003).  The multilateral REER is used in 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1993), Bahmani-Oskooee et al. (2007), and Leon and Najarian (2005).  In 
this chapter, the RER is applied, as the focus is on the bilateral relations between a selection of 
Caribbean micro-islands and the United States. 
The RER is constructed with the exchange rate and prices of the two trading countries.  
The prices are measured using one of the following price indexes: the CPI (Chang et al., 2011; 
Kapetanios et al., 2003; Sarno & Valente, 2006), the w olesale price index (WPI; Micheal et al., 
1997), or the GDP deflator (Edison & Kloveland, 1987).  Each of these price indices has 
advantages and disadvantages.  The advantage of the CPI is that CPI data are available in most 
countries; however, its disadvantage is that it conains price indices of both tradable and non-




of non-tradable goods and services provides a margin of error in the data to test the PPP 
hypothesis.  
Another issue with the use of CPI data in testing the PPP theory is that the CPI does not 
include the prices of trade in services.  Trade in services (e.g., tourism) represents a substantial 
part of the tradables produced on micro-islands, but this is not measured in the CPI.  Moreover, 
according to McCloskey and Zecher (1984), the price indices used to test the PPP have flaws, 
and therefore they cannot be applied as evidence for a rejection of the PPP theory.  Accordingly, 
price indices should capture the characteristics of commodities, such as the ease of use or the 
reliability of the service. 
The advantage of the WPI is that it contains a higher s are of tradable goods and services 
compared to the CPI.  The advantage of the GDP deflator is that the price of export of services is 
included in it.  Meanwhile, the WPI and the GDP deflator both have the disadvantage that these 
indices are not measured in (all of) the Caribbean micro-islands.  Hence, to increase the sample 
size of Caribbean micro-economies based on availability of data, the CPI is preferred. 
 The CPI data of Caribbean micro-islands were select d on consistency of their monthly 
CPI time series.  The CPIs of Aruba, the Bahamas, Brbados, and the three ECCU countries of 
Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia were obtained from the IFS of the IMF.  The 
CPI of Curaçao was obtained from the CBS.48  As the currencies of the selected islands are 
pegged to the US dollar, the CPI of the United States was selected as the foreign price.  The 
exchange rate pegs and the CPI of the United States were obtained from the IFS of the IMF.  All 
                                                 
48 In the IFS, the CPI data for Curaçao before 2006 consisted of combined CPIs of the two islands of Bonaire nd 
Curaçao.  In contrast, the CPI data of theCBS Curaçao consisted of data for the island of Curaçao.  Thus, the data from the CBS 




IFS data were retrieved on August 28, 2013.  The sample period consisted of monthly data from 
January 1990December 2012.  
Figure 6.1 displays the RERs of the selected micro-e onomies (the dashed line) and the 
nominal exchange rate, ° (as defined in Equation (6.1)), which in this case is a peg (° = °) and 
therefore a horizontal line on the graph.  The vertical axis lists the domestic currency.  The 
trough in the RERs in 2008 reflect the global financi l crisis.  In particular, the islands of 
Barbados (Figure 6.1c), Curaçao (Figure 6.1d.), and Saint Lucia (Figure 6.1g) show high 
volatility in the RER after 2008.  The graphs of the Caribbean micro-islands illustrate that the 
RER is not constant; hence, the absolute PPP does not hold for the Caribbean micro-islands.  The 
graphs also show that with the exception of Saint Lucia (showing a mean reversion), the RERs 
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g. Saint Lucia 
Figure 6.1. The RERs between the US and selected Caribbean micro-islands (in the domestic 
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Table 6.1 presents the statistics of the inflation rates by country and the RER with the 
United States.  The means and standard deviations of the RER by country are shown in Columns 
2 and 4, respectively.  The RER is calculated using the left-hand side of Equation (6.3).  The peg 
(the third column) is the nominal exchange rate with the US dollar, specifically the amount of 
domestic currency for 1 US$.  The average month-to-month inflation rate in the period of 
January 1990December 2012 is shown in Column 5.  The statistics in Column 4 show high 
volatility in the RER, which is inconsistent with te third assumption of a constant RER, thereby 
violating the absolute PPP.  Prices in Caribbean micro-islands are not equal to those in the 
United States, probably due to the high transportati n costs, among other things.  
 
Table 6.1 
Statistics of the RER and its Components for Selected Caribbean Micro-islands (January 1990–
December 2012) 













deviation of the 
RER 
(4) 
Mean of the month–to-
month inflation rate 
(%)c 
(5) 
Aruba  1.82 1.77 0.11 0.23 
Bahamas 0.96 1.00 0.04 0.17 
Barbados  2.00 2.00 0.14 0.29 
Curaçao 1.75 1.79 0.04 0.20 
Dominica (ECCUd) 2.53 2.70 0.13 0.17 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 
(ECCUd) 
2.83 2.70 0.17 0.23 
Saint Lucia (ECCUd) 2.63 2.70 0.05 0.23 
Note. 
a.The RER is defined in the left-hand side of Equation (6.3).  
b.The peg is the exchange rate in domestic currency for 1 US$. 
c.Only the mean is shown, as the difference between th  mean and the median is negligible. 
d.ECCU is the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. 






If the relative PPP in a fixed-exchange-rate system holds, then the inflation rates between 
the anchor country and the micro-economy are equal (Equation (6.6a)).  The tests on the relative 
PPP, however, have a broader definition, and the PPP in a fixed-exchange rate system holds 
when the deviations from the PPP have a (non)linear specification.  A preliminary assessment of 
the equality of the inflation rates was explored using two methods of estimating inflation.  The 
first method was the month-to-month inflation rates of the micro-islands and the United States, 
and the second was the annual inflation rates of the micro-islands and the US.  For the first 
method, the US month-to-month inflation rate of 0.18% is compared with the month-to-month 
inflation by country in Table 6.1.  The statistics n this table show that with the exception of 
Barbados, the month-to-month inflation rates approximated month-to-month inflation of the US.  
The second method is shown in the graphs in Figure 6.2, where the annual inflation is defined as 
the CPI percentage change of month t and month t-12.  The graphs in Figure 6.2 (a to f) show the 

























































































































































































































































































g. Saint Lucia 
Figure 6.2. Inflation rates of the US and a Caribbean micro-island (in percent, January 1991–
December 2012). Source: IFS and CFS Curaçao.  
The graphs show that there are inflation rates differentials between the US and the 
Caribbean islands.  Another important observation is the fact that the graphs show a co-
movement between the US inflation rates and those of Aruba (6.2.a.), Curaçao (6.2.d ), Saint 
Kitts and Nevis (6.2.f ), and Saint Lucia (6.2.g.).  The co-movement in the inflation rates may 
indicate that the deviations from the PPP (∆R ≠ 0) have a (non)linear specification (see Equation 
(6.6a)), and hence that the PPP may apply. 
To summarize, the data and the graphical presentatio  showed that the absolute PPP does 
not hold in the case of the Caribbean islands of Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Curaçao, 
Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, or Saint Lucia.  The statistics and graphical illustrations of the 
data of the selected Caribbean micro-islands indicate that the relative PPP, may hold in Aruba, 






























































































































6.4. Empirical Results 
The relative PPP tests on the Caribbean micro-island  of Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Curaçao, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia are presented in this section.  When 
the PPP holds, the deviations of the PPP are presented through linear or nonlinear specifications. 
6.4.1. The Results of the Linear Specification  
Table 6.2 provides t-statistics for the linear and the nonlinear specifications.  In the second 
column of Table 6.2, the ADF t-statistic (tADF1) of the unit root of the RER is presented. A 
rejection of the unit root means that the relative PPP holds.  Table 6.2 shows that the test on non-
stationarity of the RER was not rejected in the linar specification for Aruba, Barbados, the 
Bahamas, Curaçao, and Dominica.  The ADF test rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root in the 
RER for Saint Kitts and Nevis at a 10% significance level and for Saint Lucia at a 1% 
significance level.  Hence, using a linear specification and applying the null of non-stationarity 
of the RER, the relative PPP holds for Saint Lucia and weak evidence that the PPP holds was 
found for Saint Kitts and Nevis.  An alternative test on the linear specification of the deviations 
of the PPP is the test of the null hypothesis of no co-integration (Equation (6.8)).  The t-statistic, 
tADF2, is displayed in the third column of Table 6.2.  Consistent with the graphs in Figure 6.2, 
which show the RERs with a constant and a trend for all islands except Saint Lucia, the ADF test 
with a constant and a trend have been applied to all RERs except that of Saint Lucia.  For Saint 
Lucia, the ADF with a constant was applied.  The results show that only for Saint Lucia are 







Unit Root Tests of the Linear and Nonlinear Specifications 
(January 1990–December 2012) 
Country: tADF1  a tADF2   b tNL  c 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Saint Lucia  –3.86***(d) –4.29**(d) –2.15(e) 
Saint Kitts & Nevis –3.22* –3.26 –3.76** 
Curaçao  –2.31 –2.33 –3.70** 
Aruba –2.79 –3.23 –3.60** 
Bahamas –2.03 –2.17 –3.25* 
Barbados –0.52 –0.33 –0.36 
Dominica –1.69 –1.87 –2.40 
Notes. 
a.The 10%, 5%, and 1% asymptotic critical values for the tADF1 with 
constant and a trend are –3.13, 3.43, and –3.99. 
b.The 10%, 5%, and 1% asymptotic critical values for the tADF2, 
hypothesis ρ = 0 with two variables in the co-integrating 
relation with a constant and a trend are 3.84, –4.16, and –4.64 
(Phillips & Ouliaris, 1988). A constant and trend is applied to 
all islands excluding Saint Lucia. 
c.The 10%, 5%, and 1% asymptotic critical values for the tNL for 
the de-trended RER are –3.13, –3.40, and –3.93 (Kapetanios et 
al., 2003, p. 364). 
d.The RER with a constant is applicable to Saint Lucia. 
e.The 10%, 5%, and 1% asymptotic critical values for the tNL for 
the de-meaned RER are –2.66, –2.93, and –3.48 (Kapetanios 
et al., 2003, p. 364). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively 
 
To summarize, the RER is stationary for Saint Lucia and Saint Kitts and Nevis.  For the 
island of Saint Lucia, the deviations from the PPP can be specified by a co-integration relation 




6.4.2. The Results of the Nonlinear Exponential Smooth Transition Autoregressive 
Models  
 The nonlinear specification of the ESTAR model, as proposed in Equation (6.10), was 
estimated for the selected micro-islands.  The fourth column of Table 6.2 shows the t-statistic (tNL) 
of the nonlinear specification of the deviations of the RER.  The RER of Saint Lucia shows only 
a constant; therefore, this RER is de-meaned (Figure 6.1).  The unit root of the de-meaned RER 
was not rejected for Saint Lucia; hence, the nonlinear ESTAR model was not applied for this 
island.  The RERs except that of Saint Lucia show a constant and a trend (Figure 6.1).  Hence, the 
tNL  test is applied on the de-trended RERs for all countries except Saint Lucia.  The null hypothesis 
of a unit root of the de-trended RER was rejected for Aruba, the Bahamas, Curaçao, and Saint 
Kitts and Nevis.  Hence, I proceed with the estimaton of the nonlinear ESTAR models for these 
four islands.  
The speed of adjustment of the RERs in four Caribbean islands, the  È    in Equation (6.9), 
is estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator and is approximately 0.46 for these four 
countries (Table 6.3).  The t-values show that the speed is highly significant at a 1% significance 
level.  The speed can be considered as moderate, as i  is not extremely small (too close to zero) in 
comparison to the speeds of Australia, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and the United 






The ESTAR Model for Selected Caribbean Micro-islands 
(MLE, January 1990–December 2012) 
Country Í s.e. (Í)a t-value 
Aruba 0.465*** 0.152 3.06 
Bahamas 0.465*** 0.152 3.06 
Curaçao 0.460*** 0.153 3.01 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 0.453*** 0.154 2.94 
Notes. 
a.s.e. = standard error. Í is the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) 
estimated with imposing    = -1,The RERs are de-trended 
  *** means significant at 1% 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the exponential transition functions 91  exp(2 %? );.  The 
deviations from the RER (on the horizontal axis) are symmetrically allocated on the exponential 
transition functions and differ by country.  In Aruba, the deviations from the RER (defined in 
Figure 6.3.a by the variable trendar(-1)) lie in the [-0.06, 0.06] range.  The variable trendbah(-1) 
for the Bahamas, the variable trendcur(-1) for Curaçao, and the variable trendstkitts(-1) for Saint 
Kitts and Nevis show that the deviations from the RER lie in the smaller range of [-0.04, 0.04].  
The deviations from the RER in the micro-islands are small, with an absolute maximum range of 
0.06.  The transition functions (shown on the vertical axis) lie below 0.0009 for all selected 
countries, which implies slow transitions.  The relative PPP holds for the Caribbean micro-
islands of Aruba, Barbados, Curaçao, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.  For these islands, the smooth 
nonlinear specification (ESTAR) applies.  The nonlinear specification and the weak evidence for 
a stationary RER of Saint Kitts and Nevis imply that this country is probably a borderline case 






a. Aruba b. The Bahamas 
  
c. Curaçao   d. Saint Kitts and Nevis 





















































































































6.4.3. The Results of the Nonlinear Transition Autoregressive Models  
The long-run equilibria were estimated using Equation (6.7).  The residuals of this equation 
are considered as deviations from the PPP.  The residual  of Equation (6.7) were tested for unit 
root (Ho:  º = 0) in Equation (6.8).  Only for Saint Lucia was the null hypothesis of no co-
integration rejected (Table 6.2, third column, tADF2).  The PPP held for Saint Lucia and was 
presented by a linear specification.  The SC was used to determine the appropriate lag lengths, 
as  ¼  in Equation (6.8) was assumed to be white noise.  The results for the lag lengths and ρ, the 
speed of adjustment, are presented in Table 6.4.  The table shows ρ for all selected islands, although 
only the long-run equilibrium for Saint Lucia was established.  In the case of Saint Lucia, the speed 
of adjustment of the positive and negative deviations from the long-run PPP was 14.1%.  
 
Table 6.4 
The Estimated Adjustment in the Standard Co-
integration (January 1990–December 2012) 
Country ρ Lags SC 
Saint Lucia –0.1405 0 
Aruba –0.0731 1 
Saint Kitts & Nevis –0.0621 0 
Curaçao –0.0353 1 
Dominica –0.0284 0 
Bahamas –0.0275 0 
Barbados –0.0030 0 
Note. 
Lags are determined according to the 
Schwartz criterion (SC).  
 
 
For the remaining micro-islands, the following step was carried out to test whether the 
nonlinear asymmetric specifications of the TAR or MTAR would fit the data.  The results for 
TAR and MTAR are presented in Tables 6.5 and 6.6, respectively.  These models assume that 




Table 6.5 show the two slopes ρ1 and ρ2 of the regressions.  The first slope applies to the 
observations above a threshold (a positive deviation), while the second slope is for the 
observations below a threshold (a negative deviation).  The fourth column presents the test 
statistic Φ for no co-integration with Ho: ρ1= ρ2=0.  The null hypothesis of no co-integration is 
rejected in the case of Saint Kitts and Nevis at a 5% significance level.  As the critical values of 
the maximum of four lags are tabulated, the case of Saint Lucia, with six lags of the statistic Φ, is 
not accounted for.  However, the linear co-integration specified with one speed of adjustment, 
ρ=14.05% (Table 6.4 in Section 6.5.2), implies a rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-
integration.  In the fifth column, the test of the symmetric adjustment with similar slopes (ρ1=ρ2) 
is presented.  Again, there four maximum lags of the critical values; hence, the critical values for 
the statistic of Saint Lucia, with six lags, were not tabulated.  The hypothesis of a symmetrical 
speed of adjustment should likely not be rejected for Saint Lucia.  This is consistent with the 
linear specification found in Section 6.5.2 (tADF2 test in Table 6.2), with one speed of adjustment.  
The speed of adjustment, the ρ of Saint Lucia equals 14.05% (Table 6.4).  For Saint K tts and 
Nevis, the hypothesis of two similar slopes is rejected.  The other Caribbean micro-economies 
showed no co-integration. 
The sixth column in Table 6.5 shows the threshold values.  On the Caribbean micro-
island of Saint Kitts and Nevis, the positive deviation (above the threshold of τ = -0.0184) 
adjusts at a lower absolute speed of 2.08% than those below the τ (a negative deviation), with a 
speed of adjustment of 13.4% (Table 6.5).  Saint Kitts and Nevis has a negative threshold.  As 
the original data are transformed in logs, the negative values mean that the actual values are in 
the range of [0,1].  Hence, the actual threshold vaues are less than unity.  Negative threshold 




countries (Enders & Dibooglu, 2001), and a few Pacific ountries (Enders & Chumrusphonlert, 
2004).  A possible interpretation of the threshold value is offered in the study of Enders and 
Chumrusphonlert (2004), where the value is interpreted as the long-term equilibrium of the PPP. 
 
Table 6.5 
The TAR Models for Selected Caribbean Micro-islands (January 1990–December 2012) 
Country ρ1 ρ2 Φ a ρ1=ρ2b τc Lags 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Saint Kitts & 
Nevis –0.0208 –0.1342 8.369** 7.6763*** –0.0184 4 
Saint Lucia –0.1151 –0.1522 5.847 0.3175 –0.0158 6d 
Barbados –0.01367 –0.0017 0.7179 0.4467 –0.0449 2 
Bahamas –0.0705 –0.0055 5.3859 6.0193*** 0.0279 1 
Aruba –0.0521 –0.1086 5.7607 1.5298 –0.0126 2 
Curaçao –0.0579 –0.0143 2.7741 1.8826 0.0248 4 
Dominica –0.0109 –0.0582 2.5964 2.1727 –0.0351 1 
Notes.  
(a) The test statistic for Φ for no co-integration: Ho: ρ1= ρ2=0. Entries in this column 
are the non-standard F statistics. The critical values of the non-standard F–statistics 
are reported in Enders and Siklos (2001) and depend on the numbers of lags and the 
number of observations.  
(b) The null hypothesis is Ho: ρ1= ρ2. Entries in this column are standard F statistics for 
the null hypothesis of a symmetric adjustment.  
(c)The threshold value τ in Ì = !1, « % ≥ :0, « % < :. 
(d)The maximum lags reported in Enders and Siklos (2001) were 4.  









The M-TAR Models for Selected Caribbean Micro-islands (January 1990–December 
2012) 
Country ρ1 ρ2 Φ a ρ1=ρ2 b τc Lags 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aruba –0.1889 –0.0527 7.7327* 5.3329*** 0.0032 2 
Saint Kitts & 
Nevis –0.0419 –0.1549 6.6927* 4.445** –0.0005 4 
Saint Lucia –0.0901 –0.1862 6.8089 2.1608 –0.0019 6d 
Barbados 0.0029 –0.0163 1.0626 1.1337 0.0012 2 
Bahamas –0.0769 –0.0181 3.8106 2.922 0.0043 1 
Curaçao –0.0159 –0.0592 2.711 1.7589 –0.0013 4 
Dominica –0.0429 0.0029 2.5686 2.1176 –0.0014 1 
Notes. 
(a)Entries in this column are the non-standard F-statistics for null hypothesis of 
ρ1= ρ2=0. The critical values of the non-standard F-statistics are reported in 
Table 1 of Enders and Siklos (2001) depend on the numbers of lags and the 
number of observations.  
(b)Entries in this column are standard F-statistics for null hypothesis of a 
symmetric adjustment. 
(c) The threshold value τ in j = !1, ∆« % ≥ :0, ∆« % < : 
(d)*,**, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 
MTAR is an alternative to a nonlinear adjustment of the RER.  In this case, the change of 
the deviations from the RER are analyzed.  The second and third columns of Table 6.6 present 
the two speeds of adjustment.  The MTAR models in Table 6.6 show that the Φ statistic of no co-
integration is rejected for Aruba and Saint Kitts and Nevis.  As the critical values are tabulated to 
a maximum of four lags, the critical values for thestatistic Φ of 6.8089 with six lags for Saint 
Lucia are unavailable.  MTAR and TAR for Saint Kitts and Nevis show asymmetric adjustment.  
Aruba’s MTAR also has an asymmetric speed of adjustmen .  For deviations above the threshold 
(τ > 0.0032), the speed of adjustment is high at 18.89%, and deviation below the threshold (for τ 




A linear specification of the deviation from the RE is not rejected for the countries of 
Saint Kitts and Nevis and Saint Lucia.  The departure from the RER of Saint Lucia had a linear 
specification with one absolute speed of adjustment of 14.05%.  In Saint Kitts and Nevis, weak 
evidence was found for a linear specification, as the unit root of the RER was rejected at the 10% 
significance level.  However, no co-integration betw en the prices of the United States and those 
of Saint Kitts was found.  Hence, Saint Kitts and Nevis is considered as a possibly borderline 
case between linear and nonlinear specification.  Following the weak evidence for a linear 
specification in Saint Kitts and Nevis, the deviation from the PPP showed an asymmetric 
adjustment to the long-term PPP (TAR at 5% significance) and a symmetric adjustment of 
ESTAR (at 1% significance).  
More specifically, the deviations of Saint Kitts and Nevis were modeled by a TAR with a 
threshold of -0.0184 and the speed of 2.08% above the threshold and a speed of adjustment of 
13.42% below the threshold, as well as by an MTAR result with speeds of 4.19% for positive 
deviation and 15.49% for negative deviation or ESTAR with a speed of adjustment of 0.45.  
Having both nonlinear specifications is plausible, as ESTAR is a generalization of TAR 
(Appendix 6). 
The country of Aruba had two nonlinear specifications for the departure from the RER, 
an asymmetric specification of the MTAR with two speeds of adjustment of 18.85% and 5.27%, 
or a symmetric adjustment of the ESTAR with a speed of adjustment of 0.46.  The departure 
from the PPP of the Bahamas had an ESTAR specification with a speed of adjustment of 
approximately 0.46.  Curaçao, the micro-island with short-run sticky prices, showed a nonlinear 
ESTAR adjustment; thus, the PPP holds.  Hence, althoug  prices were sticky, these deviations 




Table 6.7 summarizes the results of the PPP hypothesis for selected Caribbean micro-
islands pegged to the US dollar.  The absolute PPP was rejected, as none of the islands had a 
constant RER (Figure 6.1).  The nonlinear specificat on provided a useful alternative to the linear 
tests of the relative PPP for the Caribbean micro-islands.  The relative PPP has five tests that are 
shown in Table 6.7, partitioned into linear (Columns 3 and 4) and nonlinear specifications 
(Columns 5, 6, and 7).  The relative PPP was rejectd for two out of seven Caribbean micro-
islands.  The possible explanation for the rejection of the PPP in Dominica and Barbados lies in 
the shocks affecting the RER in both countries.  
In contrast to the two other selected members of the ECCU—Saint Kitts and Nevis and 
Saint Lucia—the island of Dominica did not support the PPP hypothesis with the United States 
as the anchor country in the period of 1990–2012.  One of the factors that may have influenced 
the RER with the US dollar is the depreciation of the pound sterling in 1992.  This led to a 
change in the sterling/dollar exchange rate and hence the sterling/ECCU $.  Dominica,49 with its 
higher share of agricultural exports to the United Kingdom compared to the other two ECCU 
countries, was severely affected.  In addition, the higher prices of imports from the UK led to 
high imported inflation in Dominica and overall inflation in Dominica, and increased the 
volatility in the RER.  As a former British colony, Barbados was also affected by the 
depreciation of the pound against the US dollar in 1992.  This economy was severely affected 
due to the large share of tourists from the United Kingdom.  The depreciation resulted in high 
imported inflation, which increased the overall inflation and the volatility of the RER.  Another 
                                                 
49 Dominica, a former British colony, is a volcanic island with hardly any beaches.  Tourism is 
comparatively less developed than on the other Caribbean islands.  Its largest share of tourists originates from the 
Caribbean area.  Dominica has relatively higher agricultural production compared to the other Caribbean micro-
islands.  Banana was the main export to the United Kingdom until till the European Union decided to phase out the 




source of the departure from the PPP may be related to the balance of payment disequilibria in 
the 1990s. 
High transportation costs as part of the transaction costs are often mentioned as one of the 
reasons for rejecting the PPP.  Caribbean micro-islands have high transportation costs, which 
could result in such rejection.  The results showed that for five out of seven Caribbean micro-
islands the PPP was not rejected.  The results also showed that despite the motivation for a 
nonlinear approach due to transportation costs, Saint Lucia—a micro-island with high 
transportation costs—fit a linear specification.  Another factor reported as a cause of deviation 





The PPP Hypothesis between the Caribbean Micro-islands and the United States 
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Ho: unit root of θ 
Ho: of no co-
integration 
Ho: of no co-
integration 
(1)        (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Aruba: 1.77 AWG  PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP holds PPP rejected PPP holds 
Bahamas: 1.00 BSD PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP holds PPP rejected PPP rejected 
Barbados: 2.00 BBD PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected 
Curaçao: 1.79 ANG PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP holds PPP rejected PPP rejected 
Dominica: 2.70 XCD PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected PPP rejected 
Saint Kitts & Nevis: 
 2.70 XCD 
PPP rejected PPP holds PPP rejected PPP holds PPP holds PPP holds 
St. Lucia: 2.70 XCD PPP rejected PPP holds PPP holds PPP rejected PPP holds PPP holds 
Notes. 
a The exchange rates for 1 US $: the AWG is the Aruban guilder, BSD is the Bahamian dollar, BBD is the Barbadian dollar, ANG is the 
Netherlands Antillean guilder, XCD is the Eastern Caribbean dollar. The islands of Dominica, Saint Kitts & Nevis, and Saint Lucia are part of 
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU). 





The aim of this chapter was to test whether the absolute and relative PPP hold for selected 
Caribbean micro-islands.  The PPP hypothesis is important in the economic literature, as the 
exchange rate alignments are based on this hypothesis.  In the case of the Caribbean micro-
islands, their high transportation costs may cause the PPP to fail.  In addition, sticky prices in 
Curaçao may be a source for deviation from the PPP.  Due to the lack of certainty on these 
issues, the PPP hypothesis was tested for this group. 
In all of the selected Caribbean micro-islands—Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Curaçao, 
Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia—the absolute PPP hypothesis was rejected.  
The relative PPP hypothesis was tested for the same ple using linear and nonlinear 
specifications for the deviations from the PPP.  The nonlinear specification was applied in cases 
of arbitrage costs.  Hence, the nonlinear specification was preferred, as the Caribbean micro-
islands have high transportation costs.  Despite these high costs, the relative PPP hypothesis 
holds for the majority (five) of the selected (seven) Caribbean micro-islands.  These results 
include Curaçao, the economy with sticky prices.  In addition, in contrast to the commonly 
applied nonlinear specification in the literature, a linear specification applies to Saint Lucia, an 
island with high transportation costs.  Ultimately, the relative PPP did not hold for Barbados or 
Dominica.  
The rejection of the PPP for these islands was associated with the depreciation of the 
pound sterling in 1992, which represented an external shock to their RERs.  These islands were 
greatly affected by this shock due to their large share of their exports to the United Kingdom—
the export of bananas from Dominica and tourism to Barbados.  As the relative PPP held for the 




led to the rejection of the PPP hypothesis in the sel cted Caribbean micro-islands.  Accordingly, 
the nonlinear TAR and ESTAR models and linear co-integration were applied to these micro-
islands.  
The finding that the PPP holds for Curaçao is important, as it implies that sticky prices in 
Curaçao have no impact on its long-run prices.  Hence, the PPP holds despite the sticky prices in 
Curaçao.  Another important finding was that in contrast to what has commonly been reported in 
earlier literature, in the presence of arbitrage costs, the deviation from the PPP is not necessarily 
represented by a nonlinear approach; rather, a linear specification also applies.  Hence, the 
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Appendix 6: From a Symmetric to an Asymmetric Representation 
This appendix shows the derivation of the asymmetric TAR representation from the 
symmetric adjustment of the ESTAR model presented in Sarno and Taylor (2002).  A general 
STAR model is as follows: 
9o  –  μ;  =∑ a½> Ïo % − μ Ð+ K∑ a∗½> Ïo % − μ ÐLΦ9; o %k − μ;+ εt.     (6A.1) 
Here, {o   is a stationary ergodic process, and ¼  ∼ dd(0, Ó?.  The transition 
function Φ9; o %k − μ; determines the smooth transition between the two regimes (one below 
and one above the equilibrium), and the parameter  determines the speed of mean reversion.  
The parameter μ  is the equilibrium value of {o  .  The exponential function is a simple form of 
the transition function, as follows: 
 Φ9; o %k − μ; = 1 − exp (?9o  –  μ;?.       (6A.2) 
In Equation (6A.2), STAR becomes an exponential STAR (ESTAR).  The transition 
function Φ ∶ ℜ →[0,1] is symmetrically inverse and bell shaped around zero.  This means that 
there is a smooth, symmetric transition of the RER between the positive and negative deviations 
from the equilibrium value.  The lower  means lower speed of adjustment.  Sarno and Taylor 
(2002) use the terminology of inner and outer regimes.  The inner regime is when o  =  μ, and 
Φ = 0.  Equation (6A.1) is therefore a linear AR(p) model: 
9o  –  μ;  =∑ a½> Ïo % − μ Ð+ εt.         (6A.3) 
In the outer regime, for a given  equal to lim9´YÖ – ×;→±Ú Φ9; o %k − μ;, Equation (6A.1) becomes 
a linear AR(p) model, but it is different from Equation (6A.3):  




For a∗ ≠ 0, there are two different speeds of mean reversion (Equations (6A.3) and 






Caribbean micro-islands have population sizes of less than half million inhabitants, 
resulting in commodity markets with a small size that is “economically disadvantageous” 
(Briguglio, 1995, p. 1616).  The two main disadvantages facing the Caribbean micro-islands due 
to their smallness and their insularity are high transportation costs and a lack of comparative 
advantage among these islands.  
In contrast to large economies, Caribbean micro-islands are price takers in the world 
market, and their domestic prices are presumed to fluctuate in line with world prices.  Briguglio 
(1995) formulated this as follows: “SIDS have negligible control on the prices of products they 
import and export” (p. 1616).  As a result, the domestic prices of SIDS are assumed to be 
flexible, as they are likely to adjust in line with world market price changes.  However, prices are 
sticky on the Caribbean micro-island of Curaçao, implying that the commodity markets are in a 
state of disequilibrium, as they are not equal to the prices that would represent demand and 
supply.  Consequently, this may result in misallocati n of resources and the redistribution of 
income.  Moreover, sticky prices on a micro-island challenge the hypothesis that small 
economies have flexible prices, and at the same tim, it raises a question concerning the causes 
of price rigidity on a micro-island.  This dissertation focused on explaining sticky prices on the 
micro-island of Curaçao. 
The benchmark for sticky prices in this dissertation was when the price change frequency 
was lower than 22% of months.  Curaçao, with its mean price change frequency of 9% of 
months, has sticky prices.  The mean price change frequency of 9% of months is equivalent to 




short run.  Moreover, the stylized facts of the CPI micro-data showed price asymmetry, as price 
adjustments in commodity markets of Curaçao are sticky downward, meaning that prices are 
resistant to drop.  Sticky downward prices are not consistent with the price stickiness caused by a 
kinked demand in an oligopolistic market, as in this t eory, the competitive firms are reacting to 
price declines only.  Hence, the kinked demand hypothesis is not applicable to Curaçao.   
The determinants of price rigidity are presented in the price-rigidity theories.  They are 
broadly categorized into state-dependent and the tim -dependent pricing.  In SDP hypotheses, 
the firms’ decisions to change the price depend on the state of the economy, while in TDP 
hypotheses, the decisions to change the price occur independently of the state of the economy, 
and prices are changed periodically or at random.  The price-rigidity theories were developed in 
large economies; hence, not all of these hypotheses are applicable to the micro-island of 
Curaçao.  The state-dependent hypothesis that is likely to apply for Curaçao is attractive pricing, 
as 60% of the prices have a 5 or 9 digit-ending.  According to the attractive pricing theory, firms 
set prices ending with 5 or 9 and hold these prices fix d until they can be changed to new 
attractive prices.  However, the panel analysis of the micro-CPI data excluding energy prices, 
rental fees, insurance, and tariffs on postal servic s n the period of 2006–2010 rejected the 
hypothesis of attractive prices as a cause of sticky prices in Curaçao.  Price regulation, a time-
dependent hypothesis, states that regulated prices lead to sticky prices.  Using the same panel 
analysis, the hypothesis of price regulation was also rejected. 
The TDP hypotheses of seasonality and political interference, in contrast, supported 
sticky prices in Curaçao.  The seasonality in the post-holiday season of the months of January in 
the category of clothing and footwear and February for all categories, as well as the political 




The price stickiness in the months of January and February was probably related to the slow 
months after the Christmas season.  The TDP hypothesis of political business cycle states that in 
the pre-election periods, policymakers are shy away from making any decision that may 
jeopardize their re-election.  Policymakers postponed i creasing energy prices following 
international price increases, but the occasional international energy price declines led to an 
immediate adjustment of domestic energy prices.  A case of regulatory capture was the 
introduction of the Energy Fund in Curaçao, the outc me of interest groups’ pressure on 
policymaker/regulators to keep the energy prices fixed. 
In the panel analysis, energy prices were excluded; thus, the price rigidity of the energy 
prices was not analyzed.  In addition, using the ABC model, price rigidity for a segment of the 
energy market—the gasoline retail market—was analyzed.  The ABC model was used to test the 
state-dependent hypotheses of menu costs and inattentive producers, as well as the time-
dependent hypotheses of political interference, regulatory capture, price regulation, and the 
political business cycle in the gasoline market.  The hypotheses of political interference in the 
periods of pre-election and the regulatory capture of the Energy Fund and price regulation were 
supported for the period of 19902012.  In contrast, the state-dependent hypothesis of menu 
costs and the hypothesis of inattentive producers wre both rejected in the gasoline retail market 
in Curaçao. 
Generally, consumers around the globe have been complaining about price asymmetric 
behavior of the producers in the gasoline markets.  Price asymmetry in the gasoline retail market 
is caused by rockets and feathers (Bacon, 1991) or inve se rockets and feathers (Bacon and 
Kojima, 2010).  The inverse rockets and feathers was confirmed in the period of 1990–2012 in 




international gasoline market were more likely to be immediately passed on through domestic 
prices than were common price increases.  This may be ascribed to the political interference in 
the gasoline price setting in pre-election periods, when gasoline price increases were postponed 
despite the increase in the international gasoline prices, while the international gasoline price 
declines were passed through in the domestic gasoline pr ces.  
Considering the fact that prices in Curaçao are sticky in the short run, it is interesting to 
know its impact on the long-run path of prices.  For the long-run domestic price adjustments, the 
relative PPP hypothesis is used.  Besides sticky prices, the high transportation costs on micro-
islands may lead to deviation from the PPP.  The relativ  PPP was tested with a sample 
consisting of selected Caribbean micro-islands.  The relative PPP was rejected for two islands—
Barbados and Dominica—out of the seven selected Caribbean micro-islands of Aruba, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, Curaçao, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia.  The rejection 
of the relative PPP was due to the depreciation of their exchange rate.  The results of the relative 
PPP hypothesis revealed that the sticky domestic prices and the high transportation costs in 
Curaçao did not lead to a rejection of this hypothesis.  For the deviations from the PPP in 
Curaçao a nonlinear specification is applicable.  A nonlinear specification is advised when there 
are transaction costs between the trading countries, which in this case entail the high 
transportation costs of micro-islands.  The results of the PPP in the case of Saint Lucia revealed 
that having high transportation costs does not necessarily imply a nonlinear specification of the 
deviations from the PPP as proposed in the literature (Sarno, 2003, 2005).  More specifically, the 
deviations from the PPP in Saint Lucia are presented by a linear specification.  
Undoubtedly, more research is needed in field of sticky prices on micro-islands, which is 




the cost of economic distortion due to price asymmetry are interesting areas left for future 
research.  Another important element that was not dealt with is the fact that the longstanding 
hypothesis of price flexibility in small economies conflicts with the finding of sticky prices in 
Curaçao.  Hence, this theory needs fine tuning.  In addition, other unexplored areas of research 
include price rigidity caused by the implicit contracts between the customer and the seller (Okun, 
1981), fair pricing, concentration ratios, and tacit collusion.  For research in these areas, more 
information is necessary.  This brings up the topic of the incomplete or lack of data on the micro-
islands.  Immediate attention is needed to rectify this lack of data, as this leads to sample 
selection bias, which may result in incorrect interpr tation of results and inadequate policy 
formulation for micro-islands. 
Finally, sticky prices on micro-islands have not been previously discussed in the 
literature, and this topic is therefore a valuable addition to the existing research.  Conceptually, 
sticky prices on a micro-island are a contradiction.  Moreover, based on the available literature, 
sticky prices in Curaçao appears to be is a novelty.  I propose the term “mañana” to designate the 
phenomenon of postponing price changes which causes sticky prices in Curaçao.  Mañana 
literally means tomorrow and is an expression that is often used to refer to (the time lag involved 
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This dissertation focused on explaining the price rgidity on a Caribbean micro-island.  
After an introductory description of price rigidity, a review the Caribbean micro-islands was 
presented in Chapter 2.  These are small island developing states (SIDS), each with a population 
of less than half a million.  The SIDS were recognized by the United Nations (UN) in 1992, as a 
distinct group of countries that share common development challenges.  The common 
characteristic of smallness among SIDS implies small commodity markets with higher per unit 
costs of production than those of larger countries.  In addition, because micro-islands are insular 
and small, their transportation costs are higher than t ose of larger countries.  Consequently, a 
higher price level is expected on micro-islands.  
Consistent with the “price-flexibility” hypothesis that assumes that prices in small 
economies (including micro-islands) are flexible, theprice changes on micro-islands are 
expected to adjust in line with international price changes.  Sticky prices on a micro-island, 
therefore, contradict the long-standing price-flexibility hypothesis, which is probably one of the 
reasons why a theory on this concept has not been considered.  The empirical observation of 
sticky prices in Curaçao, therefore, raises the question of why prices adjust slowly on this 
Caribbean micro-island.  This puzzle was the initial motive for pursuing this research.  To the 
best of my knowledge, price rigidity on a micro-island is a topic that has not been previously 
considered in the literature.  
The omission of this topic in the literature may be related to the fact that only recently, in 
2011, were the first results on price frequency adjustments of micro-islands published by the 
Caribbean Centre for Money and Finance.  The price f equency adjustment and the sizes of price 




islands, only 3 reported their price adjustments.  Barbados reported on the period of 19942008, 
Saint Lucia on 19842008, and Curaçao on 20062010.  The price change frequencies reported 
were 50–80%, 98%, and 9%, respectively.  A clear-cut benchmark to distinguish sticky from 
flexible prices is lacking in the literature.  In this dissertation, the benchmark for frequency of 
price adjustment of less than 22% was considered sticky.  Hence, the prices in Barbados and in 
Saint Lucia were flexible, while they were sticky in Curaçao.  
As only these three micro-islands reported their price frequency adjustments, it remains 
unclear whether Curaçao is an exception in the group of micro-islands or whether there are other 
micro-islands with sticky prices.  Even so, this posibly unique case of price stickiness on a 
micro-island requires an explanation.  Hence, this dis ertation explained the price rigidity in 
Curaçao by applying selected New Keynesian price rigidit es’ theories and the theories of 
political science.  
New Keynesian price rigidity theories assume that mrkets do not clear and prices adjust 
sluggishly.  There are many reasons stated in the various theories/hypotheses for why prices do 
not adjust instantaneously, including the state-dependent hypotheses of menu costs (Barro, 
1972), attractive pricing (Levy et al., 2011), coordination failure (Blinder, 1994, 1998), and 
information delays (Reis, 2006), and the time-dependent hypotheses (Calvo, 1983; Taylor, 1980), 
implicit contracts, hypotheses of kinked demand, fair pricing, and tacit collusion.  It is important 
to notice that these theories were developed in relativ  large markets and for a micro-island, a 
different approach may be required.  
I also proposed a political angle to explain the price igidity in Curaçao, namely the 
hypothesis of political interference in price setting, which states that the political intervention in 




political business cycle and price regulation in the price setting.  Regulatory capture in price 
setting occurred in the period following the energy price hikes in 2005, when interest groups 
pressured policymakers to maintain the regulated enrgy prices fixed in times of price hikes.  
The political business cycle in price setting occurred when the incumbent policymakers 
abstained from raising the regulated energy prices in periods of pre-election, as this would 
jeopardize their chances of re-election.  
I employed several methods to find out more about the frequencies and size of price 
adjustments in Curaçao.  The methods applied in this dissertation were a descriptive analysis, a 
panel analysis, the autoregressive binomial conditional (ABC) models, linear co-integration, the 
nonlinear threshold autoregressive (TAR) models, and the exponential smooth transition 
autoregressive (ESTAR) models. 
The descriptive analysis applied in Chapter 1 examines the theories of price rigidities 
from the perspective of the micro-island of Curaçao.  The descriptive analysis was applied to 
investigate whether the price-rigidity theories may fit in the small commodity markets of 
Curaçao.  The state-dependent hypotheses of menu costs, a price plan, and the staggered pricing 
hypothesis of coordination failure are not likely to occur in Curaçao.  Menu costs, which are the 
cost of changing prices, are small and most likely n gligible in Curaçao.  The price plan, which 
is a plan of current and future prices, are not used in Curaçao.  Coordination failure is not likely 
either as small island firms are more likely to cooperate.  
Alternatively, the hypotheses of implicit contracts, fair pricing, tacit collusion, and 
attractive pricing are more likely to apply in Curaçao.  Implicit contracts are based on informal 
business relationships, which are not uncommon in small communities.  According to the fair 




causing prices to remain unchanged.  This hypothesis may apply, for example, in times of a 
hurricane warning when hurricane-proof building materials are in demand.  Under such 
circumstances, price increases of these goods are considered unfair; consequently, prices will be 
kept unchanged and remain sticky.  Tacit collusion is when firms tacitly cooperate in the price 
setting and/or the output level determination.  As a result, prices may be sticky.  As tacit 
collusion has been reported in the trade and construction sectors of Curaçao, it may be a source 
of price rigidity. 
Chapter 3 analyzed the stylized facts of the CPI micro-data (excluding rental fees) of 
Curaçao in the period of 2006–2010.  The data show t at Curaçao has asymmetric, sticky 
downward prices.  This finding is inconsistent with the kinked demand curve theory.  In the 
kinked demand curve theory, oligopolistic firms cooperate only in price decreases, as opposed to 
the micro-data in Curaçao, where price increases were mostly reported.  Other stylized facts are 
as follows: Price change frequencies varied from low t  high across the sectors or were 
heterogeneous. Moreover, the duration of price spells, the period wherein prices remained 
unchanged, had an average duration of 10 months.  In addition, in contrast to the asymmetrical 
price change frequencies, the sizes of price changes are almost symmetrical. 
Chapter 4 used panel analyses to explain the price change frequencies and sizes in the 
period of 2006–2010.  The price-rigidity hypotheses applied were attractive pricing, seasonality, 
and the political interference hypotheses (price regulation, regulatory capture, and political 
business cycle).  The applicability of these hypotheses to Curaçao was tested. 
Two panels of data were used, namely a panel of product categories (e.g., food, housing) 
and a second panel of types of commodities (e.g., non-durables, services).  In addition to rental 




services.  These excluded data were index data instead of prices.  The reason for this exclusion 
was that the test of attractive pricing requires the last two digits of each price.  The results 
showed that the attractive pricing hypothesis of 5 and 9 endings causing sticky prices was 
rejected in both panels.  Alternatively, depending o  the panel, seasonality in the months of 
January and February and political interference caused price rigidity in Curaçao. 
The energy sector (including the gasoline retail market) was not included in the panel 
analysis.  The hypotheses of price regulation, regulatory capture, and the political business cycle 
were tested in Chapter 5 to determine whether they explain the sticky prices in the gasoline retail 
market.  Micro-islands are dependent on oil as a main source of energy, which needs to be 
imported, as most of these countries lack natural resources.  Similar to other countries, gasoline 
is an important combustible on micro-islands.  As a consequence, governments on micro-islands 
tend to intervene in gasoline prices when internatio al oil prices soar.  In the small, close-knit 
community of Curaçao, interest groups pressured the gov rnment in the period following the 
international oil price hikes in 2005 to maintain the energy prices.  Apparently, the regulatory 
authority cooperated with the government and kept the energy prices fixed, revealing a case of 
regulatory capture.  This resulted in the introduction of an “Energy Fund” to subsidize the energy 
prices during 20062007 period.  
In pre-election periods, policymakers appeared to forestall “unpopular” decisions 
concerning gasoline price increases, representing a clear example of the workings of a political 
business cycle.  Accordingly, gasoline price increases were postponed.  Chapter 5 applied the 
ABC models to the gasoline retail sector in Curaçao in the period of 19902012.  The alternative 
theories of menu costs, the inattentive producer and the political interference hypothesis are 




political interference was confirmed in most of theABC models.  The political interference in 
price-setting resulted in price rigidity.  The hypotheses of menu costs and inattentive producers 
were rejected in the case of the gasoline retail market of Curaçao. 
Similar to most countries, the gasoline prices in Curaçao are asymmetric.  In contrast to 
most countries, the data of Curaçao show that the gasoline price declines were more likely to be 
passed through after occasional international gasoline price declines than after common 
international gasoline price increases.  
Overall, prices were sticky for on average 10 months, us prices are sticky in the short 
run.  The impact of sticky prices on the long run prices is tested through the relative PPP.  In 
Chapter 6, the relative PPP theory hypothesis assume  a long-run relationship between the 
adjustments in the domestic prices, the prices changes of the trading partner, and the exchange 
rate changes.  The United States is the main trading partner of most of the Caribbean micro-
islands, which have their currencies pegged to the US dollar.  Hence, the relative PPP is about 
the long-run bilateral relations between the domestic prices and the US prices. 
Besides sticky prices, the PPP may also fail due to high transportation costs, which is a 
common characteristic of the Caribbean micro-islands.  To test the relative PPP, two approaches 
were applied, namely the linear approach of co-integration, the nonlinear TAR models (TAR), 
and the ESTAR models.  The nonlinear approach (TAR or ESTAR) is recommendable, 
particularly when there are arbitrage costs, as in the case of high transportation costs in 
Caribbean micro-islands.  
The test of the relative PPP hypothesis was used on a sample of selected Caribbean 
micro-islands based on data availability.  The sample consisted of the islands of Aruba, the 




19902012.  The results showed that the sticky domestic prices and high transportation costs of 
Curaçao did not lead to a rejection of the PPP hypothesis, and that the deviations of the PPP were 
estimated by an ESTAR model.  The high transportatin costs, which are a common 
characteristic of micro-islands, did not result in he overall rejection of the PPP hypothesis on the 
Caribbean micro-islands either, as the PPP hypothesis was rejected for only two out of seven 
islands.  Remarkably, despite the high transportatin costs of the micro-island of Saint Lucia, a 
linear specification was applicable to this island.  This shows that the use of the nonlinear 
approach, which is often proposed when arbitrage costs are present, is not always necessary. 
 To summarize, this dissertation provided evidence of sticky prices on a Caribbean micro-
island of Curaçao.  Prices were found to be sticky n the short-run.  SDP and TDP were tested to 
explain this price stickiness.  The state-dependent price hypothesis of attractive prices was 
rejected as a source of price stickiness.  TDP by political interference (the political business 
cycle, regulatory capture, and price regulation) and seasonality explain the price rigidity in 
Curaçao.  Contrary to expectations, the sticky prices in Curaçao did not have an impact on the 
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